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 The study‘s main purpose is to propose a governance framework that meets the 
priority of sustainable development for the regulation of offshore renewable resources in 
the OECS region. The study develops an analytical framework for evaluating the recently 
adopted ―Round 3 model of governance‖ for the regulation of offshore wind and other 
marine activities in the United Kingdom. The focus is on the licensing procedures 
applicable to offshore wind development. Thereafter, the study examines the 
appropriateness of the application of the Round 3 model to the regulation of marine 
renewables in the OECS, and makes recommendations in that regard.  
 Additionally, through the study of marine renewable resource development, this 
thesis looks at general conditions for effective ocean governance. In this regard, the thesis 
argues that strict hierarchical governance of the marine environment is not a desirable 
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1.1  Background Information 
 
 The fancy of the Caribbean lies in the shameless promise of heaven on earth 
offered by pristine sandy beaches and exciting marine adventures, all wrapped in the 
seclusion and tranquility of untouched charm. For many of these low-lying paradises, 
particularly in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) region,
1
 the tourism 
industry alone relies heavily on the natural beauty of coastal environments and the 
ecosystem biodiversity characteristic of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. 
Together, this package provides the primary means for economic sustenance and survival 
for many OECS states. Beyond tourism however, these bodies of water service many 
other competing interests and uses. The ocean spaces have long been the epicenter for 
many environmental, social, cultural and economic benefits which range from oil and gas 
exploration to aquaculture, fishing, boat racing, leisure, down to navigation, shipping and 
trade. The coastal and marine ecosystems therefore, have always been especially 
vulnerable to human interventions and their escalating demands for the sustenance of 
modern standards of living. While the region has made substantial efforts to balance the 
                                                        
1 The OECS is a sub-regional economic union created in 1981 by the Treaty of Basseterre (See, Treaty of 
Bassettere, Bassettere, 18 June 1981, online: The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
<http://www.oecs.org>.) Today, its membership comprises the countries of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. The Mission of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States is to be a Center of 
Excellence contributing to the sustainable development of OECS Member States by supporting their 
strategic insertion into the global economy while maximizing the benefits accruing from their collective 
space. 
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interests of the marine environment against modern standards of living, the impacts of 
climate change threaten to distort this equilibrium. 
 Most energy supplies come from the burning of fossil fuels. Combustion releases 
large amounts of pollutants into the atmosphere, particularly carbon emissions that cause 
global warming.
2
 However, for quite some time, there has been a denial of any 
correlation between fossil fuel use and global warming.
3
 Recently, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has settled the science on the matter, at least for the 
time being that is. They note that: ―[g]lobal atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human 
activities since 1750. […] The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due 
primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide 
are due to agriculture.‖
4
 However, there are still some who doubt the findings of the 
IPCC. While there are still skeptics, the numbers are low and the IPCC appears to be the 
most comprehensive and credible source of information on climate change.
5
 Climate 
change is real and is happening. Global average increases in air and ocean temperatures 
                                                        
2 Susan Soloman et al, Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 2 [Soloman, ―Summary for 
Policymakers‖]. 
3 See e.g. Dr. Edward F. Blick, Global Warming Myth and Marxism: How the U.N. and Marxist Economies 
Have Used the Global Warming Myth to Wreck World Economies, (USA: Southwest Radio Church of the 
Air, 2009) [Blick, ―Global Warming Myth‖].    
4 Soloman, ―Summary for Policymakers‖, supra note 2. 
5 The IPCC was formed by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environmental 
Programme in 1988 to further understandings of global climate change. Since its formation, the IPCC has 
published four comprehensive assessments on global climate change in addition to several ancillary special 
reports. By way of example, the IPCC‘s Fourth Assessment Report drew together 450 scientists from all 
over the world. In drafting the Report, 800 contributing authors gave specialized inputs while 
approximately 2500 experts reviewed the document providing a total of 90,000 comments. The reports are 
used worldwide, most notably by state parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its Kyoto Protocol, as a credible and comprehensive source of information on climate change, 
its potential impacts, and options to adapt to or mitigate climate change. See generally, Rajendra Pachauri, 
―A Mistake about Glaciers does not Negative Climate Change‖ The Sydney Morning Herald (30 March 
2010), online: <http://www.smh.com.au> [Pachauri, ―Climate Change‖].     
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pose immediate threats to the integrity of the environment.
6
 The IPCC has predicted that 







 and coastal systems and low-lying areas.
10
 Specifically, small island states, 
such as those that constitute the OECS, are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change and sea-level rise due to their limited size, proneness to natural hazards and 
external shocks, and low adaptive capacity.
11
 Some of the immediate threats of global 
warming that impact the overall tourism product and the environmental sustainability of 
OECS countries include for instance, the destruction of marine ecosystems through ocean 
acidification and coral bleaching, and the demolition of coastal barriers. These impacts 
reduce the amenity value for coastal users and tourists.
12
 Such irreversible catastrophes 
inherently shock other economic activities such as the fishing industry and disrupt socio-
cultural norms of coastal populations. The effects of global warming are never-ending, 
irreversible and cannot be ignored.
13
 To avoid dangerous atmospheric temperatures, the 
IPPC has recommended long-term stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
                                                        
6 Soloman, ―Summary for Policymakers‖, supra note 2 at 5. 
7 Martin L. Parry et al., Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge Printing Press, 2007) at 11 [Parry, ―Summary for 
Policymakers‖]. 
8 Ibid. Ecosystems will be affected by flooding, drought, wildfire, insects and ocean acidification impacts 
perpetuated by climate change. 
9 Ibid. While extreme weather affects the ability of natural resources to regenerate, rising temperatures 
themselves will have a massive impact and the ability to continue growth of foods associated with 
particular climates.  
10 Ibid. at 12. Coasts are projected to be exposed to increasing risks, including coastal erosion, due to 
climate change and sea-level rise. The effect will be exacerbated by increasing human-induced pressures on 
coastal areas.   
11 See, Nobuao Mimura et al., ―Small Islands‖ in Martin Parry et al., Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 687 – 716 at 689 [Mimura et al., ―Small Islands‖].  
12 Ibid.  
13
 See, A.R.H. Goodwin, “The Future of Oil and Gas Fossil Fuels” in Trevor M Letcher, Future Energy: 
Improved, Sustainable and Clean Options for our Planet (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008) at 19 ¶ 5. [Goodwin, 
―Future of Fossil Fuels‖]. 
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atmosphere. To do this, a portfolio of adaptation and mitigation measures must be 
immediately
14
 deployed to reduce the pernicious effects of climate change.
15
 
 Internationally, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
16
 
and its Kyoto Protocol
17
 recognizes the need for urgent and massive reductions in carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions in order to counter the effects of climate change. Specified 
parties to these treaties are legally bound to mitigate climate change by limiting 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGes).
18
 There are two options available 
for effective emission reduction: (1) development of processes that make fossil fuel 
production cleaner and more sustainable;
19
 and (2) development of renewable forms of 
energy. Though option one reduces CO2 emissions, it continues business as usual 
practices, that is, the combustion of fossil fuels, which contribute to natural resource 
depletion. While it is accepted that a ‗portfolio of diverse adaptation and mitigation 
actions‘
20
 are necessary to combat climate change, renewable energy is the only initiative 
that delivers permanent GHG emission reductions. It is well accepted that our energy 
                                                        
14 See generally, Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at xv. Here, Lord Stern argues that ―there is still time to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change, if we act now and internationally.‖  
15 Parry, ―Summary for Policymakers, supra note 7 at 20. 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf> 
[UNFCC]. 
17 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 
2303 U.N.T.S. 148, online: United Nations Treaty Series <http://treaties.un.org> [Kyoto Protocol]. 
18 See, UNFCCC, supra note 16 at 6 ¶ 2(a). For a list of Annex I countries bound by this obligation see 
page 23 of Convention. 
19 See, Godfrey Boyle, Bob Everette & Janet Ramage, Energy Systems and Sustainability: Power for a 
Sustainable Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 573 ¶ 14.1 [Boyle, ―Energy Systems and 
Sustainability‖].  Here, the authors outline three approaches for reducing the impacts of fossil fuels: 1. 
Improve energy conversion efficiency of fuel-based energy supply system, so that less fuel is required to 
achieve a given level of energy output. 2. Switching to lower-carbon fuels with a lower carbon content. 3. 
The use of energy conversion devices that can extract useful energy from fossil fuels directly, thus, 
avoiding combustion and its associated impacts.   
20 See generally, Richard J.T. Klein et al., ―Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation‖ in Martin 
Parry et al., Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2007 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 744-777 [Klein et al. 
―Adaptation and Mitigation‖]. 
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future needs alternative sources of energy, ―…which when consumed, are free of 
environmental impact.‖
21
 Renewable energy resources impose the least regrettable 
impacts on the environment, human health and the economy. Apart from the contribution 
to GHG emission reductions, there are several other benefits to be had from renewable 
energy generation. For one, the use of renewable energy ensures a more sustainable use 
of finite sources of energy. As well, the development and use of renewable forms of 
energy could potentially create employment and economic development opportunities. 
Additionally, renewable energy provides a hedge against volatile energy prices. This is 
particularly important for OECS countries that are dependent on imported fossil fuels to 
meet their energy demands. Together, these benefits explain why OECS countries are 
interested in renewables in the absence of obligations to mitigate under the climate 
regime. 
 Additionally, although the international climate change regime does not legally 
bind countries in the OECS to pursue climate change mitigation, primarily, in the interest 
of securing their own physical and economic existence,
22
 the countries have set out to 
replace, or supplement, their electricity generation with clean, indigenous and renewable 
forms of energy. Statistically, the countries in the Caribbean are negligible contributors to 
global carbon emissions. Despite this fact, the understanding that climate change is a 
global issue and that a concerted effort is needed to address it, has also influenced 
Caribbean states to rethink their energy generation practices.
 23
 In addition to climate 
change, the issues of energy security, energy poverty, and the opportunity to ensure a 
                                                        
21 Goodwin, ―Future of Fossil Fuels‖, supra note 13 at 19 ¶ 5. 
22 See, OECS Secretariat, Media Release 18/09, ―Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat 
Statement for Earth Day 2009‖ (22 April, 2009), online: <http://www.caricom.org>. 
23 See, Senator Conrad Enil, ―Welcome Remarks‖ (Speech delivered at the Caribbean Preparatory Meeting 
on the Establishment of a Caribbean Renewable Energy Centre, 10th March 2010) [unpublished]. 
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more sustainable use of finite sources of energy are also propelling the paradigm shift in 
the energy sector towards renewable energy.
24
 As well, other factors driving the 
development and use of renewable energy include the potential for the creation of 
employment and economic development opportunities.  
 At present, the region has utilized quite a few forms of onshore renewable energy: 
wind power, hydropower, geothermal and solar energy.
25
 However, the current amounts 
of electricity generated from these sources are nowhere near the region‘s potential
26
 and 
do not meet the demand. Over the past two decades however, there has been substantial 
international interest in the advancement of offshore renewable energy sources (wave, 
tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion and offshore wind). The growing international 
interest
27
 in the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of marine renewables has 
recently influenced the renewable energy agenda at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable 
Energy Forum held in Montego Bay, Jamaica.
28
 Drivers for integrating marine 
renewables into the Caribbean energy mix include: reduction in GHG emissions, energy 
security, job creation opportunities, and opportunities for saving foreign exchange by 
                                                        
24 See, Andrew Thorington, ―Editorial‖ Industry Journal 8 (January 2010) at 1, online: Caribbean Electric 
Utility Service Corporation <http://www.carilec.com/publications/IJJAN2010%20.pdf>. [Thorington, 
―Editorial‖]. 
25 See, Thomas M. Scheutzlich, ―Existing and Future Opportunities for Investment in Caribbean 
Renewables‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, October 
2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com> [Scheutzlich, ―Existing and 
Future Opportunities‖]. 
26 See, Caribbean Council for Science and Technology, Renewable Energy In the Caribbean; Where we 
are; Where we should be, (LC/CAR/G.565/CCST/99/1/)(4 June 1999)[unpublished] at 2, online: Economic 
Commission for Latin America <http://www.eclac.org> [Caribbean Council for Science and Technology, 
―Renewable Energy In the Caribbean‖].   
27 For instance, tidal energy in Nova Scotia, Canada is at the demonstration stage. So too is wave power in 
Portugal and offshore wind in Denmark and the United Kingdom. 
28
 See generally, Michael Murphy, ―Tapping into the Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖ (slide show 
presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 16 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF 
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>. [Murphy, ―Ocean Energy Potential‖]. 
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reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.
29
 While conceptually attractive, the use of 
marine renewables in the Caribbean region is largely unexplored and untapped. These 
renewables are yet to be subject to rigorous feasibility assessments. In fact, marine 
renewables progress in the region can be described as items for discussion on renewable 
energy agendas. In the context of energy security, volatile energy prices and the 
increasing burden of climate change, regulators and policy makers in the region believe 
that now is the time to move beyond the identification and investigation stage of 




1.2  Description of the Problem 
 
 Several obstacles stand in the way of renewable energy deployment in the 
Caribbean. These obstacles include: lack of baseline data on resource potential, limited 
technological awareness, inadequate financing, limited capacity and inadequate policy, 
regulatory and legislative frameworks to encourage renewable energy development.
31
 For 
the most part, discussions in the region on barriers to renewable energy deployment have 
focused on inadequate financing.
32
 However, World Bank economists believe that the 
challenges to project development in the region seem more political, regulatory, legal and 
institutional rather than financial.
33
  
                                                        
29 Ibid. 
30 Thorington, ―Editorial‖, supra note 24. 
31 See, Joseph Williams, ―A Strategic Regional Approach to Sustainable Energy: Challenges, Solutions & 
Role of CARICOM‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 
2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>, [Williams, ―A Strategic 
Regional Approach‖]. 
32 See, David Ehrhardt, ―Promoting Efficient Renewable Energy Generation in the Caribbean: Jamaica‘s 
Renewables Tender and Possible Alternatives‖ (slide show presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy 
Forum, 15 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>. 
33 See, Fanz Gerner, ―Towards a Regional Caribbean Energy Market‖ (slide show presented to the 
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 Already, the coastal and marine environments in the region serve a wide variety 
of highly competitive uses. The more services that are expected and demanded from the 
ocean, the greater the opportunity is for unsustainable exploitation and conflict over 
ocean space use. For quite some time therefore, there has been a growing interest in the 
management of the uses of ocean space and the associated impacts.
34
 In the context of 
this study, when new values, expectations and services, such as the generation of 
renewable energy, are being demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear mandate 
to guide their deployment: develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist, and 
revise existing arrangements where they do exist.
35
 Developing and/or revising ocean 
governance regimes for marine renewables is particularly important to optimize the 
management of coastal and marine resources as well as to protect the ocean environment 
from damage to its long-term viability. At present, there is no marine licensing regime for 
the regulation of renewable energy generation activities in the coastal and marine 
environments of countries in the OECS region. 
 
1.3  Statement of the Problem 
 
 In moving towards the deployment of marine renewables in the OECS, one of the 
greatest challenges facing ocean governance regimes is the wide array of marine 
activities that marine licences must regulate. Any ocean governance arrangement that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 2009)[unpublished] online: CREF 
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>, [Gerner, ―Towards a Regional Caribbean Energy Market‖]. 
34 See, Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management - The Evolution of Ocean 
Governance (London: Routledge, 1996) at 1. [Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖]. 
35
 See David Leary and Miguel Esteban, ―Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides: A Viable 
Renewable Energy Resource in search of a Suitable Regulatory Framework‖ (2009) 3(4) Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 417 at 424-425. [Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Oceans and Tides‖]. 
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attempts to regulate activities in coastal and marine environments must take into account 
the needs of all the stakeholders under its jurisdiction, while simultaneously, providing 
appropriate terms and conditions to protect the offshore environment from damage to its 
long-term viability. In this regard, the absence of a regulatory framework on the regional 
and national levels in the OECS region is now a discernible obstacle to the development 
of renewable forms of energy from the ocean. 
 
1.4  Purpose of the Study 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to propose a governance framework that meets 
the priority of sustainable development for the regulation of offshore renewable resources 
in the OECS region. In furtherance of this mandate, the study develops an analytical 
framework for evaluating the recently adopted Round 3 model of governance for the 
regulation of offshore wind and other marine activities in the United Kingdom. The focus 
on this Round 3 model of governance is in relation to the licensing procedures applicable 
to offshore wind development. Thereafter, the study examines the appropriateness of the 
application of the Round 3 model of governance to the regulation of marine renewables 
in the OECS, and recommends policy and governance frameworks in that regard.  
 However, while the main purpose of the study is to propose a governance 
framework for the regulation of renewables in the OECS, the study seeks to achieve a 
wider purpose. Ancillary, therefore, but none the less important, through the process of 
achieving the main purpose, the study also seeks to come to general conclusions on 





1.5  Limitations to the Study 
 
 Governance arrangements have been proposed and established for the regulation 
of several different types of marine renewables in different jurisdictions around the 
world. For instance, Nova Scotia has instituted a provisional governance arrangement for 
the regulation of tidal energy. Similarly, Portugal has also instituted a provisional 
governance framework for the regulation of wave energy. In the United Kingdom, there 
have been many attempts to regulate the development of tidal and offshore wind 
resources. In this regard, Freedom-Kai Phillips notes that the United Kingdom ―…is 
clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to renewable energy broadly and 
ocean-based renewables particularly.‖
36
 Therefore, in the interests of time, availability of 
data and financial resources, the study will focus on assessing the effectiveness of the 
United Kingdom‘s governance arrangement for the regulation of offshore wind 
development. This is not for the purposes of restricting the scope of the study, but as the 
decision that is commensurate with the maturity of the technology, and the critical 
learnings to be had from the advanced regulatory experiences in the United Kingdom. 
Specifically, the study will focus on examining the United Kingdom‘s Round 3 model of 
governance for offshore wind as an appropriate governance arrangement for the 
regulation of marine renewables in the OECS region. Additionally, the Round 3 model of 
                                                        
36 See, Freedom-Kai Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy in the European Union: Understanding and 
Strengthening EU-Canada Relations in the Law of the Sean and Ocean Governance‖ in Timo Koivurova et 
al., Understanding and Strengthening European Union-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean 
Governance (Finland: Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, 2009) at 176 ¶ 7.3.8 
[Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy‖]. 
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governance regulates all renewable energy activity in the marine environment and not 
just offshore wind. Therefore, there is a wider governance lessons that policy-makers in 
the OECS may adopt given that the regime transcends all forms of offshore renewables. 
 Further, the study is not concerned with the feasibility of any particular marine 
renewable in the OECS region, nor does it attempt to advocate the use of any particular 
marine renewable in the OECS region.  
1.6  Significance of the Study within the Current Landscape of Legal 
 Scholarship 
 
 The problem and currency of the study is borne out by the title of a 2009 article 
entitled, Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides: A Viable Renewable Energy 
Resource in search of a Suitable Regulatory Framework.
37
 In this article, the authors note 
that, internationally, ―…there has been significant progress towards the development of 
commercial scale operations of ocean energy [and that] ocean energy is now on the 
threshold of providing a reliable base-load source of renewable energy on a commercial 
scale.‖
38
 They observe however, that ―[w]hile technological barriers are being overcome 
the lack of clear regulatory frameworks in many countries is now emerging as a barrier to 
wide-scale development of ocean energy.‖
39
  In this regard, they recommend that there is 
a need for new regulatory regimes to be developed, where they do not exist, and a 
streamlining of existing regulations where they do exist.
40
 While they remain supportive 
of these recommendations, they emphasize a point which underscores these 
recommendations, that is, that ―[r]egulatory frameworks need to be developed to more 
                                                        




40 Ibid. at 424 - 425. 
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suitably deal with environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‖
41
 In short, the article 
captures the jurisprudential significance of the issue that will be studied in this thesis in 
the context of the OECS. This is particularly important. As section 1.2 above notes, the 
coastal and marine environments in the OECS region serve a wide variety of highly 
competitive uses. As such, there has been a growing interest in the management of the 
uses of ocean space and the associated impacts.
42
 In the context of this study, when new 
values, expectations and services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being 
demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear mandate to guide their deployment: 
develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist, and revise existing 
arrangements where they do exist. The key however, is to pursue these mandates in a 
manner that ‗suitably deals with the environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‘
43
  
 At present, the socio-political will in the OECS to explore offshore renewable 
energy has not yet reached a high-level of activism as it has in many other countries 
around the world. However, if the recent discussions at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable 
Energy Forum are any indication, the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of 
marine renewables will be soon pushed to primacy on the energy agenda‘s of Member 
States. When that happens, the findings of this study would be best placed to inform the 




                                                        
41
 Ibid. 
42 Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34. 
43 Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Oceans and Tides‖, supra note 35 at 424-425. 
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1.7  Thesis Structure 
 
 The study is organized in a series of interconnected chapters. Chapter 2 briefly 
explores the evolving importance of ocean governance, what is meant by ocean 
governance and the need to revisit governance arrangements when new services are being 
demanded from the oceans and seas. Chapter 2 also introduces a two-tiered analytical 
framework for the assessment of the ocean governance regime. The first tier of the 
analytical framework is the New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael 
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson.
44
 The second tier of the analytical framework 
is Gibson et al.‘s eight core requirements for progress towards sustainable development.
45
   
 Chapter 3 explores the concept of renewable energy, what it is and the various 
technologies available for the production of clean, sustainable energy. It is a narrative 
literature review of some of the benefits that encourage shifts towards renewable energy 
generation practices and factors thought to discourage the worthiness of pursuing 
renewable energy exploration and development.  
 Chapter 4 begins with a brief historical overview of the development of onshore 
wind power, what it is, how it operates and continues with an overview of the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with modern development and operation of onshore wind. 
Thereafter, Chapter 4 explores some of the reasons why countries around the world are 
moving wind power development offshore. In addition, the practical and technical 
considerations of developing offshore wind energy are then discussed in relation to the 
United Kingdom. 
                                                        
44 See generally, Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson, ―From Government to Governance in 
Forest Planning? Lessons from the case of the British Colombia Great Bear Rainforest Initiative‖ (2009) 11 
Forest Policy and Economics 383 [Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖]. 
45 See, Robert B. Gibson et al., ―Requirements for Progress towards Sustainability‖ in Robert B. Gibson et 
al., Sustainability Assessment: Criteria, Processes and Applications (London: Earthscan, 2005) at 95 - 114.  
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 Chapter 5 is a case study of the development of the offshore wind regulatory 
regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable regulatory 
attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies will be allowed to 
enter the marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided with the government‘s 
decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a different consents process was 
used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects respectively. In chronological 
order, this Chapter outlines the consents approaches used to approve project applications 
under each round of development. Each consent process is then considered in light of 
Howlett et al.‘s three-dimensional new governance framework outlined in Chapter 2. 
Thereafter, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability, also 
outlined in Chapter 2, will be used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive 
outcomes of each consent process. Finally, on an evaluation of all three regulatory 
regimes, the chapter comes to a conclusion as to which regime is most effective in 
serving the priority of sustainable development.               
 Chapter 6 seeks to apply the governance lessons learnt from the United 
Kingdoms‘ many attempts to regulate offshore wind to the development of an effective 
governance arrangement or offshore renewables in the OECS region. The chapter begins 
by outlining the energy supply and consumption context in the OECS region. Thereafter, 
the chapter describes the energy strategy and legal requirements of the region. The 
remaining sections are dedicated to justifying the transposition of lessons from the UK 
case study through a new governance assessment of marine development practices in the 
region. Specifically, Chapter 6 will explore the governance arrangement used to regulate 
the development of the dolphinarium industry in Anguilla and the Ashton Marina Project 
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in Saint Vincent & The Grenadines The findings of the assessment are then discussed in 
relation to their similarities and differences to the UK experience. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of lessons policy-makers in the OECS could adopt in attempting to 
formulate a governance framework for the regulation of marine renewables in the OECS. 
 Lastly, chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study and the recommendations 
to policy makers and regulators for formulating an effective governance arrangement for 




















Ocean Governance & Analytical Framework 
 
2.1  Ocean Governance: Why does it Matter? 
 
 The oceans cover over 70% of the Earth‘s surface. From the beginning of time, 
the utilization of this huge body of water and the diverse marine resources that it supports 
has made life on earth possible for humans.
46
 Early uses of the ocean were generally 
confined to subsistence fishing and trade and navigation.
47
 Today, the oceans have been 
pressured to provide a variety of services for the advancement of individual livelihoods 
and international trade and economic development.
48
 These services include food and 
recreational opportunities; the development of coastal and marine tourism; navigation, 
shipping and commerce activities; access to immense sources of usable energy (such as 
oil and gas) and other non-living resources (minerals); and the provision of a depository 
for waste products of our contemporary world.
49
 Above all, the oceans provide the 
invaluable service of regulating the climate and weather.
50
 The variety of services offered 
                                                        
46
 The importance of the oceans to human life cannot be overstated or under-estimated. The resources 
provided by ocean and coastal ecosystems, as well as various ocean uses, sustain billions of people around 
the world through, inter alia, the provision of food, shelter, energy, transportation, employment and 
recreation. See, Oceans and the law of the sea: Report of the Secretary-General, UNGA, 64th Sess., Annex, 
Agenda Item 76, UN Doc. A/64/66/Add.2 (25 November 2009) at 56 ¶ 214 [UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law 
of the Sea‖]. For an overview of the importance of the oceans, see generally, Robert Costanza, ―The 
Ecological, Economic and Social Importance of the Oceans‖ (1999) 31 Ecological Economics 199. 
[Costanza, ―Importance of Oceans‖].    
47 For a review of how ocean resource exploitation has evolved, see generally, Adalberto Vallega, 
Sustainable Ocean Governance: A Geographical Perspective (London: Routledge, 2002) at 83 ¶ 5.2. 
[Vallega, ―Sustainable Ocean Governance‖]. 
48 See, Christian Nellmann, Stefan Hain & Jackie Adler, In Dead Water: Merging of Climate Change with 
Pollution, Over-harvest and Infestations in the World‟s Fishing Grounds (Norway: Grid-Arenfal, 2008) at 
7 and 14. [Nellman, ―In Dead Water‖]. 
49
 Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1.  
50 The oceans are commonly described as ‗the blue lungs of the planet.‘ They breathe in carbon dioxide and 
exhale oxygen. When the oceans inhale and exhale, they help to regulate the climate system and generates 
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underscores the importance of the seas to humans. If the expectation is that present and 
future generations will continue to benefit from the dynamic oceans and seas, then the 
maintenance of safe, healthy and productive seas and the attainment of principled ocean 
governance are of even greater importance.
51
 
 The seemingly endless uses and services of the oceans have spawned a modern 
culture of exploration and exploitation.
52
 This dominant culture is aided and abetted by 
our own advances in technology,
53
 excessive consumption patterns, and the increasing 





 and excessive marine exploitation pressures
56
 have empowered 
anthropogenic influences that fundamentally change the natural order of coastal and 
marine ecosystems. The cumulative pressures of over-fishing, pollution, climate change 
and other environmentally harmful activities are bearing down on the marine 
environment.
57
 Simply put, the health of our seas is at risk.
58
 Consequently, when the 
health of the seas is at risk, so too is its capacity to provide the services that contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
half of the world‘s breathable oxygen. Life on Earth is therefore dependant on the health of our oceans. See 
Janot Memdler de Suarez et al., Draft Policy Brief Ensuring Survival: Oceans, Climate and Security 
(proceedings of the Global Oceans Conference, May 3-7, 2010) (Paris: UNESCO, 2010)[unpublished] 
online: Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and Islands  <http://www.globaloceans.org > [Draft Policy Brief]. 
51 See, Robert L. Friedheim, ―A Proper Order for the Oceans: An Agenda for the New Century‖ in Davor 
Vidas et al., Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) at 539 who notes that even though ―…there is no definitive evidence that the natural 
world cannot provide for the needs of the future human billions, especially since it is so difficult to predict 
the benefits of future technological change, it is reasonable to be cautious and plan for ways to avoid 
system collapse.‖ [Friedhman, ―A Proper Order‖]. 
52 Costanza, ―Importance of the Oceans‖, supra note 46.  
53 UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law of the Sea‖, supra note 46 at 12 ¶ 26.  
54 See generally, Edward R. Carr et al., ―Interlinkages: Governance for Sustainability‖ in John Agard et al., 
Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development (United Nations Environment Programme, 
2007) 361 – 394. 
55 Over half of the world‘s population lives along the coast - only 10% of the Earth‘s land - creating intense 
pressure on coastal habitats and resources. See, Draft Policy Brief, supra note 50 at 1. 
56 Nellmann, ―In Dead Water‖, supra note 48 at 42. 
57 For a quick review of some of the threats to the marine environment, see, Nellman, ―In Dead Water‖, 
supra note 48 at 26. 
58 See, Jacquline Adler et al, ―Water” in John Agard et al, Global Environment Outlook: Environment for 
Development (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007) at 115.  
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human well-being, economic security and sustainable development for present and future 
generations.
59
 If left unchecked, the severity of these risks will be amplified as  
technology advances and as human needs, values and expectations of the oceans continue 
to change and increase. The more services that are expected and demanded from the 
ocean, the greater the likelihood is of unsustainable exploitation and conflict over ocean 
space use. For quite some time therefore, there has been a growing interest in the 
management of the uses of ocean space and the associated impacts.
60
 In other words, 
when coastal and marine resources are shared by more than one stakeholder, and the 
interests and activities of stakeholders in the marine environment change and/or increase, 
there is a pressing need to strategically manage the oceans so as to ensure the sustainable 
development and exploitation of the diverse marine resources that it supports. In short, 
the governance of our oceans and seas matters. 
 
2.1.1 The Concept of ‘Governance’ 
 
 In order to define the phrase ―ocean governance,‖ it is necessary first to outline 
the concept of ―governance,‖ at least in its broad sense. What is governance? Governance 
is a concept that may be defined in many ways. The simple and probably the most 
obvious approach is to adopt a strict legal interpretation of the governance concept. So for 
instance, Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht define governance as:  
the architecture and makeup of the regime used to govern behaviour, 




                                                        
59 UNGA, ―Oceans and the Law of the Sea‖, supra note 46 at 56 ¶ 214.  
60
 Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1. 
61 See, Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Future of U.S. Ocean Policy: Choices for the New 
Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000) at 14.  
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 Governance may also be defined by referencing the values, institutions and other 
non-legal mechanism that influence the decision-making process. In this regard, 
Lawrence Juda in 1999 defined the concept as:  
the formal and informal arrangements, institutions, and mores which 
determine how resources or an environment are utilized; how problems 
and opportunities are evaluated and analyzed; what behavior is deemed 
acceptable or forbidden; and what rules and sanctions are applied to affect 




 In Juda‘s opinion, the concept of governance is not about government and 
management per se, but really about the ―… mechanisms and institutions that serve to 
alter and influence human behaviour in particular directions.‖
63
 The concept as defined 
by Juda, is a recognition of the increasingly significant contribution that non-
governmental actors make to a governance process by simply monitoring, evaluating, 
publicizing and seeking to influence management efforts.
64
 This interpretation of the 
governance concept appears to have percolated the specialist and academic 
communities.
65
 The Centre for Governance at the University of Ottawa provides an 
excellent working definition of governance:  
Governance is about guiding. It is about the processes by which 
human organizations, whether private, public or civic, steer 
themselves. The study of governance involves examining the 
distribution of rights, obligations and power that underpin 
                                                        
62 See, Lawrence Juda, ―Considerations in Developing a Functional Approach to the Governance of Large 
Marine Ecosystems‖ (1999) 30(2) Ocean Development and International Law 89 at 90.  
63 Ibid. at 91. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See, Lucia Fanning, Robin Mohan & Patrick McConney, ―Principled Ocean Governance for the Wider 
Caribbean Region‖ in Lucia Fanning, Robin Mohan & Patrick McConney Towards Marine Ecosystem-
based Management in the Wider Caribbean (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2010) 
[forthcoming October 2010], online: Marine Affairs Programme 
<http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Files/Mahon,_Fanning,_McConney_Principled_ocean_governance.doc
>,  who note that ―…The movement towards the use of this term reflects a global shift in awareness of the 
increasing diversity of stakeholders (actors) involved in determining the patterns of actions and ideas that 
we see and hear around us daily.‖ 
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organizations; understanding the patterns of coordination that 
support an organization's diverse activities and that sustain its 
coherence….  
 
[Governance is about] interacting.  Governance pertains not only to 
organizations, but also to: the complex ways in which private, 
public and social organizations interact and learn from one another; 
the manner in which citizens contribute to the governance system, 
directly and indirectly, through their collective participation in 
civil, public and corporate institutions; and the instruments, 
regulations, and processes that define the "rules of the game"…  
 
The knowledge of governance has application not only in 
determining the appropriate guiding mechanisms for organizations 
or the evolution of society, but also as a manière de voir, or 
coordination perspective, on the workings of organizations… to 
support the development of socio-economic policy; an analytical 
framework providing a language of problem reformulation; and a 
tool to provide insights into new ways to tackle problems of 
organizational design and social architecture.
66
   
 
 One can debate endlessly about what it means to ―govern‖ and which definition is 
best suited to convey the appropriate meaning of the concept. However, as stated above, 
there is a growing trend that favours interactive decision-making – a process that places 
due value on the contributions of non-governmental actors to the governing process. 
Essentially, therefore, a good modern concept of governance must incorporate the 
prevailing view that it establishes the framework and relationships for the exercise of 
government and/or management over societal resources between state and non-state 
actors. Or put in other words by Michael Sutherland and Sue Nichols, ―[g]ood 
governance is based on recognition of the interests of all stakeholders and inclusion of 
their interests where possible.‖
67
 What then is ‗ocean governance?‘ 
                                                        
66 Cited in Sue Nichols, Michael Sutherland & David Monahan, ―Good Governance of Canada‘s Offshore 
Coastal Zone: Towards an Understanding of the Marine Boundary Issues‖ (2000) 54(4) Geomatica 415. 
67
 See, Michael Sutherland and Sue Nichols, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces‖ in Michael 
Sutherland et al., Administering Marine Spaces: International Issues (Copenhagen, Denmark: The 
International Federation of Surveyors, 2006) at 6 [Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces‖]. 
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2.1.2 The Concept of ‘Ocean Governance’ 
 
 The foregoing section explored a number of definitions on the concept of 
governance. Most importantly, the foregoing section provides appropriate context to 
begin the discussion under this heading, that is, the concept of ‗Ocean Governance.‘ 
Despite the frequent occurrence of ―ocean governance‖ in scholarly work in marine 
affairs and ocean law, academics note that the multi-dimensional nature of the concept 
makes it extremely difficult to define.
68
 Over the years, the many dimensions of the 
concept has inspired a great body of academic thought. Early academic interpretations of 
the concept focused on the need to manage the uses of ocean spaces while at the same 
time protecting the ecosystem. Juda‘s 1996 definition reads as follows: 
The management of the uses of ocean space… seeks, in accordance with 
some system of politically determined values, which is either explicit or 
implicit, to increase the benefits that may be derived from the resource and 
non-resource use of the ocean. At the same time, it attempts to minimize 
detrimental effects on the ocean environment and to ameliorate conflict of 
use situations. In general it tries to provide for a directed balance among 
the various uses of ocean space as well as to protect the ocean 




 For quite some time, the concept of ocean governance focused on the governance 
issues espoused by Juda above.
70
 By necessary interpretation, therefore, the early 
                                                        
68 See, Gilles Paquet and Kevin Wilkins, Ocean Governance: An Inquiry into Stakeholding (Centre on 
Governance, University of Ottawa, 2002) cited in David Vanderzwaag, Sean LeRoy & Rod Dobell, ―Ocean 
Governance‖ in Workshop Backgrounders – 2003 Ocean Management Research Network National 
Conference (Ottawa, 1 November 2003) online: 
<http://www.maritimeawards.ca/OMRN/vanderzwaag.html >.  
69 Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 1. 
70 See, Robert Friedheim‘s 1999 definition: ――…the development of a set of ocean rules and practices that 
are equitable, efficient in the allocation of ocean uses and resources (including the notion of sustainability), 
provide the means of resolving conflicts over access to and the enjoyment of the benefits of the oceans, and 
specifically attempt to alleviate ‗collective-action problems in a world of independent actors‘.‖ See, 
Friedhman, ―A Proper Order‖, supra note 51 at 537.  
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characteristics/traits of ocean governance were defined by the emerging ‗ocean 
governance‘ issues of that time, that being, the governmental management and control of 
multiple users of ocean space and the associated impacts on the marine environment 
incident to the use.  
 Recently however, academics have proffered the view that ‗ocean governance‘ 
goes beyond traditional command and control
71
 approaches to regulating and influencing 
human behaviour in relation to the ocean. The other dimension or characteristic of the 
concept advanced by Rothwell & VanderZwaag, embrace a more interactive decision 
making process which not only incorporates ― …government agencies and departments 
but a broader range of participants including the private sector, scientists, community 
groups, non-governmental organizations, academics, First Nations and others.‖
72
 In light 
of this interpretation of the ocean governance concept, one good definition would read: 
The governance of any geographical area, including marine spaces, is actually 
the management of stakeholder relationships with regard to spatial-temporal 
resource use in the pursuit of many sanctioned economic, social, political, and 
environmental objectives. 
 
 In keeping with the recognition of stakeholder involvement in the governing 
process, Rothwell & VanderZwaag further suggest that ocean governance would offer 
alternative opportunities and approaches to influence human behaviour beyond the 
confines of command and control regulation. The approaches identified are ―…economic 
incentives and disincentives, voluntary programs, community-based management, co-
                                                        
71 Traditional command and control approaches that influence human behaviour usually refer to legally 
binding sanctions such as fines or imprisonment. 
72 See, Donald R. Rothwell & David L. VanderZwaag, ―The Sea Change Towards Principled Ocean 
Governance‖ in Donald R. Rothwell & David L. Vanderzwaag, Towards Principled Ocean Governance: 
Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (London, Routledge, 2006) at 4 - 5. [VanderZwaag, 
―Towards Principled Ocean Governance‖]. 
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management and integrated ocean/coastal planning.‖
73
  Gorina-Ysern et al., offer a 
definition that is an apt summation of the participatory decision-making dimension of 
ocean governance postulated by Rothwell & VanderZwaag:   
The term ―ocean governance‖ covers a set of rules – some legally binding and 
some not – adopted by the international community of States … for the 
structured regulation, management and control of ocean uses. It also includes 
the persons, bodies and institutions entrusted with administering the rules that 
govern ocean space. One of the purposes of ocean governance is the 
conservation of and protection of ocean habitat and marine life.  
 
 From the above articulations of the ocean governance concept, one can extrapolate 
a few trends that define the scope of the term. The most obvious of these trends is that 
ocean governance is primarily concerned with the management of stakeholder activities 
in coastal and marine areas.
74
 The other trend is that ocean governance necessarily goes 
beyond the ambit of simply mitigating conflict of use inevitabilities in the marine 
environment. In fact, the justification for the management of stakeholder activities in 
ocean spaces is mainly two-fold: to maximize the benefits that may be derived from the 
resource and non-resource use of the ocean, while at the same time, ensuring the ocean‘s 
long-term viability by conserving and protecting ocean habitat and marine life. To 
balance these objectives, the evolving trend in ocean governance favours interactive 
decision making over traditional regulation. Ocean governance therefore, is also defined 
by a strong presence of human perceptions on the value of ocean uses.  
 Juda noted that: ―[t]he legal regime of ocean space, like all legal regimes, attempts 
to provide some order by indicating the nature, requirements, and limits of permissible 
behaviour and by establishing valid expectations for that behaviour.‖
75
 The question 
                                                        
73
 Ibid. 
74 Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces,‖ supra note 67 at 7. 
75 See, Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 3. 
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remains however, how would policy-makers go about establishing valid expectations for 
permissible behaviour? One way to do this is to pursue governance objectives or 
principles when seeking to manage stakeholder activities in the ocean. Statements of 
principles for ocean governance can be found in a variety of sources.
76
 They have 
emerged through a number of directives and protocols on good governance, international 
agreements, declarations and codes of conduct.
77
 However, the principles that often 
inform ocean governance are often ill-defined and difficult to apply in practice.
78
 As a 
result, the list of principles will continue to grow as academics seek to clarify their 
scope.
79
 Some of these principles include sustainable development, integration, 
precaution, the ecosystem approach and community-based management.
80
 Consequently, 
there is an ongoing movement towards adopting governance arrangements which focus 
on principle-based ocean governance.
81
 The adherence to principles when managing 
stakeholder activities in the ocean can therefore be added to the list of trends which 
define ocean governance.  
 The preamble to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),
82
 recognizes that ―…the problems of the ocean spaces are closely 
                                                        
76 Juan L. Suarez De Vivero, ―New Frontier of international Law: Recent Lecture – Marine Policy: Europe 
and Beyond‖ (2007) 15 Williamette J. Int‘l L. & Disp. Resol. 167 at 168. 
77 VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance,‖ supra note 72 at 5. 
78 See, Howard S. Schiffman, ―Moving from Single-species Management to Ecosystem Management in 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations‖ (2007) 13 International Law Students Association Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 387 at 387. 
79Ibid. See also Juda, ―Ocean Use Management‖, supra note 34 at 3 where the author notes that ―over time, 
once-governing principles of ocean law appear to become anachronistic in the face of changing political, 
economic, social and technological conditions.‖ 
80 VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance,‖ supra note 72 at 5. For a short list of a modern 
ocean governance principles, see, David Freestone, ―Principles Applicable to Modern Ocean Governance‖ 
(2008) 23(3) Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast L. 385 at 391 [Freestone, ―Modern Ocean Governance‖]. 
81 See for instance the title of Donald R. Rothwell & David L. VanderZwaag‘s book Towards Principled 
Ocean Governance: Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (London, Routledge, 2006).  
82 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, entered into force on 16 
November 1994, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397, online: United Nations <http://www.un.org>, third preambular 
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interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.‖ The simple fact is that the oceans are 
connected, and flow into each other. To collectively govern the activity of stakeholders in 
oceans around the world would therefore make good sense. UNCLOS is widely referred 
to as the ‗constitution for the oceans.‘
83
 The regime is one of many governance 
arrangements that protect marine and coastal environments. Apart from global 
arrangements, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 advocates that ocean governance ―…requires 
new approaches to marine and coastal area management and development, at the national, 
sub-regional, regional and global levels… .‖
84
 Therefore, in addition to global 
arrangements, ocean governance is also needed at the national, sub-regional and regional 
levels.  
2.2 New Governance Assessment  
 
 The foregoing sections outlined the need for improved governance of our marine 
spaces in order to protect their long-term viability by managing the manner, and extent to 
which marine spaces deliver services. Articulating and improving the governance 
arrangements is particularly necessary when new human needs, values and expectations 
of the coastal and marine environment arise. In the context of this study, when new 
services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being demanded from our 
oceans, there is a clear mandate: develop new regulatory regimes where they do not exist, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
paragraph. See also, Juda, ―Ocean Use Management,‖ supra note 34 at 317 where it is noted that 
―interdependence, [refers to] the concept that what happens here has effects there, remains a reality in 
ocean space.‖   
83 UNCLOS is commonly referred to as ―A Constitution for the Oceans‖. This phrase was coined by 
Tommy T. B. Koh used to describe the intention of the drafters of the treaty. See, Myron H. Nordquist, 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: Commentary (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985) at 11.  
84
 See, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3 -14 
June 1992 , Volume I, Resolutions Adopted by the Conference, UN. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev1 (Vol. 1), 
(1993) at 238 ¶ 17.1 [Rio Declaration]. 
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and revise existing arrangements where they do exist.
85
 One way in which policy-makers 
and regulators may go about achieving this mandate is to begin by looking at the existing 
regulatory regime, irrespective of whether said regime permits renewable energy 
generation activity in the marine environment. In this respect, the New Governance 
Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson,
86
 is 
particularly useful. Briefly, this approach is not about adopting or advocating a certain or 
definitive approach to solving public problems.  Rather, it is a way of taking stock of 
political practices, institutional structures and regulatory instruments which will assist in 
understanding how a particular regulatory regime operates. However, before exploring 
Howlett et al.‘s spin of New Governance theory, it is first necessary to outline the New 
Governance theory itself. 
 
2.2.1 The New Governance Theory: Governing without Government  
 
 The title of Rosenau & Czempiel‘s book, Governance without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics,
87
 captures the basic but fundamental concept of 
New Governance theory – governance without government. Noted above, is the 
increasing awareness among scholars that ‗governance‘ and ‗government‘ are not 
synonymous terms even though they both share goal-oriented activities.
88
 ―Government 
occurs when those with legally and formally derived authority and policy power execute 
                                                        
85 Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides‖, supra note 35 at 424-425. 
86 Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44.   
87 See, James N. Rosenau & Ernest Otto Czempiel, Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
88 Above at 26 ¶ 2.2.1. See also, Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Tina Nabatchi & Rosemary O‘Leary, ―The New 
Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of 
Government‖ (2005) 65(5) Public Administration Review 547 at 548. [Bingham et al., ―The New 
Governance‖]. 
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and implement activities... .‖
89
 Simply then, governing is what governments do.
90
 On the 
other hand, ―…governance refers to the creation, execution, and implementation of 
activities backed by shared goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have 
formal authority and policing power.‖
91
 The pillars upon which New Governance 
scholarship are built are a testament to the truth of the growing perception that 
‗governance‘ and ‗government‘ are not synonymous.
92
 The New Governance approach 
can be described as a collection of wide-ranging processes developed to effect public 
objectives using methods that differ in one way or another from classical forms of law.
93
 
According to Douglas Nejaime,
94
 the cause of New Governance scholars has been 
motivated by critiques
95
 of rights-based, state-centered, top-down strategies which led to 
an institutional turn towards flexible, collaborative public-private partnerships that seek 
to destabalize the priority of traditional modes of governance. In this respect, the New 
Governance model identifies horizontal networks of public, private and non-profit 
                                                        
89 Ibid. 
90 Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44 at 385 ¶ 2.1. 
91 Bingham et al., ―The New Governance,‖ supra note 90 at 547. 
92 For a brief overview on the distinction between ‗government‘ and ‗governance‘ see R. A. W. Rhodes, 
―The New Governance: Governing without Government‖ (1996) 44(4) Political Studies 652 [Rhodes, 
―Governing without Government‖]. 
93
 See, David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ―The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity or Rivalry?‖ (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Research 
Committee on the Sociology of Law, July 2005) [unpublished], online: < http://www.reds.msh-
paris.fr/communication/docs/trubek.pdf>. [Trubek, ―Coexistence of New Governance‖]. The authors equate 
the understanding of New Governance to ‗soft law‘: see, David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ―Hard and 
Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Open Method of Coordination‖ (2005) 11(3) Eur. L.J. 
343. 
94 See, Douglas Nejaime, ―When Governance Fails‖ (2009) 79 Ohio St. L.J. 323 at 323 and 331. [Nejaime, 
―When Governance Fails‖]. 
95 See, Myungsuk Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance: A New Institution of Social Coordination‖ 
(Paper presented to the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 2003) [unpublished] 
at 2, online: Indian University <http://www.indiana.edu> [Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance‖]. 
Here the author notes that ―[t]he popularity of governance has something to do with the distrust about the 
government. Many people have been disappointed with the ability of the government to tackle social 
problems. [This] leads to reconsideration of the traditional theories of public administration.‖ See also, 
Rhodes, ―‖Governing without Government‖, supra note 94 at 666. Therefore, there is need to get 
stakeholders to cooperate to pursue their joint affairs.  
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organizations as the new structures through which governance is administered.
96
 In 
theory, the approach suggests ―…that co-ordination by [alternative modes of governance 
to traditional top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations] 
can lead to more effective rules and opportunities for political participation… .‖
97
 In this 
respect, Douglas Nejaime
98
 notes that the New Governance approach places primacy on 
collaborative processes; stakeholder participation; local experimentation‘ public/private 
partnerships; and flexible, policy formation, implementation and monitoring. Theory 
aside, in recent years, the landscape of public administration is slowly reshaping to reflect 
this new paradigm of solving public problems.
99
 Consequently therefore, the New 
Governance approach is instigating change in a wide spectrum of policy issues and fields, 
ranging from employment and environmental protection; to welfare, family, health and 
education laws; to criminal justice administration; and to torts and consumer 
protection.
100





                                                        
96 Bingham et al., ―The New Governance,‖ supra note 90 at 547.  
97 Burkard Eberlein & Kieter Kerwer, ―New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical 
Perspective‖ (2004) 42(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 121 at 121. New Governance scholars 
envision that their approach could create more effective forms of participation; coordinate multiple levels 
of government; allow more diversity and decentralization; foster deliberative arenas; allow more flexibility 
and revisability and foster experimentation and knowledge creation. See, Trubek, ―Coexistence of New 
Governance,‖ supra note 95 at 2.  As to why the New Governance approach would work, Rhodes argues 
that ―[g]overnance as self-organizing networks is a challenge to governability because the networks 
become autonomous and can resist central guidance.‖ See, Rhodes, ―The New Governance,‖ supra note 94 
at 667. 
98 Nejaime, ―When Governance Fails,‖ supra note 96 at 332. 
99
 See, Orly Lobel, ―The Renew Deal: The Fall of regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought‖ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 at 343. 
100 Ibid. at 346. 
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2.2.2 New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy 
Rayner & Chris Tollefson 
 
 In their article, ―From government to governance in forest planning? Lessons 
from the case of the British Columbia Great Bear Rainforest Initiative,‖
101
 Michael 
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson, question the body of literature that suggests 
as a fact or otherwise, that there has been a shift from government (traditional top-down 
hierarchical government control) to governance (flexible, collaborative public-private 
partnerships) in forest policy. They support their criticism by examining the 2006 Great 
Bear Rainforest Initiative in British Columbia; an initiative that is ―often-touted as a bold 
exemplar of plurilateral ‗network governance.‘‖
102
 They espouse and evaluate their 
skepticisms of the acclaimed shift to governance by constructing a three dimensional 
analytical structure that isolates the modes of governance: the political dimension, the 
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The Political Dimension of Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson‘s 
analytical structure 















The Institutional Dimension of Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson‘s 
analytical structure. 





The Regulatory Dimension of Michael Howlett et. al.‘s , Jeremy Rayner & Chris 
Tollefson‘s analytical structure. 
Source: Michael Howlett et al.  
 
 Having isolated the modes of governance, the authors were able to take stock of 
the political practices, institutional structures and regulatory techniques as they existed. 
But more important, the isolation allowed them to track the complexity of the changes 
involved in any shifts among those modes of governance so that they may come to a 
conclusion about whether there had been a shift from government to governance. It 
would be helpful at this time to reference the authors‘ definition of governance: 
‗Governance‘ is all about establishing, promoting and supporting a 
specific type of relationship between governmental and non-governmental 
actors in the governing process and a central dimension of any governance 
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mode is its placement on a spectrum of governing arrangements ranging 




 In sum therefore, the application of this analytical framework to a particular field 
of governance (employment, environmental protection, health, welfare, etc.) would 
simply describe the governance arrangement of that field in reference to the three modes 
of governance. What is the value of this framework? The answer to this question is 
perhaps best served by a brief outline of the three dimensions. 
 The first dimension created by the authors is the political dimension. In this mode 
of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with one question: ―whether political 
power – that is, the ability to make legitimate, authoritative decisions allocating societal 
resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖
104
 It can be argued on end about what it 
means for political power to be vested in the state and what it means for that power to be 
vested in society-driven actors.
105
 Earlier, it was noted that ―many people have been 
disappointed with the ability of government to tackle social problems.‖
106
 At the same 
time, New Governance scholars argue that the social trait of non-state actors would 
influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems.
107
 These are issues that 
the framework forces one to consider after having identified whether the political power 
in the regime favours state or non-state actors.  
                                                        
103 Ibid. at 385 ¶ 2.1. 
104 Ibid. at 385 ¶ 2.2. 
105 See for instance, Peter M. Haas, ―When does power listen to truth? A Constructivist approach to the 
policy process‖ (2004) 11(4) Journal of European Public Policy 569 [Haas, ―When does power listen to 
truth?‖]. Here, the author puts forward the view that the ability of state-centered decision-makers to master 
new ideas has limits, and when those limits are reached, there is a need to defer or delegate to authoritative 
actors with a reputation for expertise. In this view, the article debates about what it means for political 
power to be vested in state versus non-state actors when scientific issues such as sustainable development is 
at the heart of the decision-making process.  
106 Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance‖, supra note 97. 
107 Above at 26 ¶ 2.2.1. 
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 The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance 
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the 
fact that ―institutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖
108
 In this dimension, 
the authors were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional 
structures: Are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions 
composed of state or non-state actors? According to the authors, these characteristics 
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy 
disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments 
used to implement the mode of governance.‖
109
  
 The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used 
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether 
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control 
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible 
and voluntary. In each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance 
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of 
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). The authors describe the key to using the 
framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘ to 
‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but 
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and 
regulatory techniques… .”
110
 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the 
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of 
governance, and who those actors are. 
                                                        
108
 Howlett et al. ―Government to Governance‖ supra note 44 at 2.2. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. at 384 ¶ 1. 
 35 
 This framework does not achieve a particular policy objective. Nor does it 
advocate a certain approach to solving public problems or how societal resources should 
be distributed. The value in this framework is that it provides a means by which one may 
understand, analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. So for 
example, when formulating or revising ocean governance arrangements that permit 
renewable energy generation activity, or policies that guide those governance 
arrangements, one would want to begin by understanding the political, institutional and 
regulatory nature of the governance arrangement under study. An understanding of the 
nature of the regime under study would lead to an awareness of where amongst the three 
dimensions the power to make decisions respecting societal resources is concentrated, or 
shared as the case may be.  
 The only drawback to Howlett et al.‘s framework, if it can be considered a 
drawback at all, is that it stops at an evaluation of the decision-making process that leads 
to decisions and substantive outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a 
substantively good outcome would be. Put another way, in the context of this study, the 
framework would be unable to assist in a determination of whether a particular ocean 
governance arrangement that permits renewable energy generation activity is effective. In 
this regard, there is a need to formulate a substantive standard against which the 
effectiveness of those regimes can be measured. Simply put, a regime consists of a set of 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which define an issue-area of 
co-operative use and activity among citizens. One immediate question is what do we 
mean by ―effectiveness‖ or ―regime effectiveness.‖ Arild Underdal defines the concept 
quite nicely: ―In common-sense understanding, a regime can be considered effective to 
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the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) function(s) or solves the 




Any attempt at designing a conceptual framework for the study of regime 
effectiveness must … cope with at least three (sets) of questions: (1) what 
precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? (2) Against which 
standard is this object to be evaluated? and (3) How do we go about 
comparing the object to this standard – in other words, what kinds of 
measurement operations do we have to perform to attribute a certain score 
of effectiveness to a certain regime? 
 
 The application of Howlett et al.‘s framework contributes to an understanding of a 
particular governance arrangement, i.e., the object to be evaluated (Underdal‘s first 
question). The focus now is on the subject matter of Underdal‘s second question, i.e., the 
standard against which the governance arrangement is to be evaluated. At the outset of 
this brief discussion, it should be noted that in the context of this study, many standards 
are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy regimes. Because 
these regimes impact ocean use and management, suitable criteria for effectiveness can 
be located in principles that advocate certain standards for stewardship of the oceans and 
seas. As previously noted, statements of principles for ocean governance can be found in 
a variety of sources: directives and protocols on good governance, international 
agreements, declarations and codes of conduct. The principles that inform ocean 
governance are often ill-defined and difficult to apply in practice. As a result, the list of 
principles will continue to grow as academics seek to clarify their scope. Some of these 
principles include sustainable development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem 
                                                        
111 See, Arild Underdal, ―One Question, Two Answers‖ in Edward L. Miles et al., Environmental Regime 
Effectiveness: Confronting Theory With Evidence  (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002) at 4-5. 
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approach and community-based management.
112
 Any of these principles may serve as 
legitimate criteria for measuring the effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore 
renewable energy regulation. Any of these principles may serve as the standard by which 
renewable energy generation activity affecting the coastal and marine environments can 
be judged. The following section briefly introduces a sustainable development criteria 
which will be used to measure the effectiveness of the offshore wind regime in the United 
Kingdom.    
 
2.3  Sustainable Development: A Criteria for Measuring the 
 Effectiveness of Offshore Renewable Energy Governance Regimes 
 
 Section 2.1 above outlined the tragedy of our ocean‘s health. Ocean resource 
exploitation is bearing down on the health of the oceans and seas, and creating a wide 
range of difficulties that call for close co-operation between science and policy. 
Adalberto Vallega in his book Sustainable Ocean Governance: a Geographical 
Perspective,
113
 consider two important questions central to this study:  
What is the conceptual framework necessary to design ocean governance 
strategies consistent with the need to protect the ocean ecosystem? What 
assessment of the ecosystem is needed, and what principles should be 




 In dealing with these questions, it was argued that there should be a strict 
reference to the concepts of sustainability – the contextual pursuit of three goals: (a) the 
integrity of the ecosystem; (b) economic efficiency; and (c) social equity including a 
                                                        
112 VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance‖, supra note 72 at 5. For a short list of a modern 
ocean governance principles, see, Freestone, ―Modern Ocean Governance‖, supra note 82 at 391. 
113 Vallega, ―Sustainable Ocean Governance‖, supra note 47. 
114 Ibid. at 41 ¶ 3.1. 
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guarantee of the rights of future generations.
115
 This view has generated discussions in 
marine affairs.
116
 In the context of the challenges posed to the marine environment by 
human use, one author, Edward Miles,
117
 conveyed the informed ideology as follows: 
―There is an urgent need to breathe life into the notion of ―sustainability‖ to make it into a 
fundamental norm of the new world ocean regime.‖ Therefore, sustainable development 
is an appropriate standard against which the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy 
regimes can be evaluated.  
 In the 1990‘s, sustainable economic development has become the most heralded 
concept in the international community on issues respecting the economy, society and the 
environment. The origin of the term can be traced back to the publication of 1987 
Brundtland Report;
118
 a document which is credited as having signaled the urgency of 
rethinking our ways of living and governing.
119
 The report defined sustainable 
development as ―development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.‖
120
 Since the Brundtland Report, 
there has been a multitude of elaborations of the ‗sustainable development‘ definit ion. 
Those elaborations entertain a wide range of perceptions on the scope and implications of 
the concept. In the midst of conceptual uncertainty, it is helpful to identify shared basic 
                                                        
115 Ibid. 
116 For instance Robert L. Friedhman‘s definition of ocean governance makes explicit inclusion of the 
notion of sustainability. See, Friedhman, ―A Proper Order‖, supra note 51 at 537. 
117 Edward L. Miles, ―The Concept of Ocean Governance: Evolution Toward the 21st Century and the 
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characteristics of the concept. Gibson et al. have proposed a list of basic characteristics 
that provide an appreciation of the sustainable development concept:
121
 
 The concept of sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and 
practice. 
 The concept of sustainability is in all its formulations concerned about the 
long as well as short-term well-being. 
 Sustainability covers the core issues of decision making (the pursuit and 
maintenance of necessities and satisfactions, health, security, diversity and 
equity, ecology and community, preservation and development, etc.). 
 Sustainability demands recognition of links and interdependencies. 
 Sustainability must be pursued in a world of complexity and surprise, in 
which precautionary approaches are necessary. 
 The concept of sustainability recognizes both inviolable limits and endless 
opportunities for creative innovation. 
 Sustainability is open-ended. 
 The means and ends are necessarily intertwined. 
 The concept of sustainability is both universal and context dependent. 
 
 Gibson et al. caveat however, that sustainable development/sustainability cannot 
be defined as one set of characteristics because they are all dependent on elaboration and 
specification in context.
122
 The authors use these core characteristics to formulate generic 
sustainability criteria to be applied in assessment evaluations and decision-making.
123
 
‗Sustainability criteria‘ would necessarily refer to the body of rules or tools for measuring 
sustainability and/or identifying unsustainable practices. Any list of rules or tools for 
measuring sustainability are debatable at best as there will always be openings for 
learning and revision.
124
 It is no surprise therefore, that there are also copious 
elaborations on good sustainable development assessment criteria. To this extent, 
measuring sustainability has become a major issue as well as a riving force in the 
                                                        
121 See Robert B. Gibson et al.  Sustainability Assessment: Criteria, Processes and Applications (London: 
Earthscan, 2005) at 59 – 61 [Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖].  
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 Ibid. at 61 and 62. 
123 Ibid. at 62 – 63. 
124 Ibid at 95. 
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discussion on sustainable development.
125
  After having reviewed a wealth of 
sustainability literature, Gibson et al., propose eight points which constitute a minimal set 
of core sustainability requirements for measuring progress towards sustainability:
126
   
1. Socio-ecological system integrity 
2. Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity 
3. Intragenerational equity 
4. Intergenerational equity 
5. Resource maintenance and efficiency  
6. Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance 
7. Precaution and adaptation 
8. Immediate and long-term integration 
 
 These requirements, however elaborated and juxtaposed, determine what 
objectives are favoured, which options are considered and preferred, what effects are 
judged desirable, acceptable or intolerable in the pursuit of sustainable development.
127
 
To compliment the application of the Howlett et al. framework, this minimal set of core 
sustainability requirements for measuring progress towards sustainability will be used to 
evaluate the UK offshore wind energy consents regime. The following subsections briefly 
consider each criterion. 
 
2.3.1 Socio-ecological System Integrity 
 
 This sustainability criterion builds on the point made at the outset of this chapter, 
that is, humans are dependent on the integrity of biophysical systems such as the ocean 
and seas for the continuance of life and for the provision of a range of sufficiency 
                                                        
125 See, Naim Hamdia Afgan and Maria de Garça Charvalho, ―Sustainability‖ in Sustainable Assessment 
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 According to Gibson et al., this dependency warrants the making of 
decisions that seek to build human-ecological relationships for establishing and 
maintaining the long-term viability of socio-ecological systems.
129
 As well, the authors 
propose that decisions should simultaneously seek to build human-ecological 
relationships in a manner that favours the protection of irreplaceable life support 
functions.
130
 Notably, in making decisions based on this sustainability criterion, Gibson et 
al. add the caveat that ―… the objective is not to prevent system change but to organize 
and manage our activities so that the changes we influence still preserve the system 
conditions and services upon which we rely.‖
131
 Therefore, the criterion goes beyond the 
need to reduce human-induced stresses on socio-ecological systems.
132
 In addition to 
maintaining the integrity of socio-ecological systems, this criterion advocates that there 
should be a focus on adjusting and reconstructing human governance systems ―… to 




2.3.2 Livelihood Sufficiency and Opportunity 
 
 In the main, human well-being depends on the integrity of socio-ecological 
systems. However, in addition to environmental concerns, human-well being is also 
dependant on material goods and services for the attainment of livelihood sufficiency and 
opportunities for continued improvement.
134
 In this regard, this criterion forces decision-
                                                        
128 Above at 15 ¶ 2.1. 
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131 Ibid. at 96  
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makers to consider the contribution a particular undertaking may make to ensuring that 
everyone has sufficient material goods and services for a decent life and opportunities for 
improvements.
135
 In other words, this criterion forces a recognition and consideration of 
the fact that ―…ignoring destitution, oppression and desperation [concerns, for instance] 
is unsustainable as well as morally unacceptable.‖
136
 Therefore, in considering whether a 
particular undertaking contributes to livelihood sufficiency and opportunities, decision-
makers must necessarily involve in the process ―…those whose present needs are 
allegedly being addressed or potentially affected.‖
137
 Lastly and most importantly, 
Gibson et al. note that in seeking to advance livelihood sufficiency and opportunities for 
present generations, decision-makers must pursue these improvements in ways that do 




2.3.3 Intragenerational Equity 
 
 According to Gibson et al., for progress towards sustainability, decision makers 
should ensure that proposed undertakings that can contribute to sufficiency and 
opportunity are ―…pursued in ways that reduce dangerous gaps in sufficiency and 
opportunity […] between the rich and poor.‖
139
 In essence, this criterion advocates that 
decisions should make positive contributions towards the concept of ‗livelihood equality,‘ 
i.e. ―…the right of all peoples within the current generation to fair access to the Earth‘s 
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 In the context of this study, decision makers are to consider whether 
in approving marine renewables, the costs and benefits are shared equally among all users 
of the sea. Is the effective decision fair to all users of the sea?   
 
2.3.4 Intergenerational Equity 
 
 Also, for progress towards sustainability Gibson et al. require that decision 
makers ―[f]avour present options and actions that are likely to preserve or enhance the 
opportunities and capabilities of future generations to live sustainably.
‖141
 The focus here 
is on making a choice between preserving and exploiting ecological systems and 
associated resources for the benefit of future generations. The criterion does not advocate 
which choice is better for sustainability. What it does however, is to demand that 
decision-makers of proposed undertakings give careful attention to future effects, 
consider the particulars of each case, respect the inevitable uncertainties, and in light of 
all of this, decide whether future generations would approve the proposed undertaking 




2.3.5 Resource Maintenance and Efficiency 
 
 In the context of this study, the application of this criterion will focus on resource 
maintenance. Here, for progress towards sustainability, decision makers must ensure that 
approval decisions on proposed undertakings reduce threats to the long-term integrity of 
                                                        
140 See, Alexandre Kiss, ―Public Lectures on International Environmental Law‖ in Adrian J. Bradbrook et. 
al, The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 16. 
141 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 103. 
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socio-ecological systems by reducing extractive damage.
143
 In other words, decision 
makers must take into consideration the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated 
resources, and permit development initiatives under conditions that ensure careful 
extraction of resources. Essentially, therefore, decisions should ensure that natural capital 
is maintained at or near current levels.  
 
2.3.6 Socio-ecological Civility and Democratic Governance 
 
 As another core requirement for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al. 
propose that there should be a greater focus on better governance and developing better 
governance arrangements. This criterion is reflective of the simple point that 
sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and practice. And so, Gibson et al. 
propose that if the previously mentioned core requirements are to be met, decision 
makers must begin by recognizing that current decision-making structures and processes 
are ineffective.
144
 What is required to secure progress towards sustainability is 
governance thinking and arrangements that ―… move away from development for the 
people to development with and by the people.‖
145
 Therefore, central to this criterion is 
the application of sustainability principles through more transparent and better publicly 
informed deliberations. Through more transparent and better publicly informed 
deliberations, the desired result is a greater focus on sociological civility, i.e., ―…to be 
more thoughtful, open and flexible, and to examine our capacities and objectives in a 
                                                        
143
 Ibid. at 107. 
144 Ibid. at 108. 
145 Ibid. at 109. 
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more integrated way, with more humility, more far-sightedness, and more commitment to 




2.3.7 Precaution and Adaptation 
 
 Precaution and adaptation are some of the most heralded principles in 
environmental decision-making processes. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
encapsulates the very basic understanding of the precautionary principle:
147
  
―[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‖ 
 
 In sustainable decision-making, Gibson et al., propose that, in the main, a 
precautionary approach would seek to avoid undertakings that may imperil progress on 
other core requirements for sustainability. However, at the same time, a precautionary 
approach would also seek ―to act on incomplete but suggestive indicators of significant 
risk to social and ecological systems that are crucial for sustainability.‖
148
 Given the 
obvious complexity, Gibson et al.‘s guidance to decision-makers is to ―[r]espect 
uncertainty, avoid even poorly understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to the 
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147
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148 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 113. 
149 Ibid. at 111. 
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2.3.8 Immediate and Long-term Integration   
 
 The final core requirement for progress towards sustainability sets the policy 
objective for meeting all the other requirements. The policy objective is that decisions 
should ―[a]ttempt to meet all requirements for sustainability together as a set of 
interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive benefits.‖
150
 In other words, according 
to this requirement, the goal of sustainable decision-making is to effect decisions that 
seek to pursue all of the requirements at once so as to make gains in each area. This 
requirement recognizes the fact that because all the requirements overlap and are 
interdependent, failure or gains on one requirement will affect progress on others.
151
 So 
for instance, Gibson et al. note that ―[g]ains in livelihood sufficiency and opportunity will 
collapse if the integrity of supporting socio-ecological systems is compromised and key 




2.4  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter outlined the need for improved governance of marine spaces in order 
to protect their long-term viability by managing the manner, and extent to which marine 
spaces deliver services. Articulating and improving the governance arrangements is 
particularly necessary when new human needs, values and expectations of the coastal and 
marine environment arise. In the context of this study, this chapter highlighted the fact 
that when new services, such as the generation of renewable energy, are being demanded 
from our oceans, there is a clear mandate: develop new regulatory regimes where they do 
                                                        
150




not exist, and revise existing arrangements where they do exist. Part two of this Chapter 
developed a two-tiered analytical framework in which policy makers and regulators may 
go about achieving this mandate. The first tier of the analytical framework is the New 
Governance Approach as articulated by Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris 
Tollefson.
153
 The concept of this approach is particularly useful for policy makers and 
regulators. For one, the approach is not about adopting or advocating a certain course of 
action, procedure or method to solving public problems.  Rather, it is a way of taking 
stock of political practices, institutional structures and regulatory instruments and 
deciding where amongst these dimensions the power to make decisions respecting 
societal resources is concentrated. In other words, therefore, the value in the first tier of 
the analytical framework is that it provides a means by which regulators may understand, 
analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. This is a useful first 
step when trying to create new governance regimes or revise those already in existence as 
one would necessarily want to begin by understanding the political, institutional and 
regulatory nature of the governance arrangement under study. The only drawback to 
Howlett et al.‘s framework, if it can be considered a drawback at all, is that it stops at an 
evaluation of the decision-making process that leads to decisions and substantive 
outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a substantively good outcome would be. 
For any policy-maker or regulator, this would necessarily be their focus. In this regard, 
the second tier of the analytical framework was created to address the shortages of the 
first tier. In essence, the second tier is a substantive standard against which the 
effectiveness of governance regimes such as those governing offshore renewable energy 
can be measured. Many standards are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore 
                                                        
153 Howlett et al., ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44.   
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renewable energy regimes. Because these regimes impact ocean use and management, 
suitable criteria for effectiveness can be located in principles that advocate certain 
standards for stewardship of the oceans and seas. It was noted at the outset of the 
Chapter, that statements of principles for ocean governance can be found in a variety of 
sources: directives and protocols on good governance, international agreements, 
declarations and codes of conduct. Some of these principles include sustainable 
development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem approach and community-based 
management. Any of these principles may serve as legitimate criteria for measuring the 
effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore renewable energy regulation. 
Ultimately, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainable 
development was chosen as the second tier of the analytical framework as they constitute 
a workable minimal set of core sustainability requirements extrapolated from a wealth of 













The Main Drivers for Developing Renewable Sources of 
Energy 
 
3.1  Introduction and Chapter Overview 
 
 Energy is essential for the continued development of modern economies and for 
the maintenance of modern standards of living.
154
 In the contemporary world, there is a 
high demand for energy for the execution of daily activities. The intrinsic value of energy 
to all human activity is realized in the proclamation of energy as a ―…basic human 
need.‖
155
 It is needed to deliver adequate food, water, shelter, education, health care and 
employment. Indeed, without it, all human activity and development would come to a 
complete and instantaneous standstill.
156
 As the world‘s population increases at an 
exponential rate and aspires to a standard of living on the basis that now prevails in the 
global north, the demand for a consistent and reliable supply of energy will also increase 
exponentially.
157
 Already, the International Energy Agency has projected that world 
primary energy demand will increase by 40% between 2007 and 2030.
158
 
 Conventionally, most energy is supplied from the burning of fossil fuels – oil, gas 
and coal.
159
 Today, fossil fuels remain the dominant sources of primary energy 
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 In recent years, dependence on fossil fuels has created many challenges for 
the environment, the economy and the global energy system.
161
 The emerging scientific 
consensus is that dependence on fossil fuel combustion for the production of energy 
results in increased GHG emissions which, in turn, affect air quality and contribute to the 
rise in global temperatures. The prevailing reliance on fossil fuels also means that import-
dependent energy economies face an increased threat to receiving reliable supplies of 
energy in an energy market characterized by unequally distributed fossil fuel sources and 
fluctuating fuel costs.
162
 Together, ―[a]ll these factors contribute to the urgent need to 
transform the energy sector - which primarily relies on fossil fuels – to one that uses 
renewable energies and energy efficient measures.‖
163
 Strictly speaking, therefore, 
renewable energies combined with enhanced energy efficiency measures are necessary to 
meet the energy challenges of our time. However, some academics argue that energy 
conservation and improvements have an overall higher potential to contribute to energy 
solutions than renewable energies.
164
 This fact does not take in any way negate the 
importance of fuel switching to more sustainable sources of energy. It is perhaps best to 
think of both measures as a set of interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive 
benefits. As this study centers on renewable energies, this chapter will concentrate on the 
literature advocating a move away from carbon-based sources of energy in an effort to 
slow or possibly halt the adverse effects of exclusive reliance on hydrocarbons. In this 
                                                        
160 Ibid. Taken together, fossil fuels provide some 80 per cent of global energy needs, while fuelwood, 
hydropower and nuclear energy provide the rest. Ibid at 3 ¶ 5.  
161 Ibid at 6. 
162 IEA, ―WEO 2009‖ supra note 160. 
163 See, IRENA, ―Background‖, supra note 157.   
164 See, Yinka O. Omorogbe, ―Promoting Sustainable Development through the Use of Renewable Energy: 
The Role of the Law‖ in Donald N. Zillman et al, Beyond the Carbon Economy: Energy Law in Transition 
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respect, apart from energy efficiency measures, the focus must now be on the 
development of clean, safe, smart, sustainable and indigenous renewable energy 
generation technologies that impose the least regrettable impacts on the environment, 
human health and the economy.
165
 Renewable energy refers to all forms of energy which 
are ―alternative‖ to ―conventional‖ fossil and nuclear fuels.
166
 They include biomass, 
geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy, 
offshore wind), solar energy, and wind energy. 
 Not surprisingly, renewable energy generation has been at the fore of international 
community efforts for decades.
167
 Recently, international regard for renewable energy 
sources has been codified in the Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency.
168
 
As of 22 August 2010, 148 States have signed the Statue and 34 States have ratified it.
169
 
The Statute has entered into force on 8
th
 July 2010. Generally, the treaty calls for 
―…widespread and increased adoption and use of renewable energy with a view to 
sustainable development.‖
170
 Within the text, State Parties also recognize the real 
opportunity offered by renewable energy sources for gradually alleviating global 
problems of energy security, volatile energy prices, energy access, climate instability and 
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Assembly of the United Nations decided to convene an international conference on new and renewable 
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 Internationally, therefore, there has been much consensus on 
the urgent need and the attendant benefits of a shift to sustainable, renewable energy 
generation practices.  
 This chapter briefly outlines the factors considered to influence the adoption of 
renewable energy policies and technologies. Specifically, the chapter explores the 
contributions renewable energy makes to environmental preservation; the contribution 
renewable energy makes to the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 
providing increased access to energy; and the contribution renewable energy could make 
to alleviate the problem of energy insecurity. Briefly, the chapter thereafter makes an 
explicit link between the benefits to be had from renewable energies and Gibson et al.‘s 
eight core requirements for progress towards sustainability. Lastly, the chapter briefly 
identifies some of the barriers to the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
 
3.2  Renewable Energy Contributes to Environmental Preservation 
 
 Conventionally, natural resources like coal, oil and gas, have been extracted to 
produce energy for human consumption. This simple fact links the business of energy 
production to that of environmental preservation. Regrettably, every extraction has had 
real and tangible impacts on the environment.
172
 On the other hand, clean, renewable 
processes of energy generation gradually reduce the effects of deforestation, 
desertification, biodiversity loss and climate degradation commonly associated with 
                                                        
171 Ibid. See also, Report of the Secretary-General on the Promotion of New and Renewable Sources of 
Energy, UNGAOR, 64th Sess., UN Doc. A/64/277 (2009) at 4 ¶ 5 [UNGAOR, ―Promotion of Renewable 
Energy‖].  
172
 See generally, Rex J. Zedalis, International Energy Law: Rules governing future exploration, 
exploitation and use of renewable resources (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 2005) at 
233. 
 53 
conventional methods of energy generation.
173
 As such, the environmental benefits of 
switching to renewable energy are well established. 
 In many parts of Africa, there is a heavy reliance on the burning of firewood and 
charcoal to meet energy needs,
174
 and to sustain a charcoal trade industry for income 
generation.
175
 This practice has encouraged and intensified massive deforestation.
176
 In 
turn, deforestation causes soil erosion, floods, drought, desertification, loss of 
biodiversity,
177
 and accounts for almost 20% of global CO2 emissions, among many 
other things. These effects ultimately undermine the integrity of the socio-ecological 
system.
178
 Unfortunately, despite the stresses placed on the regenerative capacities of 
forests, the inextricable links of the charcoal trade industry to income generation and 
energy needs in Africa only serve to encourage the continued growth of the industry and 
further forest exploitation.
179
 The charcoal trade industry cannot be stopped anytime 
soon.
180
 However, reduction of its harmful impacts can be achieved through the 
implementation of measures that promote sustainable production and use of wood and 
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 and the use of alternative energy resources.
182
 Therefore, although renewable 
energy resources like biomass are only part of the solution, they help to curb 
deforestation pressures from the charcoal industry.
183
 Many renewable energy projects 
have been launched for this purpose.
184
 
 The fossil fuel industry is also adding to the degradation of the environment and 
the resulting depletion of natural resources. Most energy supplies come from the burning 
of fossil fuels. Combustion releases large amounts of pollutants into the atmosphere, 
particularly carbon emissions that cause global warming.
185
 However, for quite some 
time, there has been a denial of any correlation between fossil fuel use and global 
warming.
186
 Recently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has for the 
time being, settled the science on the matter
187
 However, there are still some who doubt 
the findings of the IPCC. While there are still skeptics, the numbers are low and the IPCC 
appears to be the most comprehensive and credible source of information on climate 
change.
188
 Climate change is real and is happening. Global average increases in air and 
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ocean temperatures pose immediate threats to the integrity of the environment.
189
 The 







 and coastal systems and low-lying 
areas.
193
 Specifically, small islands are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change and sea-level rise due to their limited size, proneness to natural hazards and 
external shocks, and low adaptive capacity.
194
 Some of the immediate threats of global 
warming that impact the overall tourism product and the environmental sustainability of 
Small Island Developing States include for instance, the destruction of marine 
ecosystems through ocean acidification and coral bleaching, and the demolition of coastal 
barriers. These impacts reduce the amenity value for coastal users and tourists.
195
 Such 
irreversible catastrophes inherently shock other economic activities such as the fishing 
industry and disrupt socio-cultural norms of coastal populations. The effects of global 
warming are never-ending, irreversible and cannot be ignored.
196
 To avoid dangerous 
atmospheric temperatures, the IPPC has recommended long-term stabilization of GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere. To do this, a portfolio of adaptation and mitigation 
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measures must be immediately
197




 Internationally, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
199
 
and its Kyoto Protocol
200
 recognizes the need for urgent and massive reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions in order to counter the effects of climate change. Specified parties to 
these treaties are legally bound to mitigate climate change by limiting anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGes).
201
 There are two main options available for 
effective emissions reduction: (1) development of processes that make fossil fuel 
production cleaner and more sustainable;
202
 and (2) development of renewable forms of 
energy. Though option one reduces CO2 emissions, it continues business as usual 
practices that contribute to natural resource depletion. While it is accepted that a 
‗portfolio of diverse adaptation and mitigation actions‘
203
 are necessary to combat climate 
change, renewable energy is the only initiative that delivers permanent GHG emission 
reductions. It is well accepted that our energy future needs alternative sources of energy, 
―…which when consumed, are free of environmental impact.‖
204
 However, an alternative 
view would seek to claim that there is much bigger picture, that is, that all sources of 
energy, renewable and non-renewable, are associated with benefits and harm. So for 
instance, on the one hand, fossil fuel generation produces the ‗harm‘ of GHG emissions. 
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On the other hand, renewable energies such as wave, wind, tidal, etc., produce some 
environmental impact (harm) associated with construction. Therefore, for governments, it 
is really a matter of making appropriate choices about what combination of energy 
sources brings the lowest harm while providing the greatest benefit. This view aside, it is 
generally accepted that renewable energy resources impose the least regrettable impacts 
on the environment, human health and the economy.
205
 In conjunction with climate 
change mitigation agendas, these characteristics give significant impetus to renewable 
energy development. In fact, some authors argue that global warming is the driving force 
behind renewable energy development.
206
 
 Lastly, if the events of the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have taught world 
leaders anything about conventional energy generation practices, it is the unadorned fact 
that ―[t]he time has come, once and for all, for [nations] to fully embrace a clean energy 
future.‖
207
 However, it is also argued that the oil spill is no new lesson, but a blatant and 
cruel reminder of environmental limits – a recurring fact to which world leaders are 
wise.
208
 Nevertheless, the message is clear; incorporating renewable forms of energy into 
the energy mix has great potential to contribute to the overall preservation of the 
environment.  
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3.3  Renewable Energy contributes to the attainment of Millennium 
 Development Goals by providing increased Access to Energy 
 
 Approximately 3 billion people in rural areas in developing countries rely on 
traditional biomass (wood, charcoal and dung) for cooking and heating.
209
 Seven hundred 
(700) million people in Least Developed Countries lack access to modern energy 
services.
210
 Six hundred (600) million people in Sub-Sahara Africa suffer the same 
fate.
211
 Worldwide, an estimated 1.5 billion people lack access to energy.
212
 ‗Access to 
energy‘ is defined as: ―access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for 
cooking and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses.‖
213
 Unfortunately, 
projected population growths only serve to widen the gap between the haves and the 
have-nots of access to modern forms of electricity. In 2000, world leaders committed to 
the attainment of eight MDGs.
214
 Of those goals, the 2015 deadline to cut world poverty 
in half is fast approaching.
215
 Access to energy is central to achieving the MDGs.
216
 The 
current trends on lack of access to modern energy services poses a significant barrier to 
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the creation of socio-economic opportunities for development.
217
 Hindering development 
is fundamentally incompatible with poverty eradication agendas. Without increased 
access to energy, the 2015 deadline and all other MDGs will not be met.
218
  
 Currently, the energy impoverished of the world are plagued by a plethora of 
extreme disadvantages and living conditions. Traditional indoor combustion of wood, 
charcoal and dung to meet energy needs has had significant health consequences.
219
 The 
practice causes high mortality rates in women and girls in West Africa who are 
traditionally responsible for this method of energy generation.
220
 Populations lacking 
access to energy are also deprived of access to food, clean water and sanitation, maternal 
health,
221
 basic healthcare services and equipment,
222
 and increased opportunities for 
education
223
. These problems are all intensified by increasing global temperatures, the 
ongoing global financial crisis and the instability of energy prices.
224
 Access to energy is 
therefore a key fundamental to reducing existing hardships in developing countries by 
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encouraging improved productivity, greater income-generating capacities,
225
 economic 
progress and overall human development
226
.  
 It is estimated that in order to cut poverty statistics in half and affect associated 
negatives by 2015, an additional 1.2 billion people will require access to electricity and 
1.9 billion people will need access to modern fuels.
227
 Given the necessity, how best can 
nations expand access to modern energy for the world‘s poor without stunting climate 
change initiatives? World leaders have agreed that renewable energy has huge a potential 
to provide ―decentralised access to energy, particularly in developing countries, and 
access to energy for isolated and remote regions and islands.‖
228
 In sum, the following 
syllogism is indisputable: The increased use of renewable energy can assist in providing 
increased access to energy; Increased access to energy is central to the attainment of the 
MDGs; Therefore, the increased use of renewable energy could make a significant 
contribution towards the attainment of the MDGs.   
3.4 Renewable Energy contributes to Energy Security 
 
 Globally, fossil fuels continue to play a major role in energy supply.
229
 
Industrialization, urbanization and rapid economic and population growth are driving 
world fossil-energy demand, and this is projected to increase by 40% between 2007 and 
2030.
230
 For quite some time, increases in global energy demand have raised international 
concern regarding the ability to secure affordable, consistent and reliable supplies of 
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energy to meet growing demands.
231
 When energy demands exceed supply, there is a 
shortage of energy resources, which means that some energy demands will not be met.
232
 
The transportation industries, for instance, are almost entirely dependent on petroleum.
233
 
Where supply fails to meet demand, the transportation systems become vulnerable to 
market pressures and volatile costs. If we take into account all other fossil-fuel dependent 
activities in our modern societies, when supplies fail to meet demand, there is significant 
threat to economic prosperity and, even national security.
234
  Simply put, economies are 
faced with the trouble of allocating scarce resources when demands exceed supply. 
Because efficiency occurs at equilibrium, there is immense pressure to balance out the 
demand. To do some of this, the usual recourse is to increase the price of energy. This 
increase in fuel costs amplifies energy security concerns when energy demands exceed 
supply. In short, supply and demand determine the value of energy.
235
 One alternative to 
paying higher fossil fuel costs is to reduce import demand or increase indigenous supply 
through the development of renewable forms of energy.
236
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 The International Energy Agency describes energy security as ―the uninterrupted 
physical availability [of energy] at a price which is affordable, while respecting 
environmental concerns.‖
237
 In very basic terms, energy security refers to the security of 
energy supply.
238
 Typically, when one speaks of a secure supply of energy, it is often in 
relation to a secure supply of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). There is a popular fear that 
meeting the world‘s increasing energy demands is speedily depleting global fossil fuel 
reserves. The fear of a peak in fossil fuel extraction often leads to questions of energy 
security and intergenerational equity.
239
 However, the International Energy Agency has 
predicted that there are enough reserves to supply the projected demand increase.
240
 Coal 
for one, is the most abundant fossil fuel in the world. It is geographically dispersed and is 
set to play a dominant role in future energy supply.
241
 Its main drawback is its high 
carbon content which, as discussed, contributes to global warming. On the other hand, 
natural gas energy emits lesser amounts of carbon than coal and oil.
242
 It is estimated that 
world oil and gas reserves are enough to cover the increase in demand through to 2030 
and beyond.
243
 However, world oil and gas reserves are concentrated in countries like 
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Russia, but more so, in the Middle East.
244
 Though it is predicted that there are enough 
reserves to supply the projected demand increase, these reserves are attended by many 
risks in the global energy system. If the geopolitics of energy demand and supply are 
appropriately observed, it becomes clear that one of the real problems in assuring a secure 
supply of energy is the fact that oil and gas reserves are not widespread, but that they are 
concentrated in the hands of very few countries.
245
 At the end of the 2009 oil and gas 
year, it was estimated that the twelve (12) countries that form the membership of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, (OPEC), control 79.6% of World 
proven oil resources.
246
 It is further estimated that 70% of OPEC oil reserves are 
concentrated in the member states from the Middle East.
247
 To put the energy security 
situation into proper geopolitical context, it is helpful to note the dominance of some 
Middle Eastern countries over the world‘s proven oil reserves. So for instance, at the end 
of 2009, Saudi Arabia held roughly 19% of the world‘s total reserves, while Iran held 
10%, and Iraq, 8%.
248
 The character of these resource-rich countries in the Middle East is 
particularly important. 
 Middle Eastern reserves are historically under threat from political instability and 
conflict characteristic of the region.
249
 The World Energy Outlook has continually 
predicted a future mismatch between countries that demand energy and those that supply, 
wherein there is a growing dependence of the former on the latter for energy.
250
 This is 
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today‘s reality for many import-dependent countries around the world.
251
 This reality 
forces an increase in international trade between the haves and the have-nots.
252
 Industry 
strikes and terrorism, for example, are acts of political instability characteristic of oil-
producing regions that threaten a ‗secure supply of energy‘ by lowering oil production 
and increasing the risk of future production shortfalls.
253
 It is this political instability and 
conflict that is the main issue of concern for all ‗have-nots‘ that increasingly depend on 
these high-risk reserves.
254
 Political instability creates global uncertainties about retaining 
supplies of energy in the near and distant future. As previously noted, secure, reliable and 
affordable energy sources are fundamental to economic stability and development. 
Therefore, these uncertainties are highly disfavoured by import-dependent countries. 
 Additionally, by affecting production, political instability indirectly increases the 
price of oil and adds to concerns over price volatility and energy affordability.
255
 As well, 
the very fact that few countries dominate the remaining oil reserves means that they have 
a great influence over the cost of oil. As world oil consumption continues to rise, global 
distribution of oil reserves will continue to shift in favour of Middle Eastern countries.
256
 
Because most reserves are concentrated in the hands of a few, and that share continues to 
increase, it gives Middle Eastern countries and Russia considerable market power and 
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ability to influence the price of their product.
257
 So for example, oil price volatility from 
the Middle East coupled with the world‘s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil represents 
a legitimate energy security risk to all oil importing economies dependent upon that 
region.
258
 In sum, price volatility can negatively impact energy affordability. Such 
impacts are undesirable.  
 In addition to the risks associated with the location of oil and gas reserves in high-
risk regions, energy security is also concerned with the ‗uninterrupted physical 
availability of energy‘.
259
 Supply disruptions have great potential to engender higher 
energy costs for consumers,
260
 and significantly affect modern economic activity. A 
supply disruption in gas for example, ―… could cost the United Kingdom up to £600 
million in lost output.‖
261
 These disruptions: 
… may occur at any point in energy supply chains; may originate at a 
range of geographical locations; may affect one or more fuel types; may 





 Supply disruptions may be geopolitically, environmentally, technically or 
economically induced.
263
 Noted above is the ability of market factors like political 
instability to impact upon the exploration and production of energy.
264
 Other political 
factors may also cause disruptions. Acts of terrorism and piracy
265
 on key sea-lanes
266
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 are major contributors to short and long-term supply disruptions, and 
render transportation methods inefficient.
268
 Additionally, the use of power grids makes 
modern energy infrastructures vulnerable to cyber attacks.
269
 Cyberspace allows hackers 
to inflict equipment sabotage, seize control of gas pipelines and steal information.
270
 The 




 A fracture in state relations and/or negotiations may also provoke supply 
disruptions.
272
 History further proves that use of force may also result in supply 
disruptions in the form of embargos.
273
 Furthermore, the revival of pervasive resource 
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 driven by high oil prices also threatens an uninterrupted energy flow. 
States like Russia and those belonging to OPEC are conducting resources nationalism 
activities in order to restrict access to energy resources, so that they may use their 
dominance over reserves to strategically coerce economic and foreign policy goals.
275
 A 
consistent and reliable supply of energy is likely to be affected where reserves are used 
for political purposes which conflict with commercial objectives.
276
 For instance, the 
vesting of control over oil resources in national oil corporations which are sometimes less 
effective than their international peers, result in ―…decreased productive capacity and 
ultimately, supply shortages.‖
277
 Lastly, the gradual resurgence of ‗oil violence‘ in oil 
producing countries like Nigeria holds grave potential to affect oil output.
278
   
 Natural disasters such as typhoons, hurricanes
279
 and earthquakes, whether 
occurring locally or regionally, may also disrupt energy supplies by causing damage to 
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 As well, extreme weather events may also interrupt supplies by 





) and technical failures (plant breakdown) during extraction, processing and 
transportation are additional risks to energy security.
283
   
 Energy security means different things to different players in the global energy 
market, depending on whether the player in question is a have or a have-not in regard to 
energy supply.
284
 The discussion in this chapter focused on the have-nots in the regime. 
Have-nots are especially vulnerable to supply interruptions because of their dependence 
on fossil fuels. The energy security challenge, therefore, is to minimize exposure to 
uncontrollable and unpredictable security risks by isolating vulnerable energy economies 
from supply disruptions and volatile prices. Among other initiatives, isolation can be 
achieved over the long-term through diversification of fuel type and fuel source.
285
 
Internationally, it is recognized that diversification by shifting to renewable energy is one 
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3.5  The Relationship between Gibson et al.’s Criteria for Sustainability 
and the benefits to be had from Renewables 
 
 This section seeks to make the link between the benefits to be had from renewable 
energies outlined above and Gibson et al.‘s eight core requirements for progress towards 
sustainability outlined in the latter part of Chapter 2. As to the benefits to be had from 
generating renewable energy, the first point made in this chapter is that incorporating 
renewable forms of energy into the energy mix has great potential to contribute to the 
overall preservation of the environment. Specifically, it was noted that renewable 
processes of energy generation has the potential to gradually reduce the effects of 
deforestation, desertification, biodiversity loss and climate degradation commonly 
associated with conventional methods of energy generation. These potential benefits of 
renewable energies find favour with Gibson et al.‘s requirement for socio-ecological 
system integrity, intergenerational equity, intragenerational equity and resource 
maintenance. 
 Secondly, it was noted that renewable energy contributes to the attainment of 
MDGs by providing increased access to energy. Here, it was noted that access to energy 
is fundamental to reducing existing hardships in developing countries by encouraging 
improved productivity, greater income-generating capacities, economic progress, local 
development and overall human development. These benefits ultimately find favour with 
Gibson et al.‘s requirements for livelihood sufficiency and intragenerational equity. 
 Lastly, it was noted that renewable energy could make a significant contribution 
to energy security. In the main, the use of renewables puts a hedge against volatile energy 
prices making energy more affordable. This benefit would make considerable gains on 
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Gibson et al.‘s requirement for livelihood sufficiency and opportunity and 
intergenerational equity. 
 In sum therefore, issues such as environmental preservation, GHG emission 
reductions, attainment of MDGs, energy security – all benefits of renewable energy – 
flow naturally from Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability. 
In other words, the general principle that may be extrapolated from the foregoing is that, 
taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of renewable energy is a 
sustainable initiative. 
3.6  Barriers to the Deployment of Renewable Energy Technologies 
 
 Today, many countries around the world have successfully incorporated forms of 
renewable energy into their supply systems. These renewables include biomass, 
geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy, 
offshore wind), solar energy and wind energy. Outlined above are some of the factors that 
have driven the evolutionary shift in these supply systems. However, despite the great 
potential for renewable energy to assist in bridging the challenges to the world‘s energy 
future, several factors hinder deeper integration of renewables into the global energy mix. 
While it is possible to make a general list of these hindrances, the character and extent of 
the hindrances are region and country specific. Generally, cost and financing, technology 
and technological capacity, food security, lengthy permitting procedures, lack of policy, 
regulatory and legislative frameworks and insufficient awareness of the opportunities for 
renewable energy are all factors that provide resistance, delay or obstruction to renewable 
energy deployment. In addition to being country specific, some barriers to renewable 
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energy deployment are also specific to particular forms of renewable technologies. The 
following chapter explores some of these barriers in relation to offshore wind. 
3.7  Conclusion 
 
 The desire for continued socio-economic development has often brought 
regrettable impacts upon the natural environment on which they depend. Decades of 
unsustainable development and denial are backfiring. Limits to the resilience of our 
environment are now on prominent display in the international arena, along with the 
challenges of energy security, volatile energy prices, failure to meet the demands and 
objectives of the MDGs, and the need for a sustainable way forward. The international 
community has now come to the consensus that renewable energy offers a key 














                                                        




Wind Energy – From Onshore to Offshore: Issues and 
Challenges 
 
4.1  Introduction and Chapter Overview 
 In keeping with the objective to propose a policy and governance framework for 
the regulation of offshore renewable energy development in the OECS, this chapter is a 
narrative literature review of those technologies that impact ocean use and management. 
Though there are tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion, wave and wind forms of 
offshore energy, this chapter focuses only on wind energy. This is not for the purposes of 
restricting the scope of the study, but as the decision that is commensurate with the 
maturity of the technology, and the critical learnings to be had from the regulatory 
experiences in the United Kingdom. The chapter begins with a brief historical overview 
of the development of onshore wind power, what it is, how it operates and continues with 
an overview of the advantages and disadvantages associated with modern development 
and operation of onshore wind. Thereafter, chapter 4 explores some of the reasons why 
countries around the world have begun to move wind power development offshore. The 
practical challenges of developing offshore wind energy are then discussed in relation to 






4.2  Wind Energy: A Brief History of is Evolution 
 
 Wind is an abundant and renewable resource that can supply a significant 
percentage of the world‘s electricity demands.
288
 Harnessing its energy potential is 
nothing new. Early uses of wind can be traced to Christopher Columbus‘ first voyage to 
the ‗New World‘ in 1492. Trade winds were used to propel La Niña, La Pinta and Santa 
María from Palos, Spain, across unexplored waters to San Salvador in the Bahamas.
289
 
Additionally, for over 800 years, wind energy has been used to power windmills in 
Europe for grinding grain into flour and meal and to provide power for agriculture and 
other industrial activities.
290
  Additionally, windmills contributed to the expansion of 
railroads in the ‗Wild, Wild West‘ of America by pumping water for use by steam 
locomotives in the industrial era.
291
 In turn, the construction of new railroad networks 
enabled westward expansion in America by facilitating cheaper transportation and 
distribution of goods and services. Railroads spurred big business and economic growth 
and are credited to have made an indelible contribution to American Industrialization.
292
 
Wind energy, therefore, made early rural electrification,
293
 industry, trade, travel, 
communication and overall economic growth possible.  
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 Wind energy also served as one of the solutions to negate escalating oil prices 
during the 1970 oil crises.
294
 In the past few decades, heightened risks to energy security 
and the issue of climate change have redirected interest towards wind energy 
development.
295
 With this renewed interest, onshore wind energy grew and matured into 
one of the first renewable technologies deployed commercially.
296
 Generally, harvesting 
the energy potential of wind becomes possible when atmospheric winds rotate a rotor-
blade propeller on a wind tower rotator shaft that turns a wind turbine.
297
 Today, the 
technology has gained global popularity and leads the way in renewable energy 
generation.
298
 All the same, the onshore wind does not come without a few inherent 
disadvantages. 
 
4.3  Problems Associated with Onshore Development 
 
 There are several problems associated with onshore wind development. This 
section briefly touches upon the following points: (1) The negative impact wind farms 
pose to wild life conservation; (2) The high cost and intermittent nature of wind energy; 
(3) The conflict wind farms pose to other land uses and interests which has sparked 
strong ‗not in my backyard‘ protest. 
 There has been much apprehension about the negative impact wind farms pose to 
wildlife conservation. Specifically, the rotating blades used to harness energy from the 
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wind are of great concern because of their potential to contribute to increased bird and bat 
mortality. However, it is argued that while wind farms increase risks to bird mortality, 
their contribution to bird mortality is less significant than death caused by cats, 
electrocution by electrical transmission wires, collisions with windows, poisoning by 
pesticides and other pre-existing threats to bird life.
299
 Regardless of the amount of bird 
deaths caused by wind farms in comparison to other pre-existing threats, the point to note 
is that wind farms present legitimate risks to wild life.  
 One early disadvantage to the development of wind energy was its inability to 
compete with considerably lower costs of generating energy from fossil fuel sources.
300
 
However, ―[o]wing to the increasing cost of fossil fuels, the value given to GHG 
emission reductions and the reducing costs of wind turbine technology, wind projects are 
beginning to compete directly with fossil-fuel plants as a source of electricity generation 
in the windiest countries.‖
301
 Though these factors are slowly bridging the gap between 
the cost of fossil fuel electricity and the cost of wind generated electricity,
302
 the ability of 
wind to be economically competitive varies from site to site and country to country, and 
depends greatly on available wind speeds, the turbine technology used, and many other 
variables.
303
 Apart from its influence on the cost of energy, the variability of wind speeds 
poses other interconnected disadvantages. For, though wind is an abundant resource, its 
                                                        
299 Sagrillo et al., ―Power from the Wind‖, supra note 293 at 10-13. Here, the authors argue that the bird 
and bat mortality can be minimizd by selecting sites that are out of migratory patterns, using taller wind 
machines with longer blades which rotate slower. These turbines are better avoided by birds.  
300 Ibid.             
301 Staudt, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 290 at 96. 
302 See, Arnold W. Reitze Jr., ―Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World‖ (2010) 34 Wm. & Mary 
Envtl. L. & Pol‘y Rev. 821 at 868 and 869. 
303
 See generally, Søren Krohn, Poul-Erik Morthorst & Shimon Awerbuch, The Economics of Wind Energy 
(European Wind Energy Association, 2009) online: European Wind Energy Association 
<http://www.ewea.org>. 
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variability means that it is not always predictable.
304
 The electricity generated is 
intermittent and creates risks of possible shortfalls in supply.
305
 Therefore, for modern 
purposes, wind power would require the use of batteries to store surplus energy, or 




 Additionally, to meaningfully effect emission reductions and meet modern energy 
demands, wind farms would have to be constructed in great numbers and would, 
therefore, require large areas of land.
307
 In any given area, but more so in densely 
populated areas and/or small countries, there is simply not enough land available to 
construct wind turbines.
308
 Worse, there is not enough available land ―… with the right 
ingredients for a wind project: strong and steady winds, a welcoming community and 
easy access to transmission.‖
309
 If onshore wind development continues to grow, at some 
point in time, construction will inevitably conflict with other land uses and interests 
(unless of course construction is located in remote areas which are burdened with 
expensive transmission costs
310
). One immediate concern is the proximity of wind 
                                                        




307 Staudt, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 290 at 108 ¶ 4.3 and 4.4. The point to note is that if offshore wind 
farms are not constructed in large numbers, then their energy output would be minimal, a fact that does not 
payback for construction and operation costs. Therefore, such projects would be rendered economic 
failures.  
308 See generally, Thijs Smith, Marting Junginger & Ruud Smits, ―Technological Learning in Offshore 
Wind Energy: Different Roles for Government‖ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 6431 [Smith et al, ―Technological 
Learning‖]. See also, Staudt, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 290 at 108 ¶ 4.4 where the author notes that ―wind 
energy does not have a high power density, and so wind farms of comparable power rating to conventional 
power stations require large land areas. A 100MW wind farm might be spread across 8 square kilometers of 
land.‖ He also notes that ―the tower footprint is very small. Less than 3% of the land of a wind farm is no 
longer useful for its original purpose (e.g. tillage, grazing)‖.  
309 See, Elisa Wood, ―Wind Farms: Are the Best Spots Taken? – Jostling for position: Where does wind 
development go from here?‖ Renewable Energy World International Magazine 13:3 (31 May 2010) online: 
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com>. 
310 Transmission costs and other related issues tend to restrict further growth of wind farms.  
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turbines to residential areas. Traditionally, onshore wind turbines have often been 
characterized by their negative visual
311
 and noise impact,
312
 which homeowners claim 
contribute to the decline of property values
313
. Proponents argue that this kind of 
opposition to wind farms is not entirely genuine.
314
 They claim that ―… those who find 
wind turbines to be unsightly often ignore the great many forms of visual blight that litter 
our landscape, among them cellphone towers, water towers, electric transmission lines, 
radio towers and billboards.‖
315
 Despite, the soundness of this fact, the ‗not in my 
backyard syndrome‘ or ―nimbyism‖ in relation to onshore wind farm development is 
exceptionally vibrant, well organized and influential.
316
 In the United Kingdom for 
instance, there are over 150 groups that have fought tirelessly against the construction of 
wind farms in their backyards.
317
 These groups have continually ―…stymied a reliable 
                                                        
311 The first wind farms were particularly visually intrusive because of their premature state of 
development. Today, wind turbines are much larger and fewer units are needed to generate a significant 
amount of electricity. Therefore, the visual impact is less intrusive on the natural environment. Visual 
impact can also be managed by using uniform turbine technology, colour, height, and direction of rotation. 
See, Staudt, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 290 at 108 ¶ 4.3. 
312 Ibid. at 109 ¶ 4.5 where the author notes that although earlier wind turbine designs were much noisier, 
wind farms would still require a distance of 500 meters to reduce audibility. 
313 See Paul Thomas v. The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region No. 22 and Township of 
Amaranth File No. WR 70364 at 6. For tax purposes, the complainant appealed against the current value 
assessment (CVA) of his home ($225,000) on the ground that the value of his property was negatively 
impacted by noise levels of 40 decibels which emanated from a transformer station directly opposite his 
house. The appeal was allowed and the complainant‘s CVA was reduced to $127,000 for the 2008 tax year. 
For present purposes, the hydro plant served a nearby wind farm in the Amaranth municipality. The 
decision is cited as having set precedent on wind power noise and property values. See, Bob Aaron, ARB 
Decision on Wind Power Sets Precedent, online: The Legal Tree <http://www.legaltree.ca/node/1332>.  
314 Sagrillo et al., ―Power from the Wind‖, supra note 293 at 8 – 18. 
315 Ibid. at 13. Here, the authors continue to demonstrate the obvious: that people have grown accustomed 
to these ‗ubiquitous‘ structures and in so doing, fail to see their impact on natural beauty. They reckon that 
the public has come to accept these structures because they have not been made the subject of public 
inquiry, but rather forced upon them by the government of the day.    
316 See, Andrew Whitehead, ―NIMBY‘s Threat to UK Wind Power‖ The Birmingham Post (6 August 
2009), online: The Birmingham Post <http://www.birminghampost.net> [Whitehead, ―NIMBY‘s Threat to 
UK Wind Power‖]. 
317
 See, Alasdair Cross, ―Winning over the ‗Nimby blockade‘‖ BBC News (30 August 2009) Online: BBC 





 and have now become significant barriers to renewable energy 
development.
319
 One way to ―overcome‖ this barrier is to move development to the 
offshore terrain
320
 where there is less nimbyism,
321
 more development space, and more 




4.4  Wind Energy: Moving Onshore to Offshore 
 
 Until recently, harnessing clean, renewable energy from the winds was an 
undertaking reserved for onshore development. Technology advanced by Denmark 
opened this exclusive industry to the wide expanse of the offshore marine territory. In 
2002, the Horns Rev wind farm sited 14-20 km off the Danish west coast came into 
operation. With an installed capacity of 160 MW, the project signaled the end of a 
pioneering phase in offshore wind energy development and is credited as having 
                                                        
318 See, James Kanter, ―Local Opposition Stalls British Wind Power‖, The New York Times (5 August 
2009), online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com> [Kanter, ―Local Opposition Stalls British 
Wind Power‖].  
319  Patrick Devine-Wright, ―Beyond NIMBYism: towards an integrated framework for Understanding 
Public Perceptions of Wind Energy‖ (2005) 8(2) Wind Energy 125 [Devine-Wright, ―Beyond 
NIMBYism‖].  
320 See, Mark Challis, ―Offshore Wind – planning for the new era‖ (2001) 8 International Energy Law and 
Taxation Review 180 at 180 where the author notes that the principle advantage of offshore wind farm is 
that the planning controversy, [nimbyism], can be avoided. However, see Maarten Wolsink, ―Near-shore 
wind power—Protected seascapes, environmentalists‘ attitudes, and the technocratic planning perspective‖ 
(2010) 27 Land Use Policy 195 at 196 where the author suggests that moving wind development offshore 
to avoid planning controversy can be considered an example of the general tendency to take refuge in still 
unproven applications when current technologies are facing barriers. The author reasons that ―[t]he idea 
that issues of acceptance could be avoided by going ‗over the sea and far away is actually rather naïve.‖ He 
supports his reasoning by referring to much of the new challenges and issues associated with offshore wind 
development outlined in section 4.6 below.  
321 The prospect of offshore wind development has won over the support of NIMBY protesters for the mere 
fact that locating wind projects offshore align with Not-In-My-Back-Yard interests. See, Tim Gray, Claire 
Haggett & Derek Bell, ―Offshore Wind Farms and Commercial Fishing: A Study in Stakeholder 
Consultation‖ (2005) 8(2) Ethics Place and Environment 127 at 138 [Gray et al., ―Stakeholder 
Consultation‖].  
322 Smith et al, ―Technological Learning‖, supra note 310. 
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―…focused the attention of the [wind] industry.‖
323
 For quite some time, Denmark stood 
as the leading producer of offshore wind energy in the world. However, as the idea of 
exploiting the energy potential of more consistent winds in the offshore terrain quickly 
spread to other marine countries, Denmark‘s dominance over the evolving industry was 
fettered. To date, most development has been concentrated in North European countries: 
Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Of these countries, the 
United Kingdom government and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland have shown a keen interest in developing the winds along their 
20,000km long coastline and the vast area of the adjacent sea. This keen interest has 
spurred a massive growth in offshore wind energy. In 2008, the United Kingdom 
overtook Denmark as the world leader in installed offshore wind capacity, and continues 




4.5  Impetus for Offshore Wind Development in the United Kingdom 
 
 Many factors have influenced the leadership and continued growth of offshore 
wind energy generation in the United Kingdom. This section briefly outlines some of the 
political factors that have encouraged offshore wind development in the UK. On one 
hand, international and domestic obligations to reduce GHG emissions have driven the 
development offshore wind in the UK. On the other hand, the desire to meet renewable 
energy targets at the European Union and National level has also given significant 
                                                        




324 See, Department of Trade and Industry, The UK Renewable Energy Strategy (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2009) at 29 ¶ 1.11 [DTI, ―UK Renewable Energy Strategy‖]. 
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political impetus for the development of offshore wind. Further, the ability of offshore 
wind to contribute to energy security is also a factor that stimulates development. 
 The impetus for the development in the United Kingdom is often traced to 
Denmark‘s publication of the European Wind Atlas
325
 which effectively documented and 
mapped wind climate, magnitude and distribution of wind resources in European 
Community countries, both onshore and offshore. The 1989 study identified the United 
Kingdom as having the greatest wind resource of any European nation and, therefore, 
best placed for offshore wind development.
326
 This finding has been echoed in recent 
wind capacity assessments, confirming that offshore wind power generation can 
contribute to wider renewable energy production, and in turn, the related policy 
objectives of emission reduction and security of energy supply in the United Kingdom.
327
 
For these reasons, offshore wind electricity generation has always formed a core part of 




                                                        
325
 See, Stephen A. Jay, At the Margins of Planning: Offshore Wind Farms in the United Kingdom 
(Hamshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008) at 10 -11 [Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖]. See 
also, Troen, I., E.L. Petersen and Risø National Laboratory, European Wind Atlas (Roskilde, 1989). 
326 See, Jay, ―Offshore Wind Farms in the UK‖, supra note 327 at 10 -11. at 11. See also, Godfrey Boyle, 
―UK Offshore Wind Potential: How Offshore Wind Could Supply a quarter of UK electricity by 2024‖ 
(2006) 7(4) Refocus 26 at 26 [Boyle, ―UK Offshore Wind Potential‖]. Here, the author refers to the United 
Kingdom as the ‗Saudi Arabia of wind energy‘. 
327 See generally, Environmental Change Institute, Wind Power and the UK Wind Resource (Oxford: 
Environmental Change Institute, 2005). The study also showed that wind tends to blow more strongly when 
demand is highest, during the day and winter months. Also, see generally, Dr. Nicholas Fichaux & Justin 
Wilkes, Oceans of Opportunity – Harnessing Europe‟s largest domestic energy resource (European Wind 
Energy Association, 2009). See also, The Offshore Valuation Group, The Offshore Valuation – A valuation 
of the UK‟s offshore renewable energy resource (London: Public Interest Research Centre, 2010) at 30 and 
33. 
328
 See, Department of Trade and Industry, Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future – Creating a Low 
Carob Economy (London: The Stationary Office, 2003) at 54 [DTI, ―Energy White Paper 2003‖]. See also, 
DTI, ―UK Renewable Energy Strategy‖, supra note 326 at 10 ¶ 2.1. 
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  The United Kingdom is bound by international and domestic obligations to reduce 
GHG emissions. Internationally, the Kyoto Protocol
329
 requires that the United Kingdom 
cut its emissions by 12.5% below 1990 levels by the first commitment period, 2012.
330
 At 
the domestic level, Parliament passed the Climate Change Act 2008.
331
 The Act 
represents the first of its kind in the international community. It sets long-term, legally 
binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. By 2050,
332
 the United 
Kingdom must achieve an 80% cut relative to 1990 levels, and in the interim, at least a 
34% cut in emissions by 2020.
333
 Because two-thirds of the United Kingdom‘s emissions 
come from energy use, the Act serves as a driver for large-scale adoption of low-carbon 
sources of energy, such as offshore wind. To meet these targets, the government 
published the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and 
Energy
334
 to serve as a roadmap to 2020 and beyond. The plan requires that 40% of 
electricity be generated from low carbon sources --- renewables, nuclear and carbon 
capture and storage --- if a 34% emission cut by 2020 is to be met.
335
 Renewable energy 
is expected to supply 30% of the low carbon energy target (40%).
336
 Finally, in 
recognition of the indelible role renewable energy is to play in the UK Low Carbon 
                                                        
329 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 17. 
330 Ibid. at Annex B.  
331 Climate Change Act 2008 (U.K.), 2000, c. 27 [Climate Change Act]. 
332 Note that the 2050 target is 20% more ambitious than that recommended by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution. See generally, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Energy – The 
Changing Climate (2000) (London: The Stationary Office, 2000).  
333 Climate Change Act, supra note 333 at sec 1. The UK‘s performance on these targets is reported as 
having been of ―good progress‖. See, Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK Low Carbon 
Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and Energy (London: The Stationary Office, 2009) at 60 
online: Department of Energy and Climate Change <http://www.decc.gov.uk> [UK Transition Plan]). 
Noteworthy, that ―good progress‖ translates into a 21% reduction of GHG emissions below 1990 levels. 
―Good progress,‖ at least domestically, may very well be an understatement given that the emissions cut 
almost double the Kyoto requirements. 
334
 UK Transition Plan, supra note 335. 
335 Ibid. at 38 and 52. 
336 Ibid. at 4 and 60. 
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Transition Plan, the government developed also, a Renewable Energy Strategy
337
 to 
secure its advancement. The final renewable commitment is to ensure that 15% of the 
total electricity supplied comes from renewable sources by 2020.
338
 It is anticipated that 
offshore wind energy will be the prime contributor to the overall renewable energy 
generation target.
339
 At the Community level, it is expected that by 2030, approximately 
half of Europe‘s wind electricity will be produced offshore.
340
 
  As well, by generating 15% of total electricity supply from renewable sources, 
the United Kingdom would be able to reduce ―…overall fossil fuel demand by 10% and 
gas imports by between 20-30% against what they would have been in 2020.‖
341
 Because 
offshore wind is expected to meet the bulk of the 15% target, it contributes to improving 
energy security in the UK by helping to recover some measure of energy self-sufficiency. 
Oil, gas and coal account for 90% of energy needs in the United Kingdom.
342
 Over the 
past decade, oil and gas reserves have been on the decline.
343
 Presently, the United 
Kingdom does not retain a secure supply of these high-demand fossil fuels. The potential 
                                                        
337 DTI, ―UK Renewable Energy Strategy‖, supra note 326.  
338 Ibid. at 10 ¶ 1.2. This represents an increase in the share of renewables by almost a factor of seven from 
about 2.25% in 2008, in scarcely more than a decade. The EU 2009 Directive on the use and promotion of 
renewable energy also legally obligates the UK to supply 15% renewable energy to the national grid by 
2020. See, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] O.J. L 140/16 at 46 [Renewables Directive].  
339 See, Stephen Shergold & Jacqui O‘Keeffe, ―A climate for change? A case for offshore wind farm 
development‖ (2001) 12 International Energy Law & Taxation Review 261 at 262 [Shergold, ―A climate 
for change?‖]. Here, the authors note that ―the main advantage enjoyed by offshore wind power at present 
is that the Government perceives it as one of the key sources to meet renewables obligations and hence the 
climate change programme.‖ See also, Boyle, ―UK Offshore Wind Potential‖, supra note 328. 
340 See, Dr. Nicholas Fichaux & Justin Wilkes, Oceans of Opportunity – Harnessing Europe‟s Largest 
Domestic Energy Resource (European Wind Energy Association, 2009) at 14. 
341 DTI, ―UK Renewable Energy Strategy‖ supra note 326 at 26 ¶ 1.7. 
342 Ibid. at 105 ¶ 4.02 
343 See, Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK Oil Reserves and Estimated Ultimate Recovery 
2009, online: Department of Energy and Climate Change 
<https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/information/bb_updates/chapters/Table4_3.htm>. See also, Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, UK Gas Reserves and Estimated Ultimate Recovery 2009, online:  
Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
<https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/information/bb_updates/chapters/Table4_4.htm>.  
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contribution that offshore wind can make to energy security is therefore a major factor 
that has and continues to influence development of the offshore wind industry in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
4.5.1 Other Practical and Technical Advantages to Locating Wind Farms 
Offshore 
 
 As previously noted, moving wind farms to the offshore terrain has many 
practical advantages. These advantages include: (1) more development space;  (2) greater 
turbine sizes; (3) easier delivery of turbine technology by sea; (4) less nimbyism and land 
acquisition complexities; and (5) greater average wind speeds. Firstly, the wide expanse 
of the ocean provides more development space for the construction of major projects.
344
 
This is especially important given the increasing technological trend to use larger wind 
turbines with rotor diameters of 60M or more, in order to generate more, and significantly 
cheaper, electricity.
345
 Unlike onshore development, the wide expanse of the ocean does 
not restrict wind turbine size;
346
 instead, it better accommodates advancements in wind 
generation technology. For instance, delivery of massive wind turbines to offshore sites is 
relatively easier by barge or ship, in comparison to delivery by land for onshore works.
347
 
Additionally, erection of large structures in the ocean is easily facilitated by the use of 
                                                        
344 Garrad Hassan et al., Offshore Wind Energy Ready to Power a Sustainable Europe – Final Report 
(Concerted Action on Offshore Wind Energy in Europe, 2001) at 1-1 ¶ 1.1 [Hassan et al., ―Offshore Wind 
Energy‖].  
345 John Twidell, ―Fundamentals of Wind Energy‖ in John Twidell and Gaetano Gaudiosi, Offshore Wind 
Power (UK: Multi-Science Publishing Co. Ltd, 2009) at 23 ¶ 4 [Twidell, ―Wind Energy‖].  The authors 
note that the emerging economic and technological consensus is that ‗the unit cost of electricity from wind 
turbines tend to decrease with increase in rotor blade length, i.e. large wind turbines produce cheaper 
electricity.‘ They note that the seas are particularly accommodating in this respect. 
346
 Ibid. 
347 Ibid. Delivery of large turbine structures by road is extremely difficult and conflicts with other highway 
uses. 
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 Additionally, the Crown Estate, as a body corporate, is charged with the 
management of land, other property, and the rights and interests that are vested in the 
Crown.
349
 The seabed extending to 12 nm from the baseline (the territorial sea) forms part 
of Crown ―land‖ and is ―owned‖ and regulated by the Crown Estate. Once declared, a 
coastal State also holds exclusive rights to the exploration and use of natural resources in 
the exclusive economic zone. Therefore, by moving offshore, developers escape land 
acquisition complexities and delays associated with onshore wind development.
350
  
 Moreover, because onshore topography negatively impacts average wind 
speeds,
351
 the resource potential is much greater offshore, i.e., the wind strength is much 
stronger and less turbulent over the seas.
352
 In addition, the further out to sea a turbine is 
built, the greater its potential to capture more wind energy.
353
 As well, the further out to 
sea a turbine is built, the greater the potential is for noise and visual impact reduction.
354
 
Together, these offshore factors present a unique development opportunity for offshore 
wind farms to generate unlimited amounts of electricity.
355
 Lastly, because land space for 
development is scarce, experience in offshore wind farm development has been rapidly 
                                                        
348 Ibid. 
349 The Crown Estate Act, 1961, c. 55, s,1 [Crown Estate Act]. The same is true for ownership of the seabed 
in other jurisdictions. 
350 Twidell, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 347 at 180 where the author notes that the principle advantage of 
offshore wind farm is that the planning controversy, [nimbyism], can be avoided. 
351 European Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy – The Facts: A guide to the technology, economics 
and future of wind power (London: Earthscan, 2009) at 107 [EWEA, ―Wind Energy – The Facts‖]. 
352 Twidell, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 347 at 23 ¶ 4. 
353
 Hassan et al., ―Offshore Wind Energy‖, supra note 346 at 1-1 ¶ 1.1. 
354 Ibid. 




 The offshore industry is, admittedly, not in its prime, but it is well beyond 
its infancy. 
 
4.6  Problems Associated with Offshore Wind Development 
 
 As one might expect, the disadvantages of offshore wind farms are drastically 
different from their onshore counterparts. While there is less concern about noise and 
visual impacts,
357
 there is great concern about high capital costs, increased dangers of 
construction at sea, collision risks to migratory birds, noise impact on marine mammals 
and fish, and impacts on commercial fishing and other existing uses and interests in the 
marine environment such as shipping and navigation. This section briefly outlines each of 
these problems associated with offshore wind development.  
 One of the biggest drawbacks to going offshore is the high capital, operation and 
maintenance,
358
 and decommissioning costs associated with the development.
359
 It is 
estimated that offshore wind is still some 50% more expensive than onshore wind.
360
 The 
difference in overall cost can be traced to the complex and specialized nature of offshore 
wind energy development.
361
 In particular, challenging weather and wave conditions,
362
 
                                                        
356 Ibid. 
357 Note however, that objections to offshore wind farms continue to be raised concerning their visual 
impact. See generally, Kira Gee, ―Offshore wind power development as affected by seascape values on the 
German North Seacoast‖ (2010) 27 Land Use Policy 185. 
358 See, Florian Martini, ―Tomorrow‘s Power Grids – Offshore Wind: High-Altitude Harvest‖ Pictures of 
the Future – The Magazine for Research and Innovation (Fall 2009) 16 at 18 [Martini, ―Tomorrow‘s Power 
Grids‖]. Here, it is noted that ‗repairs on the open sea cost about ten times as much as repairs on land.‘ The 
operation and maintenance activities also include for instance, the transport of employees by ship and 
helicopter. 
359 Shergold, ―A climate for change?‖, supra note 341 at 262. 
360 EWEA, ―Wind Energy – The Facts‖, supra note 353 at 212 ¶ 111.2.  
361 Offshore wind projects are more complex than onshore ones. Offshore developments include platforms, 
turbines, cables, substations, grids, interconnection, shipping, dredging, associated construction activity and  
engineering in order to withstand harsh natural conditions in form of high winds and corrosive salt water. 
Ibid. at 336.   
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water depth at site location, and the distance to onshore grid systems,
363
 are just a few of 
the factors that influence the excessive cost of developing and maintaining a wind energy 
industry offshore.
364
 Though offshore wind is 50% more expensive than onshore wind, it 
is believed that the costs are offset by the ability to generate several hundred megawatts 
of electricity, due to high offshore wind.
365
 The expected benefit of more wind is one of 
the prime driving forces for offshore wind development in several countries.
366
 
International demand for cleaner and more reliable sources of electricity is also driving 
developers to look at offshore wind power as viable potential energy sources despite 
concerns about costs.
 367
  In the recent past, technological developments have 
dramatically improved the economic viability of offshore projects. It is predicted, 




 Even so, the popular acceptance of offshore wind turbines as a sustainable and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
362 Wave and weather conditions pose serious construction challenges by restricting access. See, Martini, 
―Tomorrow‘s Power Grids‖, supra note 360 at 18 where in relation to the North Sea it is noted that as a 
precautionary measure, as soon as the height of waves exceeds 1.5 m the installation of a wind power plant 
is called off. Without bad weather, an installation typically takes 6 – 8 hours. In addition, inclement 
weather can also restrict repair access to ensure uninterrupted operation and maintenance after construction. 
Therefore, the loss of generated electricity is greater offshore. Damage and corrosion related to the salt-
water conditions is potentially much more serious than on land, requiring specialist designs from marine 
industries (therefore material constraints are higher). See, Twidell, ―Wind Energy‖, supra note 347 at 24. 
363 Having generated electricity offshore, the next move is to bring it onshore so that it may be used. Sea 
transmission cables are used to bring the electricity onshore. If a development is located far out to sea it 
would need more cabling to transmit the generated electricity. More cabling means more expense. For this 
reason, most of the capacity has been installed in relatively shallow water (less than 20 m) and no further 
than 20 km from the coast. See, EWEA, ―Wind Energy – The Facts‖, supra note 353 at 212 ¶ 111.2. 
364 Poul Erik Morthorst et al., ―Development of Offshore Wind Power – Status and Perspectives‖ in John 
Twidell and Gaetano Gaudiosi, Offshore Wind Power (UK: Multi-Science Publishing Co. Ltd, 2009) at 2 
[Morthorst et al., ―Development of Offshore Wind Power‖]. 
365 EWEA, ―Wind Energy – The Facts‖, supra note 353 at 217 ¶ 2. The economic viability of offshore wind 
farms is therefore dependant upon the more favourable wind conditions that are generally present off the 
coast: see, Karen N. Scott, ―Tilting at Offshore Windmills: Regulating Wind Farm Development within the 
Renewable Energy Zone‖ (2006) 18(1) J. Env. L. 89 at 91 [Scott, ―Tilting at Offshore Windmills‖]. 
366 Morthorst et al., ―Development of Offshore Wind Power‖, supra note 366 at 1. 
367
 See, Nicholas J. Lund, ―Renewable Energy as a Catalyst for changes to the High Seas Regime‖ (2010) 
15(1) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 95 at 96. 
368 Smith et al., ―Technological Learning‖, supra note 310 at 6431. 
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emission-free form of energy does not mean that the technology has no negative impacts 
on the marine environment and, thus, may not conflict with marine conservation 
initiatives. First, while data on collision mortality with offshore wind farms is limited,
369
 
there is some consensus that offshore wind farms fatally impact several species of 
seabirds, terrestrial birds
370
 and migratory birds,
371
 though not significantly. Apart from 
collision risks, other impacts include: ―short-term habitat loss during construction phase; 
long-term habitat loss due to disturbance from wind turbines installed and from ship 




 Noise associated with the construction and operation of offshore wind turbines can 
also negatively affect marine mammals.
373
 Noise pollution is produced not only from the 
turbines themselves, but also from the heavy helicopter and boat traffic associated with 
construction and operation. Noise in the marine environment ultimately distorts 
mammals‘ ability to use their hearing for communication, orientation, finding prey and 
echolocation.
374




 Potentially, noise can also affect fish species. To date, data regarding noise impacts 
                                                        
369 European Environment Agency, Europe‟s onshore and offshore wind energy potential – an assessment 
of environmental and economic constraints (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2009) at 74. Information on bird mortality is scarce due to the difficulty in detecting 
collisions and the difficulty in recovering dead birds at sea. 
370 ‗In poor visibility conditions, large numbers of terrestrial birds could collide with offshore wind farms, 
attracted by their illumination. However, this occurs only on a few nights.‘ See, EWEA, ―Wind Energy – 
The Facts‖, supra note 353 at 343. 
371 Ibid. Migratory birds have shown an ability to avoid wind farms by changing flying directions. This 
avoidance behaviour reduces the likelihood of collisions. 
372 Ibid. Note however, that ‗the degree of disturbance differs between different species. The disturbance 
may be determined by several factors such as availability of appropriate habitats, especially roosting and 
feeding areas, time of year, flock size and the layout of wind farms. 
373




on fish are still limited.
376
 Generally however, any noise impacts would be relatively 
short-term as they coincide with construction works.
377
 In addition, though there are some 
negligible impacts, the installation of turbine foundations in the ocean have been found to 
increase general biodiversity of fish and benthos species in the wind farm area, thereby 
creating new local ecosystems.
378
 However, though biodiversity may be boosted in wind 
farm areas, the very operation of wind farms in the ocean could potentially cause 
disruptions to commercial fishing activities.
379
 The issue of concern for most fishermen is 
that the construction of wind turbines in fishing grounds restricts their access to those 
areas for the operational life of the wind farm.
380
 While it is believed that commercial 
fisheries have not been significantly impacted by wind farms, the situation is likely to 
change in the future with the projected growth of offshore wind farms.
381
 Already, 
existing offshore industries, such as oil and gas, aggregate dredging, and ports and 
telecommunications, legally oust and/or restrict access to fishing grounds in their 
development areas. Compounding the problem are designated conservation areas that also 
restrict the freedom to fish the seas. Therefore, an offshore wind industry that causes the 
same, albeit for safety purposes, will inevitably frustrate free access for fishermen and 
ultimately impact commercial fishing.
382
 Furthermore, even in the absence of regulations 
that restrict access, fishermen legitimately fear the risk of collision with structural 
                                                        
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Ibid. at 340. 
379 Collaborative Offshore Wind Research Into the Environment, Opportunities and Options for Marine 
Fisheries Mitigation Associated with Windfarms – Draft: 1 April 2010 (COWRIE Ltd., 2010) at v. 
380 Ibid. at 6 ¶ 2.3. 
381 Ibid. at 6 ¶ 2.3. 
382 Ibid. „In contrast to UK statutory regulations for the oil and gas industry which exclude fishing activities 
from within 500 m of all relevant installations other than pipelines, UK legislation for offshore windfarms 
requires only that a 50 m exclusion zone is established around each turbine This will potentially leave 
significant areas open to fishing within turbine arrays.‘ 
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impediments in the sea that support turbines.
383
 Impediments in the sea bottom may also 
restrict the types of fishing gear that may be used. For instance, bottom-set drift nets are 
only useable if the seabed is smooth.
384
 Any cables and other structures that cannot be 
buried would potentially impact fishing practices.
385
 The fact is that fishermen need 
unrestricted access to fishing grounds and between fishing grounds. Wind farms have 
great potential to negatively impact a fisherman‘s livelihood. It is predicted, however, 
that future wind farm layouts and turbine technology will increase maneuverability 




 There has also been some concern about the dangers that offshore turbines pose to 
leisure and commercial navigation. Ship collisions with turbines are obviously real 
possibilities.
387
  Nevertheless, collisions can be significantly mitigated by the use of radar 
equipment and the imposition of shipping traffic controls which prohibit navigation in a 
wind farm area.
388
 The risk of collision can also be managed by locating wind farms in 
areas that do not obstruct recognized sea lanes. Lastly, offshore wind farms may also 
interfere with radio and radar signals which could potentially cause major difficulties for 
flight controllers, civil and military activity, and meteorology.
389
  
 Apart from outlining the problems associated with offshore wind development, 
this section also served to underscore a more general point made earlier in Chapter 3 of 
this study, that is, that renewable sources of energy, are as much associated with negative 
                                                        
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid. at 7. 
385 Ibid. at 7. 
386 Ibid. at 6. 
387 In the event of a collision, destruction and damage to ships is possible. Such destruction or damage may 
cause spillage of oil and other chemicals into the sea which will negatively impact the marine environment.   
388 EWEA, ―Wind Energy – The Facts‖, supra note 353 at 345.  
389 Ibid. 
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environmental impact as they are associated with environmental benefits. Therefore, even 
though it is accepted that our energy future needs alternative sources of energy, ―…which 
when consumed, are free of environmental impact,‖
390
 the installation and operation of 
these sources of energy are not entirely free from environmental impact. Again, for 
governments, it is really a matter of making appropriate choices about what combination 
of energy sources brings the lowest harm while providing the greatest benefit. This view 
aside, it is generally accepted that in comparison to conventional fossil fuel generation 
which contributes to the problem of global warming, renewable energy resources impose 
the least regrettable impacts on the environment, human health and the economy.
391
 As 
will be seen in the next chapter, Chapter 5, the truth of this premise really depends on the 
manner in which governments permit renewable energy development. 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has demonstrated that harvesting the energy potential of the wind is 
nothing new. The chapter began by exploring the unmistakable history of experience in 
onshore wind energy generation and the prevailing political and environmental impetus to 
increase wind energy for climate change mitigation and energy security purposes. It was 
noted that these agendas ensured a dramatic improvement in onshore wind energy 
technology. Thereafter, the chapter explored problems and barriers associated with 
onshore wind development. Chief among these barriers is the issue of shortages of land 
area with the right ingredients for a wind project: strong and steady winds, a welcoming 
community and easy access to transmission.‘ Initially, it was believed that moving wind 
                                                        
390 Goodwin, ―Future of Fossil Fuels‖, supra note 13 at 19 ¶ 5.  
391 Ibid.   
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development offshore provides the opportunity to evade these onshore barriers, and to 
continue progress towards a sustainable supply of electricity.
392
 Indeed, there is less 
―nimbyism,‖ stronger support from environmental NGOs, and the availability of 
seemingly unlimited development space. In this respect the chapter outlined reasons for 
moving wind development offshore and then focused on the impetus for offshore wind 
development in the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the chapter developed the premise 
that the process of harnessing the energy potential of offshore winds is generally met with 
gauntlet of challenges. Apart financial challenges, several legitimate concerns, constraints 
and conflicts from stakeholders in the marine territory were considered. Despite these 
challenges, the interest in the potential for offshore wind to assist in the creation of a low-
carbon energy future was explored. The challenge for any regulatory regime is to develop 
a governance framework that respects the various stakeholder interests while ensuring 
continued progress towards a sustainable supply of electricity from the trade winds. 









                                                        
392 See, Challis, ―Offshore Wind‖, supra note 322. See also David Still, ―Offshore Wind at Blyth‖ (2001) 




The United Kingdom Offshore Wind Consents Regime 
 
5.1  Introduction and Background Information 
 
 The preceding chapter noted the massive potential of the United Kingdom to 
develop its offshore wind resource to meet its energy objectives, and the strong European 
Union support for its advancement in this regard. Like any other new technology and 
development, the process of harnessing the energy potential of offshore winds meets with 
several pressing concerns and conflicts in the marine territory.
393
 There has been much 
concern about how the offshore wind industry will be developed; where wind farms will 
be located; and the conditions under which they will be permitted to enter the marine 
territory. Already, the marine environment serves varied and competing interests, uses 
and/or pressures for the sustenance of modern living. These interests include fishing, 
dredging, shipping, transport, oil and gas, navigation and leisure for example. The 
introduction of a new player into the marine environment is bound to cause some conflict 
with these previously established and legitimate uses of the seas. Offshore wind farms 
also have great potential to negatively impact marine conservation initiatives, and the use 
of cables and pipelines which have their specific roles in economic activities. When the 
first offshore wind systems were deployed in the United Kingdom, the regulatory regime 
failed to address these concerns and conflicts in a coherent way. This is largely due to the 
fact that regulations concerning construction in the marine territory were never 
                                                        
393 See generally, Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323. 
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formulated to facilitate offshore renewable energy generation.
394
 As it relates to offshore 
wind, the initial consents process is described as ―… a cobbling together of existing 
measures originally drawn up for a diverse range of other activities, including on-land 
electricity generation, offshore construction works, navigation and marine 
conservation.‖
395
 Sections 5.3 to 5.3.3.3 below, describe the consent process in more 
detail. As will be obvious from these sections, the process for approving offshore wind 
farms is referred to as a ―consents process‖ based on the terminology of the various 
legislations that require developers to seek ‗consent‘ to carry on activity related to the 
development of offshore wind turbines.   
  Historically, the management, control and regulation of marine activities have 
gradually developed in an ad hoc, reactive and fragmented pattern with little integration 
between different sectors.
396
 Piecemeal approaches to regulating activity in the marine 
environment are generally considered to be overlapping and confusing.
397
 For decision-
makers, piecemeal approaches restrict the ability to properly assess the cumulative 
impacts of marine activities.
398
 The British story
399
 is no different from that narrated in 
Canada,
400
 the United States
401
 or the Caribbean region.
402
 For instance, oil and gas 
                                                        
394 Guy Linley-Adams, All at Sea: Welsh Case Study on Marine Renewable Energy, online: World Wide 
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Energy‖]. 
395 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 109. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. See also, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, A Sea Change: A Marine Bill 
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399 See generally, European Commission, Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European 
Vision for the Oceans and Seas (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2006). 
400 See generally, Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31. Some writers note that the Act represented one of the first 
legislative commitments to integrate management of the seas in Canada. See, Nicole Schäfer, ―Maritime 
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[Schäfer, ―Maritime Spatial Planning‖].  
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exploration, navigation, dredging, fishing and other marine activities in the United 
Kingdom were regulated as commercial viability necessitated or in response to the 
demands of international standards and obligations.
403
 Generally, in the European Union 
―[p]olicies on, for instance, maritime transport, fisheries, energy … [and] the marine 
environment … have developed on separate tracks, which leads to inefficiencies, 
incoherencies and conflicts of use.‖
404
 It comes as no surprise therefore, that British 
initiatives to realize offshore wind potential would begin by joining the tradition of 
piecemeal regulation-making, and further obscure an already messy marine management 
regime.  
5.2  Chapter Overview 
 
 This Chapter is a case study of the development of the offshore wind regulatory 
regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable regulatory 
attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies will be allowed to 
enter the marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided with the government‘s 
decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a different consents process was 
used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects. In chronological order, this 
Chapter outlines the consents approaches used to approve project applications under each 
round of development. Each consent process is then considered in light of Howlett et al.‘s 
three-dimensional new governance framework outlined in Chapter 2. Thereafter, Gibson 
                                                                                                                                                                     
401 See, Alejandro E. Camacho, ―Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing uncertainty Through 
a Learning Infrastructures‖ (2009) 59(1) Emory Law Journal 1 at 26. 
402 In the United Kingdom the management of the marine environment has been described as suffering from 
duplication, fragmentation, sectoral interests and poor integration. See, Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, 
supra note 327 at 5. 
403 Ibid. at 109. 
404 Schäfer, ―Maritime Spatial Planning‖, supra note 402 at 93. 
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et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability, also outlined in Chapter 2, 
will be used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive outcomes of each consent 
process.  
 
5.3  Round 1 – The First Consents Process for Offshore Wind 
 
 The first wind farms to enter the UK marine environment are collectively known 
as ―Round 1‖. ―[Round 1 wind projects were intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round 
[to provide] prospective developers with an environment in which they could gain 
technological, economic and environmental experience.‖
405
 As a precaution, these 
windfarms could only be developed within 10km
2
 of the seabed, and with no more than 
thirty wind turbines to generate a minimum installed capacity of 20 MW.
406
 Proposed 
developments were given consent under existing marine development regulations and 
procedures, which were slightly modified for the purpose.
407
 In 2000, the Crown Estate 
invited bids for the development of the offshore wind industry. Industry proponents were 
invited to propose site locations for Round 1 and thereafter seek development consent to 
begin construction. Ultimately, seventeen projects received consent. 
 
5.3.1 First Stop: The Crown Estate Lease 
 
 Typically, a developer began the consents process by seeking pre-approval from 
the Crown Estate to apply for a development site. As noted in Chapter 4, the Crown 
                                                        
405 The Crown Estate, Offshore Wind Energy: Rounds 1 and 2, online: The Crown Estate 
<http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk> [Crown Estate, ―Rounds 1 and 2‖]  
406
 Ibid. See also, Department of Trade and Industry, Future Offshore: A Strategic Framework for the 
Offshore Wind  Industry (London: The Stationary Office, 2002)  at 32 ¶ 3.2 [DTI, ―Future Offshore‖].     
407 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 24. 
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Estate is a body corporate charged on behalf of the Crown to manage land and other 
property, rights and interests vested in the Crown.
408
 The seabed extending to 12 nm from 
the baseline (the territorial sea) forms part of Crown ―land‖ and is ―owned‖ and regulated 
by the Crown Estate. Proponents who wished to develop the marine territory within the 
10km
2
 restriction were required to seek the permission of the Crown Estate. The Crown 
Estate evaluates the financial standing, wind turbine expertise and offshore experience of 
the developer and, if satisfactory, enters into an agreement for a lease with the 
developer.
409
 The agreement materializes into a formal lease to be signed only when the 




5.3.2 Other Statutory Consents Required for Offshore Wind Projects 
 
 The consents process allows decision-makers to determine whether a particular 
offshore wind proposal should be granted consent for development. The process involves 
a consideration of the positive and negative impacts a specific project could likely have 
on existing interests and uses of ocean spaces, and where necessary, the protection of 
same.
411
 It also involves a consideration of the potential contribution a specific project, if 
developed, could have on the attainment of national targets and policy objectives.
412
  
Given the importance attached to the consents process, Round 1 developers were required 
to obtain several statutory consents from different government agencies which 
                                                        
408 Crown Estate Act, supra note 351 at s. 1. 
409 See generally, The Crown Estate, [Precedent of pro-forma Crown Estate Lease], online: The Crown 
Estate <http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/34_round_one_agreement_for_lease.pdf> [Crown Estate, 
―Precedent of pro-forma Crown Estate Lease‖] 
410
 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 32 ¶ 3.2.   
411 Ibid. at 32 ¶ 3.1. 
412 Ibid. at 64 ¶ 7.1. 
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represented a range of interests and users of the marine territory. Consents could be 
obtained either under the Electricity Act 1989
413
 (Consent Route 1), or the Transport and 
Works Act 1992
414
 (Consent Route 2). Round 1 developers could choose either consents 
route. This chapter will deal only with Consents Route 1 as the majority of rounds 1 and 




5.3.3 Consents Route 1 
 
 Under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 (EA), it is an offence to construct, 
extend or operate a generating station with a capacity of 50 MWs or more, without the 
consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
416
 This section 36 consent 
requirement was initially legislated to enable the Government to regulate the 
development of onshore electricity generating facilities. However, a 2001 Order
417
 
extended the ambit of section 36 to include the development of offshore wind and water 
generating stations. Thereafter, developers needed to obtain consent from the Department 
of Trade and Industry to construct, extend or operate a generating station which is wholly 
or partly driven by wind or water, and situated in the territorial waters of England and 
Wales, and has a generation capacity of 1MW or more.
418
 Note however, that the section 
does not apply to those offshore wind and wave stations that come under the purview of 
                                                        
413 Electricity Act 1989 (U.K.), 1989, c. 29 [Electricity Act]. 
414 Transport and Works Act 1992 (U.K.), 1992, c. 42. 
415 See, Emma Gibson & Peter Howsam, ―The Legal Framework for Offshore Wind Farms: A Critical 
Analysis of the Consents Process‖ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 4692 at 4694 [Howsam, ―Legal Framework for 
Offshore Wind Farms‖].  
416 Electricity Act, supra note 415. 
417 The Electricity Act 1989 (Required Consent for Offshore Wind and Water Driven Generating Stations) 
(England and Wales) Order 2001, S.I. 2001/3642. 
418 Ibid. at s. 2. Note that by reducing the permitted capacity to 1MW for offshore generating stations, the 
Order was intended to regulate the development of all offshore wind farms. 
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the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 by virtue of their site location.
419
 Developers 
also needed to obtain a section 37 consent under the Electricity Act for the installation of 
overhead electric lines needed for electricity transmission. 
 Under consents route 1, a developer was also required to obtain approval for 
marine works that are detrimental to navigation. The very nature of offshore wind 
development would automatically trigger application of section 34 of the Coast 
Protection Act 1949 (CPA).
420
 Under this section, the developer must seek consent from 
the Department for Transportation for the construction, alteration or improvement of any 
works on the level of mean high water springs. Consent must also be given for the 
deposit or removal of any object or material from the defined area. It is to be noted that a 
section 34 consent is only necessary where these works will cause or are likely to result 
in obstruction or danger to navigation either when being carried out or subsequently. The 
consent therefore does not authorize these works for the protection of the environment 
but to ensure safety of navigation.  
 In addition, under Part II of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 
(FEPA), the developer must obtain a licence from the Department of Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs for any deposit of substances and articles within UK waters either in 
the sea or under the seabed.
421
 In making a decision whether to issue a FEPA licence, the 
licensing authority ―… shall have regard to the need to protect the marine environment, 
the living resources which it supports and human health; and to prevent interference with 
                                                        
419 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (U.K.), 1990, c. 8., s. 2 [Town and Country Planning].  
420 See, Coast Protection Act 1949 (U.K.), 1949, c. 74, s. 36 [CPA]. Here, the Act makes it an offence to 
carry out a stated operation without having first obtained the necessary consent. 
421 Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 48, s. 9 [FEPA] Here, the Act makes it an 
offence to perform any of the licenced activities without having first obtained a valid licence to do so. 
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legitimate uses of the sea…‖
422
 Finally, EA, CPA and FEPA applications must be 
supported by an Environmental Statement.  
 
5.3.3.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Requirements 
 
 Since 1985, European Union legislation placed an obligation on Member States to 
adopt mechanisms to ensure that relevant consenting authorities take into account the 
direct and indirect effects of certain public and private projects that are likely to have 
significant impact on the environment by virtue of their nature, size, or location, before 
granting approval for project development.
423
 An Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) is therefore necessary for the identification, description and assessment of issues 
related to the proposed project for consideration in the decision-making process. Projects 
that seek approval to construct, extend, or operate power stations, whether onshore or 
offshore, are captured by the Directive.
424
 For power station development, the UK has 
transposed the obligation on consenting authorities through various rules and regulations.  
 Generally, where a developer seeks consent under the Electricity Act, the 
developer is obligated to ―… have regard to the desirability of preserving natural beauty, 
of conserving flora, fauna and geological or physiographical features of special 
interests…‖ and must do what is reasonably possible to mitigate any effects on the 
same.
425
 Recently, however, more formal EIA obligations have been fixed to offshore 
wind farm applications under the Electricity Act by the Electricity Works Regulations 
                                                        
422 Ibid. at s. 8. 
423 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment [1985] O.J. L 175/40 at art. 2(1). 
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 The Regulations explicitly prohibit the granting of development consent where 
the application for offshore wind development is unaccompanied by an Environmental 
Statement for consultation by the relevant consenting authority.
427
 The Environmental 
Statement is a report detailing the findings of the required EIA. It should contain such 
information as prescribed by the regulations, including project description, size and 
location, the likely environmental impacts and mitigation measures.
428
 The Regulations 
also enumerate procedures for applicants to engage in public consultation regarding the 
environmental implications of the proposed development.
429
 The designated local 
planning authority must also be given an opportunity to consider the application.
430
 
Having regard to the Environmental Statement and the results of both consultation 
exercises, the Department of Trade and Industry must then publish a reasoned decision on 
the application.
431
   
 Additionally, under consents route 1, a developer must satisfy EIA obligations 




 Lastly, although legislation has not been enacted to transpose EIA obligations to 
FEPA licence applications, section 8(5) of FEPA gives the licensing authority 
discretionary power to demand that an applicant conduct examinations or tests ‗which 
may be necessary to enable the authority to decide whether a licence should be issued to 
[that] applicant.‘ Under this section, the licensing authority may decide that information 
                                                        
426 See, Electricity Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 2000, S.I. 
2000/1927 [Electricity Works Regulations].  
427 Ibid. at s. 3. 
428 Ibid. at sch. 4, part II. 
429 Ibid. at sch. 4, part IV. 
430
 Ibid. at sch. 4, part II. 
431 Ibid. at s. 10. 
432 Harbour Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/3445. 
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equivalent to an EIA must be supplied by the applicant to enable the licensing authority 
to properly consider the application. In practice, Round 1 applications have had to 




5.3.3.2 Appropriate Assessment Requirements 
 
 In addition to general EIA requirements, offshore wind applications may also be 
subject to Appropriate Assessment requirements under European Union and national 
legislation. The EU Birds Directive
434
 and the Habitats Directive
435
 require Member 
States to designate conservation areas within the Community for the protection of listed 
wild birds and natural habitats respectively. Under article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, 
any development that is likely to have a significant impact on the above-mentioned 
conservation areas must be subjected to an Appropriate Assessment of its implications. 
Additionally, the relevant national authority may only permit developments, if, in their 
opinion, said developments will not adversely affect the integrity of any conservation 
area.
436
 The relevant authority may also have regard to public opinion in deciding 
whether to permit developments which adversely impact conservation areas.
437
 These 
directives are given legislative force in territorial waters through several regulations: the 
Birds Directive is implemented through the Wild Life and Countryside Act 1981
438
 and 
                                                        
433 Center for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science, Offshore Wind Farms: Guidance Note for 
Environmental Impact Assessment In respect of FEPA and CPA Requirements - Version 2 – June 2004 
(CEFAS, 2004) at 4 online: CEFAS <http://www.cefas.co.uk>.  
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the Conservation Regulations 1994
439
 while the Habitats Directive is transposed through 
the Conservation Regulations 1994. 
 
5.3.3.3 Consent for Onshore Components of Offshore Wind Farms 
 
 In addition to the statutory consents and EIA requirements detailed above, the 
construction of offshore wind farms are likely to require construction, extension or 
operation of onshore works, for example, the onshore stations. Generally, planning 
permission is required from the relevant local planning authority for the carrying out of 
any development on land.
440
 However, section 90(2) of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 allows an applicant for development consent under section 36 of the Electricity 
Act to simultaneously apply for ‗deemed planning permission.‘  
 
5.3.4 Application of the Howlett et al. Three-dimensional New Governance 
Assessment to the Round 1 Consents Process 
 
 The preceding sections have outlined the range of possible consents and licences 
required for Round 1 offshore wind development in the UK. The following sub-sections 
apply the three-dimensional analytical framework of Howlett et al. to the Round 1 
decision-making process. To recap, the first dimension created by the Howlett et al. is the 
political dimension. In this mode of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with 
one question: ―whether political power – that is, the ability to make legitimate, 
                                                        
439 Conservation (Natural Habitats, & c.) Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994/2716.  
440 Town and Country Planning, supra note 421 at s. 57. 
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authoritative decisions allocating societal resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖
441
 
It can be argued on end about what it means for political power to be vested in the state 
and what it means for that power to be vested in society-driven actors.
442
 Earlier, in 
Chapter 2, it was noted that ―…many people have been disappointed with the ability of 
government to tackle social problems.‖
443
 At the same time, New Governance scholars 
argue that the social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules and 
solutions to social problems.
444
 These are issues that the framework forces one to 
consider after having identified whether the political power in the regime favours state or 
non-state actors.  
 The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance 
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the 
fact that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖
445
 In this dimension, 
Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional 
structures, i.e., are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions 
composed of state or non-state actors? Essentially, in their view, these characteristics 
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy 
disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments 
used to implement the mode of governance.‖
446
  
                                                        
441 Howlett et al. ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44 at 385 ¶ 2.1. 
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 The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used 
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether 
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control 
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible 
and voluntary. In other words, the focus is on whether the regulatory practice is reflective 
of the hard or soft law approach to governance. 
 Overall, in each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance 
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of 
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). Howlett et al. describe the key to using 
the framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘ 
to ‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but 
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and 
regulatory techniques… .”
447
 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the 
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of 
governance, and who those actors are. 
 
5.3.4.1 The Political Dimension 
 
 The range of consents and licences required demonstrate the involvement of 
several actors in the decision-making process. These actors play various roles and 
perform various responsibilities and, thus, can be grouped by their affiliate state or non-
state orientations.  
                                                        
447 Ibid. at 384 ¶ 1. 
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 On the state side, the central bodies involved in the development and regulation of 
the offshore wind industry are the Crown Estate (sea bed lease), the Department of Trade 
and Industry (energy policy and section 36 EA consent), the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (FEPA licence and EIA) and the Department for 
Transport (section 34 CPA consent).
448
  
 Although it may not be expressly reflected by the consents process, many non-
state actors also hold an interest in the development and regulation of offshore wind. The 
main non-state actors include the public, industry developers, environmental pressure 
groups, statutory environmental consultees and trade organizations representing shipping 
and fishing interests. The consensus is that many State and Non-State actors hold an 
interest in offshore wind development and regulation. The question remains, which 
among these State and Non-State actors is actually charged with power to determine 
whether a particular offshore wind project will be given approval for development. 
 A quick review of the consents process would confirm that power to produce 
legally binding outcomes on consents applications is concentrated in the hands of State 
actors. However, while power to make decisions is legally vested in the State, legitimate 
questions can be raised as to whether Non-State actors influence the exercise of State 
power over consents applications. This question turns on two variables. The first variable 
concerns the identity of the Non-State actor in question. This is of particular importance 
because it characterizes the interest of the non-state actor in the regime, and hints to its 
preference of outcome on consents applications. The second variable speaks to whether 
                                                        
448 See also, Julia Köller, Johann Köppel and Wolfgang Peters, Offshore Wind Energy: Research on 
Environmental Impacts (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006)  at 334 ¶ 19.2.2, who also identify these 
bodies as central to the consenting process. See also S. Shaw, M.J. Cremers and G. Palmers, Enabling 
Offshore Wind Development (Brussels: Loft33, 2002) at 9.  
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the non-state actor has the capacity to influence State power in the direction of their 
preferred outcome. 
 In Chapter 4, the point was made that the public has had an indisputably dominant 
and influential role in the decision-making process for onshore wind farms in the United 
Kingdom.
449
 Over 150 groups have fought tirelessly against the construction of wind 
farms in their backyard.
450
 These NIMBY protesters are consistently described as ―well-
organized opponents to wind farm development.‖
451
 Essentially, they have become 
significant barriers to renewable energy development in local communities
452
 by 
continually stymieing a reliable flow of projects.
453
 For quite some time, the prospect of 
offshore wind development has won over the support of NIMBY protesters for the mere 
fact that locating wind projects offshore align with Not-In-My-Back-Yard initiatives.
454
 
Their large numbers and interests in offshore development have given them sufficient 
capacity to influence State action in the consents process. The same can be said for 
environmental pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace who have 
welcomed British offshore wind development from its inception as a demonstration by 
the Government of their ambition to defeat global warming.
455
 Therefore, in granting 
                                                        
449 Above at 76. 
450 Cross, ―Winning over the ‗Nimby blockade‘‖, supra note 319. 
451 Whitehead, ―NIMBY‘s Threat to UK Wind Power‖, supra note 318. 
452 Devine-Wright, ―Beyond NIMBYism‖, supra note 321.  
453 See, Kanter, ―Local Opposition Stalls British Wind Power‖, supra note 320. 
454 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 138. 
455 See, ―Boost for Offshore Wind Power‖ BBC NEWS (14 July 2003) online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>. The article is a brief report of the government‘s decision to issue licences for the 
development of Round 1 wind farms. Here, Greenpeace spokesman, Rob Gueterbok, is quoted as having 
said, ―[f]or over 30 years Greenpeace has opposed the pollution of our oceans but today fully support this 
massive commitment [by the UK Government] to harness wind power at sea.‖ In relation to one Round 1 
offshore wind project, Kentish Flats, it was noted that ―[s]ome environmental groups expressed positive 
support because of the contribution that the wind farm would make to renewable energy production.‖ See, 
Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 53. Additionally, see generally, Greenpeace, Sea Wind 
Europe (London: Greenpeace, 2004) which sets out Greenpeace‘s vision for offshore wind energy and its 
potential to become a mainstay of Europe‘s electricity supply system.   
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project approvals, state actors are given the confidence that development is in the best 
interest of the community and environmental pressure groups that strongly support the 
industry. 
 Industry developers also exercise a strong influence on the outcome of consents 
applications and the development of the offshore wind regime in general. The British 
Wind Energy Association (BWEA) is a formally established trade body that represents 
industry developers who want to see offshore wind energy generation realized.
456
 
Politically, offshore wind energy generation must happen if the UK is meet their 
renewable energy targets. The nexus between BWEA and the State is the undeniable fact 
that their interests also align. BWEA‘s advocacy goes far beyond ‗offshore wind energy 
is essential to sustain modern living,‘ to include advocacy for change in energy policy 
and legislation to facilitate development of offshore wind. For instance, in 2002, BWEA 
submitted an Energy Policy Review
457
 to the DTI stressing the massive contribution 
offshore wind could make to the attainment of national energy goals. In the review, 
BWEA warned DTI that ―…the prospects for offshore are zero without a swiftly 
implemented 'future offshore' process and consenting regime. [And that] until such time 
as these are in place, there will be no further offshore development [my emphasis].‖
458
 
The BWEA was adamant that there needed to be a ―satisfactory conclusion of 
negotiations‖ between BWEA and the Government on swifter consents processes.
459
 
                                                        
456 Adam M. Dinnell and Adam J. Russ, ―The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as an Alternative 
Energy‖ (2007) 27 Nw. J. Int‘l L. & Bus. 523 at 573. 
457 See for instance, Letter from Nick Goodall of BWEA to Dr. A. Parkinson of the Energy Policy Review 
Team (13 September 2002) on the subject of ‗Energy Policy Review Submission by the British Wind 
Energy Association‘, [unpublished] online: <http://www.bwea.com/pdf/bwea_energy_review.pdf>. Note 
that this letter was cited by DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408. Also, BWEA‘s work is also cited in 
DTI, ―Energy White Paper 2003‖, supra note 330.  
458 Ibid at 9. 
459 Ibid at 3.  
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Obviously, therefore, BWEA has been working closely with the relevant government 
institutions, and pressuring the development of policy and legislation on the offshore 
process and consents regime.
460
 A quick review of Hansard would confirm Parliament‘s 
reliance on BWEA‘s organized advocacy and research. ―The superior strength of the 
offshore wind industry…‖ enabled them to exercise a greater influence over the decision-
making process and the outcome, in comparison to fishermen who stood to be most 
adversely affected by offshore wind development.
 461
 
 There is great complexity in considering whether fishers have the capacity to 
influence State action. This complexity is linked to the overall ‗chronic fragmentation‘ of 
the fishing industry. In Offshore Wind Farms and Commercial Fishing: A Study in 
Stakeholder Consultation, it was found that consultation views of fishers in relation to 
offshore wind farms were not representative of the entire fishing industry.
462
 In assessing 
fishermen views and interests, ‗consultations‘ were held with national fishermen‘s 
associations. These national associations represented the larger fishing vessels in the 
commercial industry. However, it was found that less than 20% of English and Welch 
fishers were members of a national fishermen‘s association.
463
 Most fishermen belonged 
to local associations, which were ―loose, fissiparous… and rival‖ - characteristics that 
invited easy exploitation by developers and weakened bargaining power.
464
 
Unfortunately, these were the category of fishermen against offshore wind development 
and unable to prove entitlement to compensation. The overall ‗chronic fragmentation‘ of 
                                                        
460 On the relationship between BWEA and governmental departments, see generally, Geoff Hewitt, ―UK 
Energy Bill – The Great Wind Up?‖ (2004) 6 International Energy Law and Taxation Review 146 at 149. 
461 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 138. 
462
 Ibid. at 127. 
463 Ibid. at 130. 
464 Ibid. at 137. 
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 Another factor that characterizes the fishing industry‘s weak influence in the 
decision-making regime is the ―…government‘s enthusiastic support for offshore wind 
farms.‖
466
 It is no secret that the UK government is in full support of offshore wind 
development. The mandates of climate change and energy security have garnered enough 
political momentum to ensure that there is no turning back. Fishers‘ representatives argue 
that a fisherman‘s story about the loss of livelihood, and the need for compensation, 
would fail to measure up to a story about global climate change and needed mitigation.
467
 
 It is clear from the above assessment that there are many stakeholders in the 
offshore wind farm consents process representing many interests. It is also clear, that 
amongst those stakeholders power to produce legally binding outcomes on consent 
applications is concentrated in the State. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett 
framework, it would appear that the political dimension is characterized by traditional 
hierarchical governance. However, it was also found that in practice, this state-directed 
governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted non-
State actors. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett framework, this dynamic has 
created movement along the horizontal axis of the political dimension, ultimately creating 
a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. 
 
                                                        
465
 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. at 137.  





Placement of the Round 1 Political Power on Michael Howlett et al.‘s Political 
Dimension  
 
5.3.4.2 The Institutional Dimension 
 
 The founding concept under this dimension is that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework 
for the exercise of power.‖
468
 Here, Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution 
and composition of institutional structures used to exercise power. Institutions may be 
formally or informally constituted and composed of state actors, non-state actors or both. 
Essentially, in their view, these characteristics determine ―…the abilities of various state 
and non-state actors to prevail in policy disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities 
                                                        
468 Howlett et al. ―Government to Governance‖, supra note 44 at 2.2. 
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for the choice of the policy instruments used to implement the mode of governance.‖
469
 
Institutions, therefore, are linked to decision making.  Based on the assessment of the 
political dimension in the previous subsection, the prima facie assumption can be made 
that the institutional arrangements that had the capacity to make legally binding decisions 
and influence the outcome of Round 1 consent applications are typically characterized by 
formal establishment.  
 As it relates to State actors, their power to produce binding decisions on consents 
applications was exercised through four main governmental departments: the Crown 
Estate, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the Department for Transport. These governmental bodies determine 
whether a particular offshore wind project will be given consent for development. 
Another characteristic of these governmental departments is that they were all established 
by acts of parliament. Therefore, the common trait among state actors is that their power 
is exercised through governmental departments that are formally established by acts of 
parliament, and are therefore empowered to produce legally binding outcomes on 
consents applications.  
 As noted in the assessment of the political dimension above, there is a wide range 
of stakeholders that hold an interest in the offshore wind consents process other than the 
state. In fact, diversity in institutional arrangements is borne out in how these non-state 
actors are organized.  
 Since 1978, the BWEA, a trade body, has represented industry developers. 
BWEA‘s formal establishment has afforded it the opportunity to conduct focused 
research, reviews and consultations which arm it with the necessary tools to convince 
                                                        
469 Ibid. at 385 – 386. 
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Government that offshore wind development is in the best interests of the community at 
large. As noted in section 5.3.4.1 above, this formal arrangement has allowed industry 
developers to influence policy, legislation and consents outcomes. 
 By definition, the public is not, per se, formally instituted. However, its strong 
support for offshore wind is channeled through NIMBY organizations that have 
developed into formal institutions. However, outside of the public‘s affiliate status within 
NIMBY organizations, those who objected to offshore wind development retained some 
formal structure as ―statutory consultees‖ where regulatory instruments require decision-
makers and industry developers to consult with them. So for instance, where an 
application is made for consent under the Electricity Act, the Secretary of State for the 
Department of Trade and Industry must serve notice on the relevant local planning 
authority, which is also a governmental institution.
470
 The planning process allows the 
general public to register their views on the application. If the local planning authority 
decides to lodge objections, the Secretary of State is obligated to cause a public enquiry 
to be held.
471
 In determining whether to give consent, the Secretary of State is obligated 
to consider the objection and the results of the public inquiry.
472
 However, where 
objections are received from persons other than the relevant planning authority, the 
Secretary of State holds a discretionary power to decide whether a public inquiry is 
necessary.
473
 Furthermore, unlike objections received from planning authorities, there is 
no provision in the Act obligating the Secretary of State to consider objections from other 
                                                        
470 Electricity Act, supra note 415 at sch. 8, s. 2(1). 
471 Ibid. at sch. 8 ¶ 2(2)(a). Note however, during the consents process planning authorities were unable to 
bring about public inquiries and where such inquiries were held, its findings were effectively quashed. See, 
Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 102. 
472 Ibid. at sch. 8 ¶ 2(2)(b). 
473 Ibid.   
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persons when deciding whether to grant development consent. This seems purposeful. 
Surely, to give such standing to stakeholders would open the floodgates. Nonetheless, 
where the general public registers their views with the local planning authority, the 
―…planning authorit[y] may convey local feeling as part of their consultation 
response.‖
474
 Therefore, ―…the involvement of local authorities [in the decision-making 
process], albeit limited, does provide some opportunity for public comment and 
representation on individual projects.‖
475
 However, as can be seen from the above, 
planning authorities take a relatively peripheral role in the consents process. As to the 
‗peripheral role‘ of planning authorities, it is argued that because offshore wind farms lie 
wholly outside the jurisdiction of any planning authority ―… there is no relevant planning 
authority under the terms of the Electricity Act (schedule 8) and therefore the power of 
planning authorities to object and bring about a public inquiry does not apply.‖
476
 
Causatively, this ‗peripheral role‘ restricts the opportunity for wider public involvement 
in the development of offshore wind farms.
477
  Alternatively, however, the public may 
intervene in the consents process through consultation procedures under EIAs.     
 Lastly, although fishers have organized themselves into formal structures, these 
structures are more typical of ‗non-cohesive networks,‘
478
 whose members have failed to 
develop a consensus on offshore wind development. The chronic fragmentation of 
                                                        
474 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 24. 
475 Ibid. at 110. 
476 Ibid. at 31. 
477 Ibid. at 102. 
478 See, Ewa Rabinowicz, book review of Policy Networks Under Pressure: Pollution Control, Policy 
reform and the Power of Farmers by Carsten Daugbjerg (2000) 27(1) European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 91 at 93. Here, ‗cohesive networks‘ are described as structures in which the ―…members have 
developed a consensus on principles that underpin the choice of policies and on the way they handle policy 
problems.‖ 
 114 
fishers‘ structural arrangements has critically constrained their capacity to prevail in 
decisions that affect their livelihood.
479
  
 This section reviewed and characterized governmental institutional structures, 
non-governmental environmental agencies, the public, industry institutional structures, 
and the intuitional arrangement of the most affected stakeholders – fishermen. The 
conclusion that can be drawn from this assessment is that the institutional arrangements 
that had the capacity to influence the outcome of Round 1 consents applications were 
characterized by formal establishment. The governmental bodies and the BWEA were all 
characterized by formal establishment, and therefore, best placed to influence consents 
decisions. Most notably however, on the institutional dimension, the government retained 
an important structural advantage in the consents process largely due to its ownership of 
the sea bed and formal legislative control over activities in the marine area. On the other 
hand, weaker parties such as fishers suffer from such a description because of their 
inability to organize themselves into a cohesive network for representation. In this regard, 
the institutional arrangements under Round 1 retained some plurilateral features. 
However, the government was able to dominate the consents process by moving upwards 
along the vertical axis of the institutional dimension away from informality towards more 
formal structures. Additionally, there has been very little movement along the horizontal 
axis of the institutional dimension. In sum, the institutional dimension is mainly 
representative of hierarchical governance. 
                                                        





Placement of the Round 1 Institutional Structures on Michael Howlett et al.‘s 
Institutional Dimension  
 
5.3.4.3 The Regulatory Dimension 
 
 Power to make decisions on consents applications is legally concentrated in the 
hands of the state and exercised through formally established institutions. This dynamic 
has influenced the creation of an offshore wind consents regime that respects traditional 
top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations. In relation to 
Welch waters it was found that ―[t]he law governing the protection and management of 
the marine environment is found in a large number of statutes, regulations and orders.‖
480
 
The preceding sections, which outline the range of possible consents required for offshore 
                                                        
480 Linley-Adams ―Case Study on Marine Renewable Energy‖, supra note 396.  
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wind development, confirm this finding. Essentially, therefore, the nature of the Round 1 
consents process is consistent with the notion of hard law – the upper end of the vertical 
axis on the regulatory dimension. Howlett et al. describe the notion of hard law as ―… 
synonymous with a state-centric, command and control mode of regulation that imposes 
generally applicable obligations, articulated with a relatively high degree of precision, 
that are directly enforceable through the courts.‖
481
 Again, a quick review of the consents 
process would confirm this finding. Generally, therefore, the hard law governance 
arrangement constrained the ability of non-state actors to alter the policy-making process 
and the eventual binding outcome. As a result, the regime is representative of hierarchical 
governance on the horizontal axis of Howlette et al.‘s regulatory dimension.  
 
 
                                                        





Placement of the Round 1 Regulatory Approach on Michael Howlett et al.‘s Regulatory 
Dimension  
 
5.3.5 Application of Gibson et al.’s Core Requirements for Progress Towards 
Sustainability to the Round 1 Consents Process 
 
 As the heading suggests, this section seeks to apply Gibson et al.‘s core 
requirements for progress towards sustainability to the Round 1 Consents Process. 
However, before proceeding to the same it is necessary to outline a few points that offer 
appropriate context to the task at hand. Firstly, when Round 1 wind farms were deployed 
in April 2001, the sustainable development agenda had not yet formed part of energy 
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policy in the United Kingdom.
482
 It was only in the 2003 Energy White Paper that energy 
generation and supply were given a sustainable mandate.
483
 Prima facie, therefore, the 
assumption can be made that Round 1 demonstration projects were not necessarily 
characterized by sustainability objectives. The consents regime supports this assumption. 
In granting approvals under the EA, CPA, or FEPA, decision makers were not required to 
consider whether or not a proposed undertaking (offshore wind) is the best option 
available to contribute to sustainable development, or progress towards sustainability. 
The laws on this point are clear. There is no mention of sustainability in any of the above-
mentioned regulatory instruments. The legislative purposes of the Acts do not demand or 
even suggest that decision-makers consider the implications of offshore wind 
development on progress towards sustainability. Again, this is largely due to the later 
coming of sustainability as an energy development objective.  
 Secondly, because sustainability is a challenge to business as usual practices,
484
 
the very use of existing mechanisms to regulate Round 1 development goes against the 
core concept of sustainable development as defined by Gibson et al. As previously noted, 
the existing framework was developed in a fragmented pattern.
485
 Curtailing the regime 
to accommodate offshore works adds to this culture of fragmentation, resulting in a 
                                                        
482 See generally, Catherine Mitchell & Peter Connor, ―Renewable Energy Policy in the UK 1990 – 2003‖ 
(2004) 32 Energy Policy 1935.  
483 See generally, DTI, ―Energy White Paper 2003‖, supra note 330. 
484 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 90. Here, the authors note: ―This insistence 
on clear sustainability-centred decision criteria rests in part on the arguments favouring participation, 
coherence, accountability and learning. But it is also driven by awareness that sustainability is a challenge 
to business as usual and by suspicion that if assessment proponents, practitioners and authorities are left to 
their own unsupervised preferences, they will slide back into the old unsustainable ways‖. 
485 Above at 92 – 93 ¶ 5.1. 
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governance system that impedes an integrated decision-making process – ―a necessary 
element of sustainable development.‖
486
 In this regard, Gibson et al. note that:
 487
 
―…sustainability assessment processes are entering a world already 
heavily populated by legislated planning, review and approval 
requirements. These requirements are evidently insufficient for essential 
sustainability purposes – they are generally too narrowly focused, too 
short term in vision and too fragmented in application to serve sustainable 
purposes effectively.‖  
 
 So by way of example, while a developer was required to obtain an EA consent as 
well as a FEPA licence, each consent and licence had a different purpose, that is, they 
seek to regulate a specific activity. Consequently, the factors that decision-makers can 
consider when deciding whether to grant approval for an EA consent and a FEPA licence 
are limited by their respective purposes. For EA consents, decisions are generally 
confined to a consideration of factors that relate to the electricity infrastructure and 
supply.
488
 Decisions under FEPA are generally confined to a consideration of factors 
relating to the protection of the marine environment, the living resources which it 
supports and human health
489
 but not the wider benefits that offshore wind may bring.
490
 
                                                        
486 Biliana Cicin-Sain et al., Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and Practices 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1998) at 85. 
487
 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 159 – 160. 
488 However, as noted above, the Electricity Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000, section 3 explicitly prohibits the granting of development consent where the 
application for an offshore wind development is unaccompanied by an Environmental Statement for 
consideration by the relevant consenting authority. Specifically, the environmental statement should 
contain characteristics of the development (size of the development, cumulation with other developments, 
etc), location of the development (the environmental sensitivity of the proposed location), and 
characteristics of the potential impact (the extent of the impact, probability, duration, frequency etc.) for 
consideration by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Therefore, while EA consents enable a 
consideration of the potential environmental impact of offshore wind projects, it precludes a consideration 
of the benefits to be had. 
489 FEPA, supra note 423 at s. 8(1)(a)(i). 
490 Note however, by section 8(1)(b), in determining whether to issue a FEPA licence, decision makers 
―…may have regard to such other matters as the authority considers relevant.‖ It is doubtful that this 
provision would extend the category of matters that may be considered to include for instance, the wider 
benefits to be had from offshore wind development. This assessment is based on a reading of the preamble 
to the Act, which in the main, restricts its purposes to the protection of the marine environment by 
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As a result, the decisions taken did not holistically consider the benefits of a project with 
its drawbacks. The same assessment can be levied against CPA consents which were 
specifically formulated to ensure a safe environment for navigation. A consideration of 
the potential benefit of offshore wind development to emission reduction, or the impacts 
on the interests of other users of the sea, are beyond its scope.
491
 
 All the same, taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of 
renewable energy generation from offshore winds is, per se, a sustainable initiative.
492
 
However, the question whether it is able to maintain this cloak of sustainability in 
practice arises for consideration. The answer to the question depends on the manner in 
which it is allowed to enter the marine environment. In other words, the big question is 
whether the Round 1 decision-making process led to sustainable outcomes. The answer 
depends on whether the outcome has satisfied the eight generic requirements for progress 
towards sustainability identified by Gibson et al. and outlined in Chapter 2 of this 
study.
493
 In essence, therefore, Gibson et al.‘s criteria is the analytical tool chosen to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the Round 1 decision-making process.  
 The first requirement for progress towards sustainability is that decisions should 
be made which seek to advance the principle of socio-ecological system integrity. The 
principle recognizes firstly that humans are dependent on biophysical systems for the 
continuance of life on Earth and for the provision of a range of sufficiency demands. This 
dependency forms the crux of the requirement, i.e., decisions should be made which seek 
                                                                                                                                                                     
regulating, among other things, the deposit of substances on the seabed and the use of pesticides and 
substances.  
491 Note that EIA obligations are attached to section 34 CPA consents by the Harbour Works Regulations. 
See above at 99 ¶ 5.3.3.1. 
492 See generally, Hassan et al., ―Offshore Wind Energy‖, supra note 346.  
493 Above at 40. 
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to build human-ecological relationships that favour the protection of irreplaceable life 
support systems. Therefore, in the first instance, the relationships should seek to reduce 
direct and indirect human-induced stresses on the environment and associated life support 
functions. Secondly, and more importantly, the objective of this requirement is ―…not to 
prevent system change but to organize and manage [human] activities so that the changes 
[influenced] still preserve the system conditions and services upon which [humans] 
rely.‖
494
 The focus therefore is on adjusting and reconstructing governance systems in 
order ―… to establish a more modest, sensitive and flexible relationship with the 
biophysical system upon which we rely.‖
495
 As to the substantive focus under this 
requirement, the fact that Round 1 projects were permitted to enter the marine 
environment via existing legislations is illustrative of the failure to meet this 
sustainability requirement. Implicitly, by curtailing existing legislations to accommodate 
offshore works, traditional approaches to the control, management and regulation of 
human activities in the marine environment were applied. Therefore, by using existing 
approaches to manage human activities, there was no attempt to adjust or reconstruct the 
manner in which humans interact with the environment in order to build ‗sustainable‘ 
human-ecological relationships. The fundamental point is that curtailing existing regimes 
to accommodate offshore wind development applies traditional methods of control which 
are primarily reactive, fragmented and ad hoc. As noted at the outset of this Chapter, 
these characteristics restrict the ability to properly assess the cumulative impact of marine 
activities and therefore, they continue business as usual practices which make very little 
contribution to progress towards sustainability.  
                                                        
494 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 96.  
495  Ibid. at 97. 
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 In addition to socio-ecological integrity, human well-being is also dependant on 
material goods and services for the attainment of livelihood sufficiency and the creation 
of opportunities for continued development. Here, in making a determination on offshore 
wind consent applications decision-makers must consider the contribution the project 
may make to ensuring that everyone has sufficient material goods and services for a 
decent life and opportunities for improvements. At the outset of Chapter 3, it was noted 
that energy is essential for the continued development of modern economies and for the 
sustenance of modern standards of living. In the contemporary world, there is a high 
demand for energy for the execution of daily activities. The intrinsic value of energy to 
all human activity is borne by the International Renewable Energy Agency‘s 
proclamation of energy as a ―…basic human need.‖
496
 Broadly speaking, energy is 
needed to deliver adequate food, water, shelter, education, health care and employment. 
Indeed, without it, all human activity and development would come to a complete and 
instantaneous standstill.
497
 By necessary interpretation, it seems that consent applications 
for offshore wind were not considered for their ability to increase energy affordability for 
the poor. This assessment is based on the fact that energy affordability only became an 
energy policy objective in the 2003 Energy White Paper. Additionally, even if energy 
affordability had formed part of energy policy at the time, as noted above, several 
licences and consents were required under various Acts which confined decisions to a 
consideration of factors related to the purposes of those individual Acts. Possibly then, 
Round 1 EA consents might have been granted on a consideration of energy affordability 
had that been the policy of the day. The same theory cannot be applied to FEPA licences 
                                                        
496 IRENA, ―Background‖, supra note 157. 
497 Ibid. 
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and CPA consents given their specific purposes.
498
 Therefore, it is doubtful that this 
sustainability requirement would have been otherwise adequately fulfilled given the 
presence of a general energy affordability policy. In any event, a quick review of licences 
and consents issued to Round 1 offshore wind farms would confirm that the decision-
makers did not consider the potential contribution offshore wind projects could make 
towards livelihood sufficiency and opportunity. In this regard, Gibson et al. note that to 




 Incorporating the principle of intragenerational equity is the third requirement for 
progress towards sustainability. In very basic terms, the principle requires that decision 
makers ensure that proposed undertakings are pursued in ways that reduce dangerous 
gaps in sufficiency and opportunity between the rich and poor.
500
 In other words, the 
criterion advocates that decisions should make positive contributions towards the concept 
of ‗livelihood equality,‘ i.e. ―…the right of all peoples within the current generation to 
fair access to the Earth‘s natural resources.‖
501
 Therefore, when approving marine 
renewables, decision makers must consider whether the costs and benefits are shared 
equally among all users of the sea. Is the effective decision fair to all users of the sea? 
The answer to this question depends on the attention paid to trade-off and compensation 
                                                        
498 A quick review of Round 1 FEPA licences and CPA consents would confirm that the decisions did not 
consider this sustainability requirement. So for instance, see, FEPA Licence granted to Eclipse Energy Co 
Ltd, Licence No. 32987/07/0, online: Marine Management Organizaton   
<http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/works/energy/documents/round1/ormond e.pdf>, [Ormonde 
FEPA Licence]. See also, CPA Consent granted to Eclipse Energy Co Ltd, Consent No. 32987/07/0/CON, 




499 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 99. 
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  Ibid. at 101. 
501 Alexandre Kiss, ―Public Lectures on International Environmental Law‖ in Adrian J. Bradbrook et. al, 
The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 16. 
 124 
issues. Generally, substantive trade-offs are involved whenever there are positives and 
negatives that must be weighed against each other.
502
 Decision makers, therefore, are 
always in the business of deciding which objectives to emphasize and, at least implicitly, 
which ones to neglect.
503
 There are a plethora of decision-making tools designed to assist 
them with these difficult trade off decisions.
504
 One common approach is to apply a cost-
benefit analysis to the evaluation of competing interests. While it is accepted that ―[i]t 
may not be possible to convert from climate threatening coal thermal power plants to 
renewable resources without adding new ecological burdens,‖
505
 the question is whether 
the costs and benefits of offshore wind are being distributed fairly among all 
stakeholders.  
 There are several users and uses of the offshore environment. These include for 
instance, recreation, shipping and fishing. However, the group of users most affected by 
the construction and operation of offshore wind farms are fishermen, whose very 
livelihood is at risk.
506
 Therefore, an evaluation of the experiences of the most affected 
group of users is a suitable means for assessing whether the costs and benefits of offshore 
wind are being distributed fairly. In this regard, the following series of events respecting 
the Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm is of importance in the discussion on the 
intragenerational requirement. In 2002, Global Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine 
Limited, the developers of Kentish Flats, published their Non-technical Summary of the 
required environmental statement in which it was noted:
507
  
                                                        
502 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 127. 
503 Ibid. at 123. 
504 Ibid. at 124. 
505 Ibid. at 123. 
506
 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 129. 
507 See, Global Renewable Energy Partners, Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm Non-Technical Summary 
(Emu Ltd., 2002) at 8 [Kentish Flats Non-Technical Summary]. 
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Impacts on fish and shellfish species are also not expected to be 
significant. The loss of seabed habitat is not considered significant and 
does not generally affect spawning or juvenile nursery areas. Instead, fish 
would be expected to show some avoidance to areas of disturbance during 
the construction phase, particularly in response to noise generated by 
piling operations.  
[…] 
“The new structures could act to attract fish into the area and could 




 March 2003, after considering the findings of the environmental statement, 
the Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs decided to grant Global 
Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited consent under Part II of the FEPA Act 
1985 to undertake the construction of up to 30 wind turbines at Kentish Flats, off the 
North Kent coast.
508
 In the Cover Letter to the licence the following was stated:
509
  
There are generic environmental issues associated with the construction 
and operation of offshore wind farms in the UK water for which there is at 
present a lack of knowledge [my emphasis] and opportunity for possible 
answers/solutions to be investigated. 
 




Since very little is known about the potential effect of wind farms in terms 
of enhancing or aggregating fish populations [my emphasis], the Licence 
Holder must produce proposals for adequate preconstruction baseline data 
and post-construction surveys of fish populations in the area of the wind 
farm. These surveys should, as a minimum comprise some seasonal 
surveys of fish populations in the region before construction and during 
the first year of the operational phase and should consider both demersal 
                                                        
508 See, Cover Letter of FEPA licence from Brian Hawkins, Marine Consents and Environment Unit 
Manager, to Global Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited dated 7 March 2003 on the subject of 
the Construction of a Windfarm at Kentish Flats, off the North Kent Coast (MCEU reference 31780/03/0) 
online: Marine Consents and Environment Unit 
<http://www.mceu.gov.uk/mceu_local/fepa/newsitems/KFlats_letter.pdf>, [Kentish Flats Cover Letter to 
FEPA Licence]. 
509 Ibid. 
510 See, FEPA Licence granted to Global Renewable Energy Partners UK, Licence No. 31780/03/0 at 12 ¶ 
9.6, online: Marine Consents and Environment Unit 
<http://www.mceu.gov.uk/MCEU_LOCAL/FEPA/NEWSITEMS/KFlats_licence.pdf>, [Kentish Flats 
FEPA Licence]. 
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and pelagic species. The Licence Holder shall, in drawing up such 
proposals, canvas the views of the local fishermen. The proposals must be 
submitted to the Licensing Authority at least one month prior to the 
proposed commencement of the monitoring work. 
 
 Later, on 12
th
 March 2003, on consideration of the findings of the environmental 
statement, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry granted consent to Global 
Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited for the construction and operation of an 
offshore wind farm under section 36 of the Electricity Act.
511
 The Cover Letter to the 
consent listed the objections to the project and how the Secretary of State considered their 
merits. One objection listed concerned the impact of the Kentish Flats farm on fishing. In 
response, it was noted that:
512
 
The Secretary of State has been informed by the Department of the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which has Government 
responsibility for the fishing industry, that the Development would be 
unlikely to have a significant impact on fishing grounds [my emphasis] 
 
 The preceding extracts form an account of the battle for primacy between two 
competing interests in the trade-off/decision-making process: the maintenance of the 
natural capital of fisheries versus the installation of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm. 
Specifically, the extracts evidence the manner in which decision makers have favoured 
the establishment of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm over the maintenance of the natural 
capital of fisheries. Were the costs and benefits of the trade-off distributed fairly?  
 It may be helpful to note that generally, trade-offs allow some adverse effects in 
the interests of securing important gains,
513
 such as the generation of renewable 
                                                        
511 See, Cover Letter of Electricity Act consent from Jim Campbell, Licensing and Consents Unit Director, 
to Global Renewable Energy Partners UK Marine Limited dated 2 March 2003 on the subject of the 
Application for Consent to Construct and Operate and Offshore Wind Farm at Kentish flats in the Thames 
Estuary (DTI reference: GDBC/C/001/00046) [unpublished], [Kentish Flats EA Consent Cover Letter]. 
512 Ibid. at ¶ 2.4, VIII. 
513 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 125. 
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electricity from offshore winds to meet emission reduction commitments. Certainly, on 
this basis, it can be argued as it has by Theodoros Kolonas
514
 that ―[t[he development of 
wind power, following the provisions of the Kyoto protocol can be interpreted as an 
effort to establish both intra and intergenerational equity within our societies.‖
515
 The 
general principle that may be extrapolated from this proposition is that any undertaking 
that makes an effective contribution towards reducing greenhouse gases has an intra and 
intergenerational benefit. Therefore, though Kolonas articulated this view in reference to 
onshore wind, the viewpoint is equally applicable to offshore wind development. Kolonas 
caveats however, that ―…there are studies that advocate that the implementation of wind 
power on the local level might be an action against the principles of equity, referring to 
its intragenerational part.‖
516
 In this regard, he cites studies which have concluded that 
NIMBY concerns in relation to onshore wind, ―…is a result of the citizens feeling that 
they have been treated in an unfair way.‖
517
 Comparatively, the offshore ‗NIMBY‘ 
protestors would be the fishermen who feel that they have been similarly treated in an 
unfair way, i.e., fishermen have been the recipients of the negatives of offshore wind 
development rather than the benefit. It seems therefore, that while offshore wind is able 
to contribute to global intra and intergenerational equity, it conflicts with domestic gains 
on progress towards intragenerational equity. Again, in the midst of this conflict it would 
                                                        
514 See, Theodoros Kolonas, The Research on Public Perceptions to Wind Power Schemes: An Analysis 
through the „eyes‟ of Sustainability (Thesis, Lund University, 2007) [unpublished], online: Lund University 
International Master‘s Programme in Environmental Studies and Sustainability Science    
<http://www.lumes.lu.se>. 
515
 Ibid. at 40 ¶ 7.4.5.2. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Ibid.  
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be helpful to restate the fact that generally, trade-offs allow some adverse effects in the 
interests of securing important gains.
518
  
 However, while some sacrifices may be necessary to permit gains elsewhere, no 
sacrifice should be made lightly.‖
519
 It would appear from a reading of the excerpts that 
the decision to sacrifice the maintenance of fisheries capital was made lightly. On the one 
hand, the environmental statement made it clear that given the small area affected by both 
turbine installation and cabling, ‗the impacts on fish and shellfish species and the loss of 
seabed habit is not considered significant.‘
520
 Subsequently, the Cover Letter to the 
FEPA licence noted that ‗there was a lack of knowledge on a range of environmental 
issues associated with the construction and operation of offshore wind farms.‘ 
Specifically, the FEPA licence admittedly noted, albeit contrary to that which was 
expressed in the Environmental Statement, ‗that very little was known about the 
potential effect of wind farms in terms of enhancing or aggregating fish populations.‘ 
Lastly, in granting the EA consent, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry relied on 
the opinion of DEFRA to the effect that the ‗…Kentish Flats Wind Farm would be 
                                                        
518 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 125. 
519 Ibid. at 133. 
520
 As an ancillary point, it is interesting to note the manner in which the developers of the Kentish Flats 
windfarm presented the findings of the Kentish Flats Non-Technical Summary of the Environmental 
Statement. See, Kentish Flats Non-Technical Summary, supra note 509. As it relates to the environmental 
and socio-economic impact, a clear pattern is visible. The drafters purposefully outlined in bold and 
italicized print, the supposed positive attributes of the windfarm: ―no effects on rare species or habitats”; 
“The new structures would could act to attract fish to the area and could even increase fish diversity and 
productivity in the longer term”; “the windfarm could well provide a positive impact for tourism, acting 
as a new attraction for visitors to the area, attracting yachts and pleasure boat trips”. Ibid. at 7 -8 
respectively. In contrast, while possible negative impacts were reported, the clear focus of the 
environmental statement was on the proposed benefit and can properly described as a mere lobbying 
document. Additionally, see, Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 101 where it is noted 
that some local planning authorities felt that ―…the environmental statements were not totally reliable. 
[Essentially.] [t]his criticism ranged from doubts about the adequacy and coverage of the EIA studies to 
strong disagreements with the findings presented in the statements and claims that the effects of wind farms 
were being underestimated [my emphasis].‖ In fact, the Kentish Flats EIA was one of the EIAs questioned 
in reference to the adequacy of the EIA process. See, Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 
87.         
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unlikely to have a significant impact on fishing grounds.‘ The opinion of DEFRA that 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry relied on in granting the EA consent is 
dramatically different in wording, meaning and degree to the opinion expressed by 
DEFRA in the FEPA Licence. There is a huge conceptual difference between a statement 
expressing the fact that ‗very little is known about the potential impacts…,‘ and a 
statement advocating that „Kentish Flats Wind Farm would be unlikely to have a 
significant impact on fishing grounds.‟ In sum, it is clear that, the opinions expressed as 
justification for favouring the Kentish Flats Windfarm over the maintenance of fishing 
capital in the trade-off process, were inconsistent. This finding is unsurprising. It is a 
direct result of the United Kingdom‘s attempt to regulate offshore wind through existing 
and fragmented regimes that were created for other purposes. In this regard, Gibson et al. 
note that in fragmented regimes ―…trade-off judgments are made with minimal guidance, 
transparency or explicit rationale.‖
521
 
 Given the foregoing, it is difficult to determine whether the costs and benefits 
were distributed fairly in the absence of a clear, consistent and affirmative position 
regarding the potential positive and negative impacts the Kentish Flats Wind Farm 
project posed to fisheries. However, the very absence of a clear, consistent and 
affirmative position could necessarily lead to the conclusion that, at the outset, explicit 
attention was not paid to trade-off issues and implicitly, no attention was paid to the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the project or more specifically, the fair 
distribution of the same. 
 Furthermore, where gains could not be made on the requirement for 
intragenerational equity by reducing the negative impact to a local fisherman‘s 
                                                        
521 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 136. 
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livelihood, one alternative way in which decision-makers could have sought to make 
some gains on the principle was to grant consents on an active consideration of 
compensation for loss of livelihood. Indeed, many fishermen argued that they had ―… a 
moral right to compensation because the siting of wind farms on fishing grounds eroded 
their (legitimate) opportunities to earn their livelihood.‖
522
 Unfortunately, none of the 
licences reviewed explicitly focused on matters of compensation issues. In relation to the 
Kentish Flats WindFarm, this is particularly unfortunate given the fact that compensation 
issues were raised for consideration when the developers published their non-technical 
summary of the environmental statement. To recap, it was noted that ―[t]he new 
structures could act to attract fish into the area and could even increase fish diversity 
and productivity in the longer-term.”
523
 According to a study by Jennifer C. Wilson and 
Michael Elliott, ―…the placement of offshore wind turbines gives the potential for habitat 
creation, which may thus be regarded as compensation for habitat loss.‖
524
 The decision-
makers on Round 1 consent applications did not explore the potential for habitat creation 
outlined in the Kentish Flats non-technical summary. Instead, it was noted in the FEPA 
licence that ―…very little [was] known about the potential effect of wind farms in terms 
of enhancing or aggregating fish populations… .‖
525
 Upon acknowledgement of the same, 
Licence Holders were required to…  
…produce proposals for adequate preconstruction baseline data and post-
construction surveys of fish populations in the area of the wind farm. 
These surveys should, as a minimum comprise some seasonal surveys of 
fish populations in the region before construction and during the first year 
of the operational phase and should consider both demersal and pelagic 
                                                        
522 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 135. 
523 Above at 124 - 125. 
524
 See, Jennifer C. Wilson & Michael Elliott, ―The Habitat-creation Potential of Offshore Wind Farms‖ 
(2009) 12 Wind Energy 203 at 203. 
525 Above at 125. 
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species. The Licence Holder shall, in drawing up such proposals, canvas 
the views of the local fishermen. The proposals must be submitted to the 
Licensing Authority at least one month prior to the proposed 
commencement of the monitoring work. 
 
 While fish monitoring obligations may be pressed to represent agreed means of 
compensation, the unadorned fact is that consent for the Kentish Flats development had 
been provided prior to a determination of the potential effect of wind farms in terms of 
enhancing or aggregating fish populations. What is in critique here is the fact that the 
FEPA Licence should have been granted on consideration of baseline data on the 
potential effect of wind farms on fishing populations, rather than requiring baseline data 
after the licence had already been granted. However, the Joint Nature and Conservation 
Committee and English Nature argued that ―… while there are gaps, sufficient data 
existed for dealing with offshore proposals.‖
526
 All the same, the conclusion is that Round 
1 decisions failed to make gains on the requirement for intragenerational equity. 
 The requirement of intergenerational equity was briefly considered in the 
assessment of intragenerational equity above. It was noted that conceptually, offshore 
wind contributes to intergenerational equity because of its emission reduction benefit. 
Under this requirement, Gibson et al., advocate that decision-makers ―[f]avour present 
options and actions that are likely to preserve or enhance the opportunities and 
capabilities of future generations to live sustainably.
‖527
 The requirement forces decision-
makers to make a choice between preserving or exploiting ecological systems and 
associated resources for the benefit of future generations. Implicitly, in making a 
decision, decision-makers must grapple with the principle of substitution, i.e.,  
                                                        
526 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 136. 
527 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 103. 
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Do we [decide that we should] retain and protect current ecological 
systems and resources for the continued benefit of future generations? Or 
do we [decide that we should] use (and in some ways degrade) these 
systems and resources now in the expectation that the returns will build 
economic, technical and/or intellectual capacity for replacing exhausted 




 At the outset of this Chapter, it was noted that ―[Round 1 wind projects were 
intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round [to provide] prospective developers with an 
environment in which they could gain technological, economic and environmental 
experience.‖
529
 Also, in granting the section 36 Consent under the Electricity Act, the 
Secretary of State considered the important role offshore wind power could play ―… in 
providing clean forms of energy to help provide additional security in our supplies and 
also help reduce emissions from the production of electricity.‖
530
 Therefore, on the one 
hand, as ‗demonstration projects‘ that carry an emission reduction benefit, Round 1 
windfarms can be deemed significant investments for improving the environment in the 
future. On the other hand, it must also be recognized that while substitutions have been 
made which provided valued and lasting improvements in human well-being, ―[t]he catch 
is that they have not had consistently positive of fairly distributed effects.‖
531
 The failure 
of Round 1 decisions to prevent greater gaps in sufficiency and opportunity between the 
rich (the offshore wind industry) and the poor (the affected fishermen) demonstrate the 
truth of this. Nonetheless, this dynamic does not wholly discount the contribution Round 
1 demonstration projects made towards intergenerational equity. 
 Moreover, according to Jeremy Firestone et al., ―…the principle of 
intergenerational equity suggests that a future generation should not be saddled with the 
                                                        
528 Ibid. at 104. 
529
 Crown Estate, ―Rounds 1 and 2‖, supra note 407. 
530 Kentish Flats EA Consent Cover Letter, supra note 513 at ¶ 2.4 (ii). 
531 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 104. 
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costs of decommissioning a facility that benefited the present generation.‖
532
 In relation 
to Kentish Flats, for instance, the FEPA licence requires that the licence holder ensures 
that any debris or temporary works placed below mean high water springs are removed 
on completion of the works authorized by the licence.
533
 Additionally, developers are 
required to undertake a pre-construction survey in which all obstructions on the seabed 
must be plotted. Afterward, a post construction survey must be undertaken wherein any 
new obstructions must be removed at the developer‘s expense.
534
 These two provisions 
are common among Round 1 FEPA licences and, interpretively, they incorporate not only 
the requirement for intergenerational equity but also the polluter pays principle. 
Additionally, the pro-forma leases that are granted by the Crown Estate to bestow 
tenancy rights to developers contain reinstatement covenants that also incorporate the 
polluter pays principle and the intergenerational equity requirement. Generally, a 
developer/tenant covenants with the Crown Estate Commissioners/landlord that:
535
  
… prior to the expiration or sooner determination of the Term (unless the 
Landlord otherwise requires in writing) to remove the Works and Supply 
Cables […] and to restore the Premises and Designated Areas to a safe and 
proper condition and in accordance with all Legal Obligations.    
 
 As well, EA consents also incorporate the requirement for intergenerational equity 
and the polluter pays principle by binding developers to decommissioning and restoration 
obligations very similar to those contained in Crown Estate leases.
536
 It would appear 
                                                        
532 See, Jeremy Firestone et al., ―Regulating Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture: Messages from Land 
and Sea‖ (2005) 14 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol‘y 71 at 108. 
533 Kentish Flats FEPA Licence, supra note 512 at 12 ¶ 9.28. 
534 Ibid. at 13 ¶ 9.29. 
535 See, Crown Estate, ―Precedent of pro-forma Crown Estate Lease‖, supra note 411 at 21 ¶ 3.15.1. 
536
 Department of Trade and Industry, Construction of a Generating Station at Kentish Flats in the Thames 
Estuary [Kentish Flats Electricity Act Consent], (DTI reference: GDBC/C/001/00046) at paragraph 11 and 
12, [Kentish Flats EA Consent]. 
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therefore that Round 1 consent decisions made some progress towards sustainability to 
the extent that they incorporated the requirement for intergenerational equity. 
 Additionally, for progress towards sustainability, decisions should incorporate the 
principle of resource maintenance. Here, decision makers must ensure that approval 
decisions on offshore wind projects seek to reduce threats to the long-term integrity of 
socio-ecological systems by reducing extractive damage.
537
 In other words, decision-
makers must take into consideration the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated 
resources, and permit development initiatives under conditions that ensure careful 
extraction of resources. As a starting point, it was noted in the beginning of this Chapter 
that European Union and National law placed obligations on offshore wind developers to 
carry out Environmental Impact Assessments.
538
 So for instance, the Electricity Works 
Regulations 2000 explicitly prohibit the granting of development consent where the 
application for offshore wind development is unaccompanied by an Environmental 
Statement for consultation by the relevant consenting authority.
539
 The EIA process 
involves a number of steps which include project screening, scoping, description of the 
environmental baseline, identification of key impacts, public consultation, decision-
making, post-decision monitoring, etc.
540
 For present purposes the ‗description of the 
environmental baseline‘ step deserves some attention. This step involves ―…the 
establishment of both the present and future state of the environment, in the absence of 
the project, taking into account changes resulting from natural events and from other 
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 Thereafter, this information is reported in the resulting document - 
the Environmental Statement. The Environmental Statement is then taken into account by 
the relevant decision-makers who must decide whether the proposed offshore wind 
project should proceed to the development stage. Therefore, the ‗description of the 
environmental baseline‘ aspect of the Environmental Statement forces decision-makers to 
consider the existing stresses on ecosystems and associated resources. Without due regard 
to information contained in the description of the environmental baseline, it would be 
difficult for decision makers permit offshore wind development under conditions that 
ensure careful extraction of offshore wind energy. In sum, EIA requirements ensured that 
Round 1 decisions made positive gains on the requirement of resource maintenance. 
 As another core requirement for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al. 
propose that decisions incorporate the principle of socio-ecological civility and 
democratic governance, i.e., there should be a greater focus on better governance and 
developing better governance arrangements. This criterion is reflective of the notion that 
sustainability is a challenge to conventional thinking and practice. And so, Gibson et al. 
argue that if the other core requirements are to be met, decision-makers must begin by 
recognizing that current decision-making structures and processes are ineffective.
542
 
Essentially, what is needed to secure progress towards sustainability on this requirement 
is governance thinking and arrangements that ―… move away from development for the 
people to development with and by the people.‖
543
 Therefore, central to this criterion is 
the application of sustainability principles through more transparent and better publicly 
informed deliberations. There can be no mistake in concluding that Round 1 decisions 
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failed to meet this requirement. First, as noted at the outset of this section the very use of 
existing regulatory mechanisms to pursue Round 1 development is against the core 
concept of sustainability, i.e., that sustainability is a challenge to business as usual 
practices. Curtailing existing legislations to accommodate new uses such as offshore 
wind is characteristic of the conventional practice of managing and regulating marine 
activities through ad hoc, responsive and fragmented ways. This culture of fragmentation 
impedes an integrated decision-making process; a process that is considered a mode of 
better governance. Secondly, the use of traditional governance arrangements to regulate 
offshore wind means that the decision-making process was reminiscent of traditional, 
top-down control through laws and regulations that concentrate political power in the 
hands of the State. Evidence of the same is noted in the new governance assessment 
above. The new governance assessment shows that governmental departments built up 
relations with industry (BWEA) but failed to build up strong relations with the full range 
of potentially interested groups like fishermen, especially at the local level. Additionally, 
the regulatory mechanisms for marine activities, which were adopted for the purposes of 
offshore wind development, offered relatively few opportunities for public representation 
and consultation.
544
 These instances are inconsistent with a governance arrangement that 
moves away from development for the people to development with and by the people. 
 Gibson et al.‘s seventh requirement for progress towards sustainability is that 
decisions should seek to adopt the principles of precaution and adoption. Specifically, the 
guidance given to decision-makers is to ―[r]espect uncertainty, avoid even poorly 
understood risks of serious or irreversible damage to the foundations for sustainability, 
                                                        
544 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 110. 
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plan to learn, design for surprise and manage for adaptation.‖
545
 Generally, the conditions 







 and Scroby Sand
549
, demonstrate that decision-makers 
were concerned with minimizing the impact of the development on the surrounding 
environment. In doing so, the licences sought to regulate the type of chemicals that may 
be used during construction;
550
 ensure efficient storage, handling and transportation of 
fuels and other chemicals to prevent releases into the marine environment;
551
 and prevent 
accidental release of wet cement into the marine environment.
552
 FEPA licences also 
imposed strict obligations on developers to monitor impacts of project development over 
the course of construction and, thereafter, during operation.
553
 Generally therefore, 
precautionary and anticipate-and-prevent approaches were adopted by decision-makers. 
Interpretively, because precautionary and anticipatory approaches aid in ensuring the 
                                                        
545 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 111. 
546 See generally, FEPA Licence granted to NWP Offshore Ltd., Licence No. 31579/03/0, online: Marine 
Consents and Environment Unit 
http://www.mceu.gov.uk/MCEU_LOCAL/FEPA/NEWSITEMS/NHoyle_licence.pdf, [North Hoyle FEPA 
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547 See generally, Kentish Flats FEPA licence, supra note 512.  
548 See, Generally, FEPA Licence Granted to Celtic Offshore Wind Ltd., Licence No. 31640/02/0, online: 
Marine Consents and Environment Unit 
<http://www.mceu.gov.uk/MCEU_LOCAL/FEPA/NEWSITEMS/Rhyl_licence.pdf>, [Rhyls Flats FEPA 
Licence]. 
549 See generally, FEPA Licence granted to Powergens Renewables Offshore Windfarm Ltd., Licence No. 
31272/03/0, online: Marine Consents and Environment Unit 
http://www.mceu.gov.uk/MCEU_LOCAL/fepa/NewsItems/Scrobyconsent2.pdf>, [Scroby Sands FEPA 
licence].  
550 North Hoyle FEPA Licence, supra note 548 at 9 ¶ 9.19. All chemicals used in operations must be 
selected from a List of Notified Chemicals assessed for use by the offshore oil and gas industry under the 
Offshore Chemicals Regulations 2002. In accordance with paragraph 9.20, the developer will also require 
prior consent from the Licensing Authority for the use of chemicals not contained in the afore-mentioned 
list. As well, the licence holder must ensure that all protective coatings; paints etc used are suitable for use 
in the marine environment and, where necessary, are approved by the Health and Safety Executive. See ¶ 
9.21. 
551 Ibid. at 10 ¶ 9.22. Section 9.23 further imposes an obligation on the licence holder to produce a Marine 
Pollution Contingency Plan for spills and collision accidents during construction and operation.  
552 Ibid. at 10 ¶ 9.27. 
553 Ibid. FEPA at 13 - 15.   
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careful extraction of resources, progress on this requirement ensured conformity with the 
core requirement of resource maintenance outlined above.  
 Lastly, for progress towards sustainability, Gibson et al. note that decisions should 
seek to incorporate the principle of immediate and long-term integration. Essentially, this 
requirement sets the policy objective for meeting all the other core requirements. The 
policy objective is that decisions should ―[a]ttempt to meet all requirements for 
sustainability together as a set of interdependent parts, seeking mutually supportive 
benefits.‖
554
 In other words, the goal of sustainable decision-making is to effect decisions 
that seek to pursue all of the requirements at once in order to make gains in each area. 
This requirement recognizes the fact that because requirements overlap and are 
interdependent, failure or gains on one requirement will affect progress on others.
555
 So 
for instance, Gibson et al. note that ―[g]ains in livelihood sufficiency and opportunity will 
collapse if the integrity of supporting socio-ecological systems is compromised and key 
ecological functions are not maintained.‖
556
 The application of the core requirements to 
the decision making process demonstrate the truth of this proposition. Of the seven (7) 
core requirements outlined above, the Round 1 consents process failed four (4) of those 
requirements. Inescapably, this means that the Round 1 consents process also failed this 
requirement. Overall, therefore, the consents decisions failed five (5) core requirements 
for progress towards sustainability. This supports the assumption at the outset of this 
section that Round 1 offshore wind projects were developed without due regard to the 
principle of sustainable development.  
                                                        
554




 In sum, according to Gibson et al.‘s generic requirements for sustainability, the 
decisions made to deploy Round 1 offshore wind turbines did not produce sustainable 
outcomes or, rather and more importantly, maximum gains on all requirements. 
Generally, the substantive outcomes were strong on the requirements for precaution and 
adaptation, intergenerational equity and resource maintenance. In other words, Round 1 
consent decisions satisfied only three of eight requirements for progress towards 
sustainability. The few gains made on the requirements can hardly be considered 
dedicated efforts towards sustainable development. In fact, the few gains were effected 
haphazardly through the use of existing regulatory instruments. Again, this demonstrates 
the unsuitability of existing regimes for sustainability purposes. 
 Several reasons explain the unsustainable outcome. For the most part, the reasons 
are inextricably linked to the decision-making arrangements outlined in the previous 
sections. In relation to the political dimension, the first conclusion drawn was that power 
to make legally binding decisions that determine whether a particular offshore wind 
project will be given approval for development was legally vested in the State. On a 
proper examination of the regime, it was found that in practice, the State-directed 
governance arrangement was especially vulnerable to pressures from one particular non-
state actor, the BWEA (industry). Meanwhile in relation to the institutional dimension, it 
was found that the institutions that had the capacity to influence the outcome of Round 1 
consents applications were typically characterized by formal establishment (State actors 
and industry). Irrespective of whether it is decided to acknowledge the de jure or de facto 
placement of power in the political dimension, the difficulty to be considered is that, 
given the unsustainable outcome, what motivated the exercise of power in favour of 
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approval? One immediate but myopic answer is that ―[Round 1 wind projects were 
intended] to act as a ‗demonstration‘ round [to provide] prospective developers with an 
environment in which they could gain technological, economic and environmental 
experience.‖
557
 A more prudent response would reference the environmental benefit to be 
had from harnessing clean, renewable energy from offshore winds. By all accounts, it can 
be conclusively stated that in the exercise of their power to determine whether offshore 
wind farms would be allowed to enter the marine environment, the State treated Round 1 
consent applications differently because of the perceived benefit.
558
 So for instance, when 
the Government asked the Canterbury City Council Planning Authority to consider the 
merits of the Kentish Flats Wind Farm application, ―…Canterbury‘s response was to 
support the wind farm in principle, on the basis that it ‗represents the development of a 
clean, sustainable and renewable energy source.‘‖
559
 Stephen A. Jay describes the 
underlying political issues behind planning authorities‘ preference and support for 
offshore wind in the following words: 
… planning authorities may themselves look favourably on offshore wind 
as a preferred alternative to on-land schemes in their areas. By supporting 
offshore schemes, they can demonstrate their backing for renewables 
whilst protecting their territories from intrusion of on-land wind farms and 
avoiding conflicts that might arise onshore. In other words, planning 
authorities themselves can benefit from the advantages of offshore 
                                                        
557 Crown Estate, ―Rounds 1 and 2‖, supra note 407. 
558 See, David Toke, ―Wind Power in the UK: How Planning Conditions and Financial Arrangements 
Affect Outcomes‖ (2003) 23(4) International Journal of Sustainable Energy 207 and 208 where it is noted 
that: ―In recent times […] local planning officers have become more positive about windfarm planning 
applications. This is at least partly the result of the expectation that the Government is tasking a more pro-
windfarm policy which would influence the Planning Appeal system.‖   
559 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 54 citing Canterbury City Council, Development 
Control Committee Agenda, 15 October 2002, [unpublished] document at Agenda Item No. 8 ¶ 7, online: 




locations as perceived by the industry. This may be an explanatory factor 




 In the context of this assessment, it appears as though planning authorities did in 
fact demonstrate their preference for offshore wind development in the consenting 
process. In similar fashion, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry also weighed in 
on the ―…potential of offshore wind farms for delivering a significant contribution to 
meeting its renewable targets,‖
561
 during the decision-making process.  
 Though it is argued here that decision makers may not be inclined to reject 
offshore wind projects, they are, nevertheless, seized with ability to determine the manner 
in which they are to be deployed. This is particularly important because, prima facie, 
there can be a range of impacts on coastal and marine areas, depending on how wind 
farms are being deployed, and the number of wind farms being deployed under these 
conditions. At some point the impact of deploying more wind farms and/or deploying 
more wind farms with less focus on progress towards sustainability, is going to push 
offshore wind energy to become more intrusive, inequitable and harmful than 
conventional methods of energy generation. The concentration of power in the hands of 
state and industry whose primary focus in the trade-off process has been on the benefit to 
be had from offshore wind, is restricting the issuance of decisions that may ensure that 
offshore wind does not cause any more harm than good.  
 Given the foregoing, how then could decision-makers ensure that offshore wind 
does not cause any more harm than good? The simple answer would be to effect more 
gains on Gibson et al.‘s core requirements. More specifically, however, the new 
governance assessment above has shown that the main feature of the Round 1 consents 
                                                        
560 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 121 – 122. 
561 See, Kentish Flats EA Consent Cover Letter, supra note 513 at ¶ 2.4, (ii). 
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process is that it was a state-centered, top-down governance arrangement. In particular, 
this hierarchical governance arrangement prevented any gains on the requirement for 
socio-ecological civility and democratic governance. It means then that the consent 
decisions mainly reflected the interests of the Government, but also the BWEA. The 
interest of both actors in the consents process is the rapid development of the offshore 
wind industry and the potential benefit to be had. Perhaps therefore, this dynamic is one 
of the main causes of the unsustainable outcomes on consent applications. In Chapter 2, it 
was noted that ―…many people have been disappointed with the ability of government to 
tackle social problems.‖
562
 The unsustainable outcomes are one example of the inability 
of State-centered governance arrangements to effectively tackle social problems. It was 
also noted in Chapter 2, that the cause of New Governance scholars has been motivated 
by these inabilities.
563
 In the main, these scholars seek to destabalize the priority of 
traditional modes of governance. Their proposition is that the social trait of non-state 
actors would influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems.
564
 So for 
example, Gibson et al. suggest that  ―…greater [intergenerational] equality is unlikely to 
be achieved  or to be lasting unless it is accompanied by greater political equality, in the 
broad sense of power to participate effectively in decision-making in a context of real 
choices‖
565
 Essentially therefore, progress towards sustainability will remain vulnerable if 
democratic governance and customary civility are underdeveloped. At its base, this 
discussion is an apt exemplar of the significance of the requirement for integrating the 
principle of immediate and long-term integration. 
                                                        
562 Lee, ―Conceptualizing the New Governance‖, supra note 97 
563
 Above at 26 ¶ 2.2.1. 
564 Ibid.  
565 Gibson et al., ―Sustainability Assessment‖, supra note 123 at 103. 
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 Compounding the problem of concentrating political power in the hands of the 
State is the regulatory mode of governance. The new governance assessment concluded 
that the regulatory regime was consistent with traditional top-down hierarchical 
government control through existing laws and regulations. Earlier, it was noted that the 
use of existing regimes with sectoral focus, is fundamentally at odds with the principle of 
sustainability, which, in theory and in practice, challenges business as usual. It is beyond 
challenge that ―[s]ometimes, existing mechanisms have simply been adapted for new 
purposes even though they may not be ideally suited to the matter in hand. [As a result, 
the] only step towards the integration of different interests has been through consultation 
procedures.‖
566
 This is precisely the case with the Round 1 regulatory regime, the only 
difference being, that the consultation procedures were inadequate for integrating 
different interests. Additionally, given the primacy placed on the need to rapidly develop 
the offshore wind industry, the consents regime was really a quick response to effect 
government policy.
567
 Above all, and if anything, the regulatory governance arrangement 
is an explicit demonstration of the notion that ―[t]he law of the land cannot swim,‖
568
 that 
is, regulations passed to govern activity onshore are ill-suited for regulating activity in the 





                                                        
566 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 109. 
567
 Ibid. at 110. 
568 See, E. Mann Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1998) at 6. 
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5.4 Round 2 – The Reformed Consents Process and Strategic        
Environmental Assessment 
 
 Despite the foregoing assessment, the UK Government considered the Round 1 
consents process to be ‗adequate‘ for offshore wind purposes.
569
 Consequently, the 
consents process for Round 2 wind farms marginally differed from the Round 1 
process.
570
 One major critique of the Round 1 consenting process was that it was 
duplicating and complex.
571
 A slight reform was effected through the enactment of the 
Energy Act 2004.
572
 Section 99 of the Energy Act attempts to streamline the consenting 
process by trumping the need for a separate permit under the Coast Protection Act 1949 
to extinguish rights of navigation. Section 99 also inserted two new provisions (Section 
36A and 36B) into the Electricity Act 1989. By section 36A, where the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry receives an application under section 36 of the Electricity Act 
1989 for the construction, etc. of an offshore renewable energy station, he may 
simultaneously, make a declaration extinguishing rights of navigation.     
 Another change in the regime was the extension of the ability to exploit the sea 
for energy production to areas outside the territorial sea. At some point in time, if 
development continues to be limited to territorial waters, the lack of available seabed will 
become a real issue for continued development
573
 and as a result, will impede the ability 
of offshore wind to deliver its emissions reduction promise. As well, the cumulative 
impacts of developments in territorial waters may reach levels where no further 
                                                        
569 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 66 ¶ 7.4.1. 
570 Jay, ―At the Margins of Planning‖, supra note 327 at 110. 
571
 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 66 ¶ 7.4.1. 
572 Energy Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 20. 




 These difficulties, along with industry interests for larger 
projects, encouraged the Government to develop a legislative basis for offshore wind 
development beyond territorial waters.
575
 For this purpose, section 84 of the Energy Act 
was drafted to establish a 200 nautical mile Renewable Energy Zone (REZ) around the 
United Kingdom territory, within which it can exercise sovereign rights in relation to the 
production of energy from the water, currents and waves.
576
 Having established the REZ, 
section 93 of the Energy Act goes on to extend the section 36 consent requirement for 
construction etc. of generating stations to the territorial sea and the REZ.  
 Furthermore, the Energy Act also introduced two new schemes to the consenting 
regime. Firstly, sections 95 – 98 established safety zones around offshore renewable 
energy installations. Secondly, Chapter 3 Part II of the Energy Act established a 
comprehensive statutory scheme for decommissioning offshore renewable energy 
installations. 
 The final modification to the Round 1 consents regime was the passage of the 
Electricity (Offshore Generating Stations) (Applications for Consent) Regulations 
2006.
577
 Pertinent to this assessment, Regulation 5 now makes it mandatory for applicants 
to serve notice of offshore proposals on a list of state and non-state agencies representing 
varied interests.  Missing from that list however, is the agency that represents the interests 
of the most affected users in the marine environment – the fishers. Possibly still, fishing 
interest may be captured under regulation 5(k) where the Secretary of State for DTI holds 
                                                        
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 See, Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy‖, supra note 36 at 175 ¶ 7.3.8 where the REZ is described as a 
novel concept in ocean renewable energy development. 
577 The Electricity (Offshore Generating Stations) (Applications for Consent) Regulations 2006, S.I. 
2006/2064 [Electricity Regulations 2006]. 
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a discretion to decide such other persons that notice of application is to be served upon. 
Additionally, Regulation 6 requires offshore wind developers to serve notice of their 
application on any planning authority that ―…is likely to have an interest in the 
development… .‖ By necessary interpretation, what this section does is to elevate 
planning authorities to the role of ‗statutory consultees‘. On the other hand, the 
Regulations also preserved the power of planning authorities to object, but on the other 
hand, the Regulations removed the power to force a public inquiry. Causatively, 
therefore, this fetter on planning authorities‘ power only serves to further restrict the 
opportunity for wider public involvement in the consents process. 
 As with Consents Route 1, the Round 2 application process began by seeking 
tenancy rights from the Crown Estate. While the Crown Estate was able to offer leases to 
Round 1 projects because they were constructed within territorial waters, Round 2 
projects developed beyond the territorial limit could only be awarded licences as the UK 
does not retain ownership of the seabed beyond the territorial limit.  
 One striking feature of Round 1 was that the State and proponents greatly 
influenced the development of offshore wind energy, particularly the decision-making 
process. Therefore, before awarding sites for Round 2, the Government published Future 
Offshore in which it was proposed that a strategic planning framework be adopted as a 
basis for the expansion of the offshore wind industry.
578
 For this purpose, in 2002, the 
Department commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) designed to 
empower actors other than the State and the proponent. The SEA focused on three 
strategic regions – the Thames Estuary, the Greater Wash and the North West. These 
                                                        
578 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 8. 
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regions were pre-selected by the Crown Estate and the DTI as areas appropriate for 
development. The SEA was completed on 29
th
 April 2003.   
 In Future Offshore, the Government adopted Threrivel et al.‘s
579
 1996 definition 
of strategic environmental assessment which reads:
580
 
The formal, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the 
effects [my emphasis] of a proposed policy, plan or programme or its 
alternative, including the written report on the findings of that evaluation, 
and using the findings in publicly accountable decision making.  
 
 Despite the Government‘s good intention to develop a strategic framework for the 
offshore wind industry, many believed that the SEA process was far from 
‗comprehensive‘. Consequently, it has often been considered a failure.
581
 Many of the 
reasons that ground this assessment stem from the fact that the SEA process was 
rushed
582
 and ―…that the issue of cumulative impact had not been addressed in enough 
depth and detail.‖
583
 The entire SEA process was completed in five (5) months. At first 
glance, the rushed outcome could be considered surprising for the very reason that the 
general impression given by the Government in Future Offshore was that due care would 
be taken during the commissioning stage of the SEA because of the newness of applying 
SEAs to marine renewables. So, for instance, when introducing the practice of conducting 
SEAs in Future Offshore, the Government noted that SEAs were not new practices to its 
                                                        
579 See, Riki Therivel & Maria do Rosário Partidário, The Practice of Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(London: Earthscan, 1996) at 4. 
580 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 58 ¶ 6.1. 
581 See generally, Round 2 Offshore Wind Energy SEA Consultation Report Responses, online: Department 
of Energy and Climate Change Offshore SEA <http://www.offshore-
sea.org.uk/consultations/Wind_R2/Wind_responses.pdf>, [Round 2 Response to SEA Consultation]. 
582 See, Chadwick, ―Environmental Impact Assessment‖, supra note 542 at 282 ¶ 9.8.5. 
583 Round 2 Response to SEA Consultation, supra note 583 at ¶ 6. A key characteristic of any SEA is that it 
should deal with potential cumulative impacts associated with the development, not only on a sectoral basis 
(in this case offshore wind farm development) but also in combination with other marine activities and 
uses. See, Carolyn Heeps, ―The Race for Offshore Renewables‖ in Hance D. Smith & Jonathan Potts, 
Managing Britain‟s Marine and Coastal Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future (London: Routledge, 
2005) at 87 [Heeps, ―The Race for Offshore Renewables‖].  
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management regimes, but had been previously been applied by the Department of Trade 
and Industry to the oil and gas sector.
584
 Since the same department would have been 
charged with the responsibility of conducting the SEA for marine renewable energy 
purposes, this was a clear statement by the Government that they had the capacity and the 
know-how to properly commission a SEA. In this respect, it was noted that ―[t]here is 
relevant experience to be gained from the application of the SEA to the UK Oil and Gas 
sector… .‖
585
 Specifically, however, it was singled out for mention that:
586
  
…there are some fundamental differences to be appreciated when 
comparing the application of the SEA to the oil and gas sector. The oil and 
gas sector is a mature industry in contrast to the offshore wind industry 
which has different impacts and issues, many of which are relatively 
unknown and cannot currently be predicted with any certainty as there is 
no monitoring information available [my emphasis]. 
 
 The above extract clearly indicates that the Government was well aware of the need 
to apply extra care when seeking to strategically assess the three development areas. 
According to Tim Gray et al., ―[t]he SEA has a number of critical requirements including 
the consultation of stakeholders. It is therefore clear that the permitting process is a long 
and complicated one, and that a key part of it is stakeholder consultation.‖
587
 Among 
those stakeholders, is ―the public, including the public affected or likely to be affected by, 
or having an interest in the decision-making of the plan or programme, comprising 
several non-governmental organizations.‖
588
 Essentially, therefore, one of the main 
purposes of SEAs is to empower non-state actors.
589
 By completing the SEA process in 
                                                        
584 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 59 ¶ 6.3. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 129.  
588 See, Gernot Stoeglehner & Gerald Wergerer, ―The SEA-Directive and the SEA-Protocol adapted to 
spatial planning – similarities and differences‖ (2006) 26 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 586 at 
589, [Stoeglehner, ―The SEA-Directive‖]. 
589 Ibid. at 595.  
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five months, many respondents, such as the Council for National Parks, the Countryside 
Council for Wales, several Sea Fisheries Committees, the Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee, the Marine Conservation Society, and the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds, expressed concern that as a direct consequence, the consultation period was 
rushed.
590
 In relation to fisheries, a study in stakeholder consultation found that ―[t]he 
undue speed of some of the consultation processes with fishers was also criticised; 
indeed, the [Joint Nature Conservation Committee] member highlighted that the four 
weeks for the SEA consultation compared unfavourably with the 12 months allowed for 
oil and gas project consultations.‖
591
 It appeared surprising, therefore, that given the 
above-quote highlighting the immaturity of the offshore wind industry, that the 
Government would fail to proceed on standards akin, or even higher than those afforded 
to the oil and gas sector. Even worse, according to Threrivel‘s definition of a SEA, the 
findings of the SEA were to be ‗used in publicly accountable decision making.‘ It seems, 
however, that business efficacy was more important to the Government than a 
‗comprehensive process of evaluating the effects‟ of offshore wind farms in the identified 
strategic regions. While noting that ‗[t]here is relevant experience to be gained from the 
application of the SEA to the UK Oil and Gas sector…‘
592
 it seemed as though the 
experience only inspired short-cuts in the interests of business efficacy:   
Although the two sectors will have a different approach to SEA, the oil 
and gas SEA work does provide the offshore wind energy sector with a 
number of potential opportunities and cost and time savings. In particular 
considerable data and information collection has been undertaken for the 
oil and gas SEA areas and, where appropriate, these data will be used to 
                                                        
590
 See, Round 2 Response to SEA Consultation, supra note 583 at ¶ e.  
591 See, Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 133. 
592 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 59 ¶ 6.3. 
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 It is necessary to make the distinction that the need to rapidly develop the offshore 
regime to meet climate change agendas is not in question. What is in critique, however, is 
the manner in which the Government has sought to meet that end. In Future Offshore, the 
Government was sure to mention ―…that the rapid development of the offshore wind 
farm industry must not be at the expense of unacceptable risks to the environment or to 
other users of the sea. It should not be undertaken in a manner which is inefficient...‖
594
 It 
was also noted in Future Offshore that ―[a]part from economic considerations, the extent 
to which this resource can be exploited needs to be determined through a comprehensive 
planning framework which properly weighs the benefit of the development against the 
potential adverse impacts.‖
595
 Notwithstanding recognition of the same, the 
Government‘s insistence on rapid development launched and concluded a SEA in a 




The planning framework […] needs to allow potential impacts and 
considerations to be fully assessed, at a strategic level, through a strategic 
environmental assessment, as well as locally, to ensure full confidence in 
the reliability of the planning process.  
 
 Again, despite the statement and recognition of the need to ensure and/or restore 
transparency and confidence in the reliability of the planning process, the SEA process 
failed miserably to effect positive gains on either end.  
                                                        
593 Ibid. In addition, see also Heeps ―The Race for Offshore Renewables‖ supra note 585 at 87 [Heeps, 
―The Race for Offshore Renewables‖]. Here, it was noted that the ―…SEA was a desk-based study, [that] 
did not include any new surveys or studies to fill known gaps and uncertainties. This was a different 
approach to the oil and gas SEA programme where new data was collected to inform the SEA and 
subsequent decision-making.‖  
594
 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 16 ¶ 1.5. 
595 Ibid. at 12 ¶ 1.1. 
596 Ibid. at 13. 
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 Notably, some developers were also critical of the short time-scale allotted for 
consultation and argued that the SEA process should have taken twelve (12) months and 
not five.
597
 BWEA‘s position on the SEA process and outcome is inconsistent. At one 
point, they state that there were ―…a number of instances within the Report in which 
assertions were made and implications drawn, on the basis of limited information and 
minimal consultation.‖
598
 They further state that the analysis of the cumulative impacts 
was not comprehensive.
599
 On the other hand, BWEA also viewed the rapid completion 
of the SEA process as ―…vital to retain the momentum established on Round 1 by 
moving quickly to begin Round 2.‖
600
 Indeed, it has already been noted that BWEA‘s 
main interest in the development of the licensing regime has been to accelerate the speed 
at which licences can be procured.
601
 The Government was equally ―…keen to maintain 
the pace of development in the offshore wind industry… .‖
602
 In this regard, it was found 
that ―…the government‘s rush to implement wind farms meant it sometimes rode 
roughshod over environmental considerations.‖
603
 The procedural inefficiency of the 
SEA process is rather unfortunate. This assessment can be considered flagrantly 
euphemistic given the fact that the Government passed the Electricity Regulations 
2006,
604
 the effect of which was to remove the power of planning authorities to force a 
public inquiry. Cumulatively, the procedural inefficiency of the SEA process and the 
                                                        
597 See, Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 132. 
598 See, Round 2 Response to SEA Consultation, supra note 583 at ¶1 d. 
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Regulations only ensured that wider public involvement in the consents process was kept 
at a minimum. 
 Apart from the procedural inefficiency of the SEA process, many also felt that the 
SEA process had been seriously flawed from start.
605
 First, it was argued that the SEA 
process was ―…flawed for not looking at the UK as a whole, but choosing three areas and 
doing a SEA on them.‖
606
 This was considered to have foreclosed many options for the 
development having little user conflict.
607
 As well, that the process for identifying the 
strategic areas in which Round 2 development would be permitted was flawed because 
the areas were selected based on favourable wind conditions and provisional indications 
from BWEA.
608
 Some authors have expressed the view that ―environmental constraints 
[did] not appear to have influenced the choice of strategic areas.‖
609
 In fact, the key 
features which ultimately influenced area selection included ―…proximity to grid 
connections serving important markets and offshore siting criteria conducive to cost-
effective construction, operation and maintenance of wind farms.‖
610
 That aside, marine 
industries raised concern over the fact that it appeared that the selection process was 
―…limited to the DTI, the Crown Estates and the wind farm developers – or their 
consultants.‖
611
 Others have also noted that it appeared as though DEFRA had not been 
                                                        
605 House of Commons Transport Committee, Navigational Hazards and the Energy Bill: Ninth Report of 
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consulted in the process of selecting the development sites.
612
 The unsurpassed irony of 
the strategic assessment process is that it began its attempt to form an integrated approach 
to offshore wind development by using sectoral decision-making practices. The potential 
for current sectoral marine management approaches to act as hindrances to effective 
delivery of sustainability has already been noted.
613
  
 Future Offshore acknowledges that ―[t]here is no single process for conducting 
SEA, but there is a broad agreement as to the overall approach and the methodological 
principles to be used.‖
614
 For the United Kingdom, information regarding the same can be 
located in the SEA Directive.
615
 When the Government decided to ―…carry out a formal 
SEA … [to] provide helpful support to the development and refinement of plans and 
programmes for expansion of the offshore wind industry,‖
616
 the Directive had not been 
transposed into UK law. All the same, the Government decided to be proactive and apply 
the SEA. Indeed, there can be no question about the nobility of this initiative. However 
noble, the preceding paragraphs have shown that in the rush to deliver offshore wind 
energy the Government failed to follow specified SEA procedures during its 
preparation.
617
 The Directive makes it unmistakably clear that one of its purposes is to be 
integrative and to empower non-state actors. The preamble provides:
618
 
In order to contribute to more transparent decision-making and with the 
aim of ensuring that the information supplied for the assessment is 
comprehensive and reliable, it is necessary to provide that authorities with 
                                                        
612 See, Gray et al., ―Stakeholder Consultation‖, supra note 323 at 133. 
613 Above at 107. 
614 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408 at 58 ¶ 6.1. 
615 EC, Commission Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans 
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616 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408, at 59 ¶6.2. 
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relevant environmental responsibilities and the public are to be consulted 
during the assessment of plans and programmes, and that appropriate 
time frames are set, allowing sufficient time for consultations, including 
the expression of opinion [my emphasis]. 
 
 Article 6 of the Directive provides further detail to the obligation to consult. 
Specifically, Article 6(2) provides that the public…  
…shall be given an early and effective opportunity within appropriate 
time frames [my emphasis] to express their opinion on the draft plan or 
programme and the accompanying environmental report before the 
adoption of the plan or programme or its submission to the legislative 
procedure. 
 
 The standard set for consultations with the public is clear. Such consultations must 
provide early and effective opportunities within appropriate time frames for the public to 
express its opinion. It is an unchallengeable assumption to suppose that the UK intended 
to follow some standard for consultations as they sought to ―…carry out a formal SEA.‖ 
Though the Directive had not been transposed, given the fact that ―[t]he government 
[decided] to act within the spirit of the Directive,‖
619
 it is also an unchallengeable 
assumption to suppose that in carrying out a ―formal SEA‖ the standard for consultations 
can be located within the text of the Directive. The foregoing paragraphs demonstrate a 
failure to meet these standards in the commissioning stage of the SEA. It is extremely 
doubtful that these assumptions can be challenged, but even if they can be challenged 
there are no other processes for conducting SEAs that would support the 
incomprehensive manner in which the Round 2 SEA was conducted. The consensus is 
that ―[p]lanning authorities [must provide] reasonable time frames for the invitation and 
the handing in of statements and for dealing with the statements in a traceable way.‖
620
 
 Apart from ‗the formal, systematic and comprehensive process for evaluating the 
                                                        
619 DTI, ―Future Offshore‖, supra note 408  at 59 ¶ 6.2. 
620 See, Stoeglehner, ―The SEA-Directive‖, supra note 590 at 596. 
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effects of a proposed policy, etc.,‘ Threrivel‘s definition indicated that the findings of the 
SEA be used ―… in publicly accountable decision making.‖ Several respondents to the 
consultation report for the round two SEA stated that they were unclear as to how the 
Environmental Report would influence the consents process for Round 2.
621
 Specifically, 
the Countryside Council for Wales noted that ―… the assessment was currently too 
general. It gave no indication of the ‗carrying capacity‘ of each of the strategic areas 
other than the physical seabed space available.‖
622
 In similar fashion, Le Secretariat 
General de la Mer (France) noted that ―…the Report did not present firm pointers to areas 
where wind farms might/might not be permitted. Instead it just gave general observations 
on additional studies needed.‖
623
 
 In sum, although the Energy Act 2004 made a few changes to the consenting 
process by attempting to streamline the process, the changes did not displace the political, 
institutional and regulatory dimensions of the Round 1 governance arrangement. 
Therefore, a thorough new governance assessment would be redundant. As well, the 
concept of the SEA was a well-welcomed move on progress towards sustainable 
development of the marine environment, and would have gained favour with Gibson et 
al.‘s  criteria but for the negligent, inefficient and incomprehensive manner in which it 
was conducted. In this regard, the Royal Yachting Association noted in their response to 
the SEA that ―…the Report should admit that it was ―a start‖ and by no means 
complete.‖
624
 Additionally, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds noted that ―[t]he 
absence of recommendations to DTI on the most appropriate strategic plan for Round 2 
                                                        
621  See, Round 2 Responses to SEA Consultation, supra note 583 at ¶ 1(b) 
622
 Ibid. 
623 Ibid. The Countryside Council for Wales also agreed. Ibid. at ¶ 6. 
624 Ibid. 
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was a major weakness in the SEA.‖
625
 
 Finally, the adoption of the SEA process ―…was intended to influence decisions on 
which areas of the sea should be offered to developers (and which should be excluded) as 
well as to guide decisions on bids submitted by individual developers.‖
626
 This is 
consistent with Threrivel‘s SEA definition which advocates that the findings of the SEA 
process are to be used in publicly accountable decision making. However, the 
Government proceeded to invite and accept bids for offshore wind developments prior to 
the completion of the SEA Environmental Report and the receipt of the consultation 
responses to the same.
627
 In essence, it appeared as though the Government started their 
decision making process prior to a consideration of any guidance or benefit to be had 
from the SEA process. This raised legitimate concerns among stakeholders in the SEA 
Consultation Report Responses about how the Environmental Report would influence 
Round 2.
628
 In response to these concerns the Government stated: ―…developers have 
been advised to consider other impacts discussed in the Environmental Report in 
selecting the sites for which they will bid.”
629
 The Government‘s response is 
unmistakable odd given the fact that the Government set a deadline for developers to 
submit bids by March 2003 when the Environmental Report was completed two months 
later. Most of all, the situation gives credence to those who view the entire process as a 
cosmetic exercise.    
 
                                                        
625 Ibid. at ¶ 6. 
626 See, Chadwick, ―Environmental Impact Assessment‖, supra note 542 at 276 ¶ 9.8.1. 
627
 Ibid. at 276 ¶ 9.8.2. 
628 See, Round 2 Responses to SEA Consultation, supra note 583 at ¶1(b) 
629 Ibid. 
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5.5  Round 3 – The New Model of Governance for Regulating Offshore   
Wind and Other Marine Activities 
 
 At the beginning of this Chapter, it was noted that the management, control and 
regulation of the uses of ocean spaces gradually developed in a reactive and fragmented 
pattern.  As Round 1 demonstrates, British initiatives to realize offshore wind potential 
began by joining in this tradition of piecemeal regulation-making. The observations were 
predictable: over-regulated consenting regimes with obscure consenting processes that 
led to unsustainable outcomes. Round 2 proved that the ocean governance arrangements, 
though slightly reformed with integrative decision-making objectives, have still failed to 
break away from the culture of sectoral decision-making. For the third round of 
deployments, the Government made another attempt at trying to impose a better-
integrated system for regulating the marine environment. At present, the Planning Act 
2008
630
 and the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009
631
 represent the new legal 
frameworks within which decisions will be made. Both pieces of legislation symbolize an 
innovative model of integrated and sustainable ocean governance in the United Kingdom.  
 
5.5.1 The Planning Act 2008 
 
 The Planning Act received Royal Assent on 26
th
 November 2008. Parts 1 to 8 of 
the Act create a new system of development consent for Nationally Significant 
Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) in England and Wales that is ‗fairer, faster and more 
                                                        
630 Planning Act 2008 (U.K.), 2009, c. 29 [Planning Act]. 




 Under the Act, consent is required for development to the extent that it is, 
or forms, part of a NSIP.
633
 NSIPs cover a wide range of infrastructural developments, 
chief among them being, projects that seek to construct or extend generating stations.
634
 
Offshore generating stations are only considered NSIPs if their generating capacity is 
more than 100 megawatts,
635
 and are located in territorial waters
636
 or in a REZ, except 
any part of a REZ in relation to which the Scottish Ministers have functions
637
. A quick 
review of the Round 3 Map
638
 and Round 3 Developers
639
 will confirm that the bulk of 
the proposed Round 3 wind projects will meet these criteria.
640
 Generally, it is an offence 
for a person to carry out, or cause to be carried out, any development for which 
development consent is required.
641
 Therefore, developers desirous of constructing or 
expanding offshore generating stations are now required to apply for development 
consent under this Act. For this purpose, the Act creates a body corporate, the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC),
642
 and vests it with power to examine and 
determine applications for development consent for NSIPs. Though the IPC must 
discharge these responsibilities on behalf of the Crown, it is not to be regarded as a 
servant or agent of the same, nor does it enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of the 
                                                        
632 See, Michael Pitt, ―Infrastructure Planning Commission: Fairer, Faster and more transparent decision-
making for national infrastructure in England and Wales‖ (Paper presented to the Offshore Wind 2009 
Conference, 25 June 2009)  [unpublished], [Pitt, ―Infrastructure Planning Commission‖]. 
633 Planning Act, supra note 632 at s. 31. 
634 Ibid.  at s. 14(1)(a). 
635 Ibid.  at s. 15(3)(b). 
636 Ibid.  at s. 15(4)(a). 
637 Ibid.  at s. 15(4)(b). 
638 See generally, The Crown Estate, Round 3 Map, online: The Crown Estate 
<http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk>. 
639 See generally, The Crown Estate, Round 3 Developers, online: The Crown Estate 
<http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk>. 
640 See also, Tim Norman, ―The Crown Estate: Planning and Consenting Issues for Marine Renewables‖ 
(paper presented to the Offshore Wind 2009 Conference, 24 June 2009) [unpublished]. 
641 Planning Act, supra note 632 at s. 160. 




 Consent for development will be given in the form of an order
644
 which 
generally imposes requirements in connection with the development for which the 
consent is granted.
645
 As well, once obtained, development consent under the Act 
replaces the requirement for development consent under other regimes. Thus, in relation 
to offshore wind projects, development consent under section 36 and 37 of the Electricity 
Act 1989 is no longer required,
646
 nor is planning permission under the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990 required.
647
 Additionally, an order granting development may 
include provision deeming consent to have been given under section 34 of the CPA.
648
 
The order may also include provision deeming a licence to have been given under Part 2 
of the FEPA to have been given.
649
 Consequently, by reducing the number of applications 
and permits that were once required for offshore wind projects under the Round 1 and 2 
regimes and shifting the decision-making power from a variety of local authorities to a 
central national authority, the Act has successfully created a new system of development 
consent which is consistent, simple, streamlined and integrated.   
 In making a determination on the applications received, the IPC will have due 
regard to National Policy Statements (NPSs) where these are in force. In relation to 
energy, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change is given authority to 
designate a statement as a National Policy Statement.
650
 This new feature, ―…forces 
governments to think ahead [and set] out clearly, in black and white, what the national 
                                                        
643 Ibid.  at sch. 1, s. 21 
644 Ibid.  at s. 37 and 114. 
645 Ibid.  at s.120. 
646 Ibid.  at s. 33(1)(h). 
647 Ibid.  at s. 33(1)(a). 
648
 Ibid.  at s. 148. 
649 Ibid.  at s. 149. 




 Notably, NPSs can only be designated where the Secretary of State has 
carried out an appraisal of the sustainability of the policy set out in the statement;
652
 
where there has been a public consultation;
653
 and parliamentary requirements have been 
met
654
. These requirements advance the theme of integration and transparency which 
permeates the Act. The Secretary of State has a very wide discretion to determine the 
content of the policy. Specifically, he or she may decide to:
655
 
(a) set out, in relation to a specified description of development, the 
amount, type or size of development of that description which is 
appropriate nationally or for a specified area; 
(b) set out criteria to be applied in deciding whether a location is suitable 
(or potentially suitable) for a specified description of development; 
(c) set out the relative weight to be given to specified criteria; 
(d) identify one or more locations as suitable (or potentially suitable) or 
unsuitable for a specified description of development; 
(e) identify one or more statutory undertakers as appropriate persons to 
carry out a specified description of development; 
(f) set out circumstances in which it is appropriate for a specified type of 
action to be taken to mitigate the impact of a specified description of 
development. 
  
 It is noteworthy that where a NPS is designated, it must detail the reasons for the 
policy contained in it.
656
 In particular, the reasons must include an explanation of how the 
policy set out in the statement takes account of Government policy relating to the 
mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change.
657
 If that were not clear enough, section 
10 of the Act makes it mandatory for the Secretary of State to designate NPSs with the 
objective of achieving sustainable development and having regard to the desirability of 
                                                        
651 See, Pitt, ―Infrastructure Planning Commission‖, supra note 634. 
652 Planning Act, supra note 632 at s. 5(3). 
653 Ibid.  at s. 5(4). 
654 Ibid. 
655
 Ibid.  at s. 5(5). 
656 Ibid.  at s. 5(7). 
657 Ibid.  at s. 5(8). 
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mitigating and adapting to climate change and achieving good design.
658
 Essentially, once 
formulated, NPSs set the framework for decision-making by the IPC.
659
 This means, 
therefore, that the objective of focusing development on progress towards sustainability 
and mitigation of climate change is indirectly transferred to the decision-makers. While 
the focus on sustainability would generally find favour with Gibson et al.‘s assessment 
criteria, it has been argued that ―… the need to mitigate climate change implies a 
predisposition to decisions in favour of offshore wind.‖
660
 While this possibility is not 
disputed, it should be noted that the Act establishes a right to judicially review a national 
policy statement or anything done, or omitted to be done, by the Secretary of State in the 
course of preparing the statement.
661
  
 Another novel improvement in the Round 3 consents regime is that it places 
structured consultation duties on applicants that must be performed before submitting 
applications to the IPC. These are, indeed, novel improvements, as Round 1 and Round 2 
developers were only encouraged to consult with local authorities and communities in 
their own interests. Under section 42 of the Planning Act, there is a duty to consult 
specified local authorities about the proposed application.
662
 Additionally, there is a wider 
                                                        
658 Ibid.  at s. 10. 
659 Note however, that where the Secretary of State has not designated or has revoked a NSP, he or she will 
be responsible for determining an application for development consent. In such a situation, the IPC will still 
have the duty of examining the application but can only make recommendations to the Secretary of State as 
to the decision to be made on the application. Ibid.  at s. 74. 
660 See, Howsam, ―Legal Framework for Offshore Wind Farms‖, supra note 417 at 4696 ¶ 3.2.1. 
661 Planning Act, supra note 632 at s. 13. The substantive decision may also be subject to judicial review. 
See, s. 118. 
662 See, U.K., H.L. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 704, col. 871 (16 October 2008) (Baroness Andrews) at 
col. 869, online: UK Parliament <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/81016-
0008.htm> [Baroness Andrews]. According to Baroness Andrews, ―local authorities can give detailed 
guidance on how to undertake local consultation, in light of the proposals and of the nature of the local 
community. That could include which bodies and groups should be referred to and what timescales are 
appropriate and so on.‖  
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and more onerous duty placed on applicants to consult local communities.
663
 Specifically, 
before consulting local communities on the proposed application, the applicant is 
required to prepare a statement setting our how the applicant proposes to conduct the 
consultation.
664
 Thereafter, the applicant is required to publish the statement in a 
newspaper circulating in the vicinity and in such other manner as may be prescribed.
665
 
At this point, the applicant is bound to carry out the consultation in accordance with the 
proposals set out in the statement.
666
 While these duties frontload the planning process 
onto the applicants, they are considered ―… crucial to the success of the planning 
process.‖
667
 However, concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the 
consultation process. For one, nowhere in the Act is the word ―consultation‖ defined. 
Therefore, the consultation process may be subject to an applicant‘s interpretation which 
could lead to different approaches by different developers and, subsequently challenges 
to the process.
668
 Also, regarding the duty to consult local communities, no where in the 
section is there a stated minimum time frame for consultation. Again, this could pose 
similar difficulties to the consenting process as experienced in Round 1 and Round 2. 
Possibly, however, the run-up to the Act provides conceptual answers to these potential 
difficulties. In 2007, the Government published Planning for a Sustainable Future: White 
Paper
669
 in which it set out a wide-ranging package of reforms for the planning system. It 
was advocated that there be ―full and fair opportunities for public consultation and 
                                                        
663 Planning Act, supra note 532 at s. 47. 
664 Ibid. at s. 47(1) 
665 Ibid.  at s. 47(6) 
666 Ibid.  at s. 47(7) 
667 Pitt, ―Infrastructure Planning Commission‖, supra note 634. 
668
 Howsam, ―Legal Framework for Offshore Wind Farms‖, supra note 417 at 4696. 
669 Department for Communities and Local Government et al., Planning for a Sustainable Future: White 




 Apart from recommending that the principles of ‗early engagement and 
effective‘ consultation be preserved,
671
 the recommendations never specifically defined 
what was meant by ‗full and fair opportunities for public consultation and engagement‘. 
For what it is worth however, it was envisioned that the duty to consult would be ―… the 
means of ensuring high standards of engagement.‖
672
 According to one author, ―[a] 
fundamental aspect of the new regime is the over-arching role of the IPC both in 
providing guidance on consultation and in vetting each applicant's approach to it.‖
 673
 In 
other words, the commission would need to satisfy itself that such consultation had been 
properly carried out. Baroness Andrews seems to have cleared the uncertainty best: ―[the 
IPC] must be satisfied that this consultation has been conducted properly, impartially, 
fully and inclusively…‖
674
 In any event, when the consultations are completed, there is an 




 By purposeful design, the IPC was created as a body corporate, independent of the 
Government of the day. Rounds 1 and 2 demonstrate that a decision-makers‘ 
independence from governmental influence is crucial to an impartial decision-making 
process. By way of example, it was regarded as unusual for the Secretary of State for 
Transport to set the policy for highways, make the applications for road improvements 
and, thereafter, decide whether or not the highway would be approved and consented 
                                                        
670 Ibid. at 20 ¶ 1.42. 
671 Ibid. at 20 ¶ 1.43. 
672 Ibid. at 20 ¶ 1.43. 
673 See, Paul Thompson, ―Consultation and the Authorization of Major Infrastructure Projects‖ (2009) 2 
Journal of Planning and Environment Law 174 at 187.  
674 Baroness Andrews, supra note 664. 




 Such processes inevitably confuse objectors as there is no identifiable separation of 
powers.
677
 The situation was slightly different in relation to offshore wind farms. The 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry performed all the afore-mentioned functions 
except regarding the application process. As has been demonstrated by Rounds 1 and 2, 
the State has increasingly exerted its commitment to offshore wind energy development 
in the consenting process by trumping objectors.  In essence, the system was not 
transparent. What the Planning Act sought to do was to introduce the IPC as an 
independent body so as to restore transparency and accountability.
678
 As well, the 
purpose of the IPC was to ―… champion the rights of objectors and local authorities and 
other organizations.‖
679
 Unfortunately, these welcome contributions to the consenting 
process are fast approaching abolishment. One of the major criticisms of the IPC was that 
it failed to make any decisions on NSIPs over its two years of operation and exhausted a 
budget of £16 million.
680
 Having failed to approve any projects, the IPC in turn failed to 
deliver on its promise of a fast-track consenting system for major infrastructure 
developments. Consequently, the IPC is set to be abolished, and its decision-making 
powers would revert to the Secretary of State. The IPC‘s successor is described as ―…a 
new rapid and accountable system where Ministers, not unelected commissioners, will 




                                                        




680 See, Tim Shipman, ―Labour planning quango which spent £16 million of public money and achieved 
nothing is abolished‖ Daily Mail (30 June 2010), online: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk>.  
681 See, Communities and Local Government, ―Planning Quango Closes‖ (29 June 2010), online: 
Communities and Local Government <http://www.communities.gov.uk>. Note however, that the IPC will 
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5.5.2 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
 
 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 received Royal Assent on 12
th
 January 
2009. Similar to the Planning Act, it also created a new system of decision-making for 
Round 3 consent applications. However, the jurisdiction of the MCAA is not as wide as 
the Planning Act which permits a range of NSIPs both onshore and offshore. As the title 
suggests, the MCAA‘s jurisdiction is limited to the management, control and regulation 
of the uses in the UK marine area. The ―UK marine area‖ encompasses the area of sea 
within the seaward limits of the territorial sea, any area of sea within the limits of the 
EEZ, the area of sea within the limits of the UK sector of the continental shelf, and 
includes the bed and subsoil of the sea within those areas.
682
 For the purposes of the Act 
―sea‖ includes any area submerged at the mean high water spring tide, and the waters of 




 Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Act establishes a body corporate
684
 known as the Marine 
Management Organization (MMO). The MMO is charged to manage the UK marine area 
on behalf of the Crown, but is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the same nor 
does it enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of the same.
685
 It is the general objective 
and duty of the MMO to ensure that MMO functions are so exercised, that the carrying 
on of activities by persons in the MMO‘s area is managed, controlled or regulated with 
the objective of making a contribution to the achievement of sustainable development, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
continue to consider and determine applications until primary legislation is passed to secure its 
abolishment.   
682 MCAA, supra note 633 at s. 42(1). 
683
 Ibid.  at s. 42(3). 
684 Ibid.  at sch. 1, s. 1. 
685 Ibid. 
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taking into account all relevant facts, and in a manner which is consistent and 
coordinated.
686
   
 The Act prohibits any individual from carrying on a licensable marine activity, or 
causing or permitting any other person to carry on such activity except in accordance 
with a marine licence granted by the MMO.
687
 It necessarily follows that it is an offence 
for any person to engage in a licensable activity without the requisite licence.
688
 The 
licensable marine activities captured by the Act are listed in Section 66 and are those that 
were previously under the purview of Part II of the Food and Environment Protection Act 
and Section 34 of the Coast Protection Act. Essentially, what Section 66 does is to 
modernize, streamline and simplify the consents process by consolidating into a single 
licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational safety 
factors.
689
 Additionally, Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Act transfers functions relating to sea 
fisheries, nature conservation, and the power to grant consents under section 36 of the 
Electricity Act, as well as functions relating to renewable energy installations, directly to 
the MMO. The transfer of these functions draws together into a single licensing decision 
consideration of the interests of other users of the sea. For present purposes, the transfer 
vests power in the MMO to grant consent for offshore renewable energy installations in 
the UK marine area that have a capacity less than 100 megawatts.
690
 Furthermore, the 
MMO will assume responsibilities for assessing environmental impacts under the 
Conservation (Natural Habitats, & c) Regulations 1994 and under the Electricity Works 
                                                        
686 Ibid.  at s. s. 2(1). 
687 Ibid.  at s. 65. 
688 Ibid.  at s. 85 
689 Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Consultation on secondary legislation for England 
and Wales under the Marine and Coastal Access Bill: Part 4 Marine Licensing (London: DEFRA, 2009) at 
8. 
690 Note that any generating stations with a capacity over 100megawatte fall under the jurisdiction of the 
IPC. 
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(Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 2000.
691
 In sum, 
by reducing the number of applications and permits that were once required for offshore 
wind projects under the Round 1 and 2 regimes, and shifting the decision-making power 
from a variety of local authorities to a central national authority, the Act has created a 
new system of development consent which is consistent, simple, streamlined and 
integrated.   
 Part 3 of the Act introduces a new marine planning system, which establishes a 
proactive marine management system. Similar to the Planning Act, Chapter 1 of Part 3 of 
the MCAA establishes the first stage in the marine planning process. The section makes 
provision for the preparation of a Marine Policy Statement (MPS) which articulates 
Government goals, objectives, policies and priorities for the sustainable development of 
the UK marine area. The MPS may also consolidate all UK policies that impact the 
marine environment and its resources.
692
 Unlike the Planning Act, the preparation of an 
MPS is not discretionary. It therefore forces the Government of the day to proactively 
plan its national priorities for contributing to the achievement of sustainable development 
of the seas. The MCCA outlines specific requirements that must be met before an MPS 
may be laid before parliament for passing. Generally, a Statement of Public Participation 
must accompany the MPS; a sustainability appraisal must be effected; and a consultation 
                                                        
691 The marine license will also replace requirements under the Marine Works (Environmental Impact 
Assessment) Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/1518; the Environmental Impact Assessment and Natural Habitats 
(Extraction of Minerals by Marine Dredging) Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/1067; and remove the need for 
separate approval under the Electronic Communications Code (Conditions and Restrictions) Regulations 
2003, S.I. 2003/2553 for cable in tidal waters. 
692 MCAA, supra note 633 at s. 44(2) and (3). Traditionally, marine policy has been developed sector by 
sector. As with the culture of fragmentation onshore, fragmented policies obscure the regime by making it 
difficult for decision-makers and users of the sea to locate the defining marine policies. In this respect, 
MSPs present an opportunity for consolidating the various policies to better facilitate the delivery of 
integrated outcomes. Licensing decisions are the principal means by which policies in marine planning 
areas are given real effect and therefore represent the most significant means through which policy 
objectives for that area can be achieved. 
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draft of the MPS must also be prepared and publicized.
693
 The preparation of MPSs in 
England is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs.
694
 In sum, MPSs will ―…create the framework for consistent and evidence based 
decision making offering certainty about government policy intentions.‖
695
 
 The second stage of the marine planning process is the preparation of a series of 
Marine Plans by the MMO.
696
 The marine plan is created to document all the uses of 
ocean space and the resources of the area to which it applies. Further, marine plans seek 
to outline how the policies and objectives contained in the MPS should be applied to the 
marine plan area. The preparation of the marine plan is subject to similar requirements as 
the MPS.
697
 Once both documents are completed, the MMO and other relevant licensing 
authorities become duty-bound to further authorization or enforcement decisions in 
accordance with the relevant marine plans and policy statements, unless relevant 
considerations indicate otherwise.
698
 The duty to pursue the objectives of the MPS and 
marine plans also apply to any decisions which relate to the exercise of any function that 
could affect the whole or any part of the UK marine area but which is not an 
authorization or enforcement decision.
699
 Similar to the Planning Act regime, sections 62 
and 63 of the MCAA establish means by which a person aggrieved by an MPS or marine 
plan may challenge its validity.  
                                                        
693 Ibid. at sch. 5. 
694 On 21st July 2010, the UK began the consultation process to formulate the Marine Policy Statement in 
accordance with the MCAA. The process is expected to be completed on 13th October 2010. See, HM 
Government, UK Marine Policy Statement: A draft for consultation (London: The Stationary Office, 2010).       
695 See, Marine Management Organization, Marine Planning: The Marine Policy Statement, online: Marine 
Management Organization:  <http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/marineplanning/index.htm>. 
696 To date, the MMO has only been charged with the duty to prepare marine plans for England but not for 
the other devolved administrations of the United Kingdom. 
697 MCAA, supra note 633 at sch. 6. 
698 Ibid. at s. 58. Note that subsection 2 of this section provides that if a public authority takes an 
authorization or enforcement decision otherwise than in accordance with the appropriate marine policy 
documents, the public authority must state its reasons. 
699 Ibid. at s. 58(3). 
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 Lastly, in determining an application for a marine licence for offshore wind farms, 
the MMO must have regard to the need to protect the environment, human health, and the 
need to prevent interference with legitimate uses of the sea.
700
 This is a clear duty to 
consider all the factors relevant to projects simultaneously, enabling a decision to be 
made about the project as a whole, but more specifically, about a project‘s contribution to 
progress towards sustainability.  
5.5.3 Marine Planning 
 
 In very basic terms, marine planning is planning for the different uses of spaces in 
the ocean. The practice of planning how ocean spaces are used has been slowly emerging 
in ocean governance regimes around the world and is often referred to as marine spatial 
planning (MSP). Chapter 2 outlined how growing pressures on the marine environment 
have created increased potential for user conflict, and how these pressures and conflicts, 
along with climate change, are negatively impacting the long-term viability of the oceans. 
It was also noted that these concerns highlight the need to revise and improve the current 
uncoordinated practices respecting management, control and regulation of the uses of 
ocean spaces.
701
 Against this backdrop, marine spatial planning has emerged as an 
important means for securing coordinated approach to the allocation of marine spaces.
702
 
More definitively, marine spatial planning refers to 
                                                        
700 Ibid. at s. 69. 
701See, Charles N. Ehler & Fanny Douvere, Marine Spatial Planning: A Step-by-Step Approach toward 
Ecosystem-based Management (Paris: UNESCO, 2009) at 18 [Ehler et al., ―Marine Spatial Planning‖, 
supra note 703]. In this respect, it was noted that when attempting to resolve conflicts between users and 
users and conflicts between users and the environment, the only thing that regulators can do is to ‗plan and 
manage human activities in the marine areas, not marine ecosystems or components of ecosystems.‘  
702
 See generally, Oran R. Young et al., ―Solving the Crisis in the Ocean Governance: Place-based 
Management of Marine Ecosystems‖ (2007) 49(4) Environment 20 [Young et al, ―Solving the Crisis in 
Ocean Governance‖].     
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…a public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal 
distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve, economic, 





 The objective of marine spatial planning is to create an integrated place-based or 
area-based plan in the marine environment to inform how ocean zoning maps
704
 are to be 
constructed and implemented.
705
 In turn, the zoning maps and marine spatial plans lend 
guidance to individual permit decisions made within individual sectors.
706
 Implicitly, 
therefore, MSP does not replace current practices of single sector management; there is 
still single sector management, authorities, plans and policies for fisheries, energy, 
tourism, transportation, etc. In relation to the MCCA, the regime integrates sectoral 
consenting processes by transferring a number of marine management functions to the 
MMO.
707
 Instead, MSP identifies key challenges within a marine planning area and 
determines priorities within that area by reducing conflicts through the redistribution of 
uses, or reducing conflicts through the amalgamation of compatibilities.
708
 Simply, 
‗priorities‘ refer to the development objectives (sustainable development, precaution, 
integration, polluter-pays, etc.,) set for the marine planning area. Therefore, through the 
process of identifying key challenges and setting priorities in a marine planning area, 
MSP is able to  ―…provide guidance for a range of decision-makers responsible for 
                                                        
703 See, Ehler et al., ―Marine Spatial Planning‖, supra note 703 at 18.  
704 Though it may seem that marine spatial planning performs the same function of ocean zoning, they are 
not same. The major difference is that zoning is based on an incremental approach to planning that allocates 
uses of the ocean without having regard to other uses and nature, while MSP allocates uses through an 
integrated approach to planning which focuses on the human uses of marine spaces. 
705 See, Ehler et al., ―Marine Spatial Planning‖, supra note 703 at 22. 
706 Ibid.  
707 The impact of marine spatial planning on MCAA decision-making process is that the MMO must make 
decisions in accordance with the relevant marine plans and policy statements. 
708
By way of further explanation, a spatial planning process increases management‘s focus on ―places.‖ 
Therefore, there is a direct improvement in the recognition of natural systems used to delineate their 
relationships to human uses.  
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particular sectors, activities or concerns, so that they will have the means to make 
decisions confidently in a more comprehensive, integrated and complementary way.‖
709
 
In other words, the benefit of MSP to sectoral consenting processes is that when an 
application is made for a particular activity or conservation initiative, agreed marine 
spatial plans have already allocated spaces for them wherein their impacts on other 
human uses and nature have already been identified and assessed. This makes it possible 
for the permitting process to be accelerated while still producing comprehensive 
outcomes that address all user interests.
710
 Rounds 1 and 2 have shown that without an 
integrated framework, there are problems with identifying existing the conflicts and the 
equitable management and resolution of those conflicts. As well, because MSP focuses 
on human uses of the marine spaces, the process of planning and redistribution of uses in 
marine planning areas pays explicit attention to trade-off/cost and benefit issues before 
the decision-making stage is reached. This underscores a key feature of MSP: it facilitates 
proactive management over reactive management. Together, attention to trade-offs and 
forward-looking planning are aspects of democratic governance consistent with Gibson et 
al.‘s criteria of sustainability. Also, the process of redistributing uses ensures that 
decisions taken to allow developments seek to permit those decisions in a manner that 
incorporates all eight of Gibson et al.‘s core principles for progress towards 
sustainability. Further, by creating marine spatial plans with the aim to identify areas of 
ecological importance as a basis of planning, decision-makers will consider those areas as 
                                                        
709 See, Ehler et al., ―Marine Spatial Planning‖, supra note 703 at 22. See also, Young et al, ―Solving the 
Crisis in Ocean Governance‖, supra note 704 at 22 where it is noted that: ―[b]y focusing on the distinctive 
features of individual places, tailoring management and regimes to regional circumstances, and 
encouraging adaptive management and social learning, place-based management of marine ecosystems 
offers a constructive means for dealing with uncertainties associated with complex, heterogeneous and 
dynamic systems.‖ 
710 In this regard, MSP would find special favour with industry developers, such as the BWEA, who have 
always been concerned about the lengthy process in which permits have been issued.  
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high priority for conservation during the decision making process and, will produce 
decisions that seek to maintain the natural capital at or near current levels in those 
areas.
711
 Therefore, in this way biodiversity objectives are incorporated into planned 
decision-making.
712
 For Gibson et al.‘s criteria, this is desirable.  
 In addition, consistent with Gibson‘s criteria, MSP helps decision-makers to avoid 
rendering decisions that convert ocean space uses from less intensive to more intensive 
varieties. While MSP as a sea use management tool does not restrict increase in ocean 
uses per se, the creation of plans in particular areas guide what level of development may 
be permissible, i.e., what intensities a particular marine planning area can sustain.  
 The consensus in the literature is that the area-based, integrated, strategic, 
anticipatory, participatory and adaptive characteristics of MSP enable governments to 
convert their commitments to sustainable development and other policy goals and 
objectives into action. To secure movement towards achieving stated goals and 
objectives, MSP was not designed to create a one-time plan for the management of a 
marine planning area. Instead, MSP‘s adaptive feature requires that it be updated 
periodically to reflect developments in science and technology. In this regard, the MCAA 
makes provision for marine policy statements
713
 and marine plans
714
 to be kept under 
review. 
                                                        
711 However, it is to be noted that marine spatial planning is not conservation planning per se. In the process 
of creating a marine spatial plan, a network of protected areas might indeed be one of the outcomes. 
Principally, these networks seek to balance economic development and environmental conservation, and 
not focus on only the goals of conservation or protection. ―MSP therefore reaches beyond managing and 
protecting the environment. Its main objective is to allocate marine space in a rational manner and thus 
arbitrate between different sectoral and user interests.‖ See, Schäfer, ―Maritime Spatial Planning‖, supra 
note 402 at 95 ¶ 5.2.2. 
712
 See, Ehler et al., ―Marine Spatial Planning‖, supra note 703 at 21. 
713 MCAA, supra note 633 at s. 45. 
714 Ibid. at s. 54. 
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5.6  The New Regime at a Glance 
 
 The emerging characteristics of the marine planning and consents regime 
established under the Planning Act 2008, and the MCCA, represent a more strategic and 
streamlined approach to marine management. One of the key characteristics is the 
adoption of a more structured approach to consultations wherein better engagement of 
non-State actors can be achieved. Together, these characteristics denote a clear departure 
from Round 1 and Round 2 consenting processes, which lacked much needed gains on 
the principle of democratic governance. A brief assessment according to new governance 
thinking confirms the same. First, both Acts have effectively displaced the location of 
power under the political dimension of Howlett‘s framework. Both Acts have removed 
from the State the legal power to make binding decisions on consent applications, and 
have vested it in central body corporates that were created to be independent of the 
Government. In relation to the Planning Act, legal power was transferred to the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission, while the MCAA transferred legal power to the 
MMO. The purposeful vesting of power in independent establishments serves to insulate 
the new decision-makers from the pressures of industry, thereby weakening industry‘s 
influence over the process. There is now one identifiable actor under both Acts. It is 
important to note however, that a proper consideration of the realities of the regime in 
practice may blur the conclusion that the newly established body corporates are actually 
independent. So by way of example, the cozy relations between the MMO and the 
Secretary of State do not make the MMO as independent as the analysis concludes. By 
sections 14 and 15 of the MCAA, the Chief Executive of the MMO is appointed by the 
Secretary of State, as ell as the Scientific Adviser. Additionally, the membership of the 
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MMO are to be not fewer than 5, nor more than 8 other persons who are to be appointed 
by the Secretary of State
715
 and serve a term not more than 5 years
716
. Though the MMO 
is to be funded by the Government, it is authorized by section 33 to borrow money from 
the Secretary of State or from private sources as it may require for meeting its obligations 
and carrying out its functions. However, the MMO may only borrow from private sources 
if the Secretary of State consents. In practice, these realities have the potential to reflect 
government commitment to promote wind energy development in the consents process. 
Interpretatively, this means that there is also a great possibility of strong industry 
influence in the consents process. In other words, the process of assessment of eligibility 
of projects may likely continue to experience a balance of influence that may still favour 
those with the stronger leverage. Again, it is to be recalled at this time, that each 
government, through the Marine Policy Statements, prioritizes its goals for sustainable 
development; a concept that is economic-development oriented as it is environmental and 
resources protection and conservation-minded. On the other hand, it is submitted here 
that the structure of the Act which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine 
area under the MMO gives the organization tremendous power. Ironically, the MMO is 
also authorized to enter into agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to 
have them carry out its mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine 
Plan. A conclusion inclusive of practical realities would state that the MMO‘s power is 
very huge but also potentially unwieldy. 
  Meanwhile, the institutional and regulatory dimensions have experienced little 
change. Institutionally, the IPC and MMO are established by Acts of Parliament. Thus, 
                                                        
715 Ibid. at sch. 1, s. 3. 
716 Ibid. at sch. 2, s. 7. 
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the institutional structures are still enmeshed with the formal establishment. However, the 
onerous and structured duties under the Planning Act seek to diversify the institutions 
that have the capacity to influence outcomes, by empowering a range of non-state actors 
to have some leverage under the exercise of its institutional jurisdiction. Even so, the 
regulatory dimension is still characterized by top-down hierarchical control through laws 
and regulations, except that the diversity in the regime comes via are the duties to consult 
at many points of the consents process. 
 The question whether these new arrangements have produced outcomes sufficient 
to satisfy Gibson et al.‘s criteria cannot be dealt with at present. This is because the 
regimes are fairly new and have not yet subjected offshore wind applications to their 
processes. However, given the clear mandate to achieve sustainable development 
articulated under both legislations and so long as the implementation of the regime 
operates as it should, it is doubtful that future licensing decisions will fail Gibson et al.‘s 
criteria. This conclusion is informed as it is speculative. Indeed, more so given that the 
implementation of these two Acts must necessarily pitch two central authority-wielding 
body corporates against each other in some way, a specter which is also duplicative of 
their functions in this issue area. 
 The following table summarizes the evolution of the consents regime over the 








5.7  Conclusion 
 
 Freedom-Kai Phillips has noted in reference to European Union countries that the 
United Kingdom ―…is clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to 
renewable energy broadly and ocean-based renewables particularly.‖
717
 In relation to the 
advancements in the consents process, this chapter has reflected the truth of this assertion. 
The chapter began with an assessment of the first consents regime used to deploy 
offshore wind farms in the UK. It was found that the regime failed to produce sustainable 
outcomes. The assessment of the Round 2 regime came to a similar conclusion. The 
chapter ended with a review of the new consenting regimes under the Planning Act 2008 
and the Marine and Coastal Act 2009. The assessment demonstrated that the new regimes 
remedied the weaknesses of the Round 1 and Round 2 regimes. Therefore, the Round 3 
model of governance is best placed to produce sustainable decision outcomes for ocean-
based energy developments.  
 Overall, what this Chapter demonstrates, is that there is something to be had, 
something very core, in plurilateral governance arrangements for regulating marine 
renewables. Rounds 1 and 2 failed Gibson et al.‘s criteria for progress towards 
sustainability largely because the regimes conformed to the tradition of hierarchical 
governance. The Round 3 model of governance, by design and effect, shifts away from 
governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of hierarchical control. Among 
other things, it incorporates participatory decision-making. This plurilateral arrangement, 
finds favour with New Governance scholars who argue that the social trait of non-state 
actors would influence more effective rules and solutions to social problems 
                                                        




Adopting Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Approach to 
Offshore Wind to the Development of an Effective 
Governance Arrangement for Renewable Ocean Resources 
in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
 
6.1  Chapter Overview 
 
 This Chapter seeks to apply the governance lessons learnt from the UK‘s many 
attempts to regulate offshore wind to the development of an effective governance 
arrangement or offshore renewables in the OECS. The Chapter begins by outlining the 
energy supply and consumption context in the OECS region. Thereafter, the Chapter 
describes the energy strategy and legal requirements of the region. The remaining 
sections are dedicated to justifying the transposition of lessons from the UK case study 
through a new governance assessment of marine development practices in the region. The 
findings of the assessment are then discussed in relation to their similarities and 
differences to the UK experience. The chapter ends with a discussion of lessons policy-
makers in the OECS could adopt in attempting to formulate a governance framework for 
the regulation of marine renewables in the OECS. 
 
6.2  The Energy Supply and Consumption Context in the Organisation of 
 Eastern Caribbean States 
 
 Like the case of many other Small Island Developing States (SIDS) around the 
world, the Caribbean energy story, particularly that of the OECS region, is one that must 
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begin with a description that is testament to its high-dependence on imported fossil 
fuels.
718
 This dependence is directly linked to the lack of oil, natural gas and coal 
resources in the region.
719
 Statistically, the ‗high-dependence‘ situation means that more 
than 90% of power supply in the region is dependent on imported fossil fuels.
720
 
Unsurprisingly, the region remains the most import dependant globally where petroleum 
is concerned.
721
 The grim consequences of chronic dependence on imported energy in the 
OECS countries, is reflected in the fact that some governments have had to spend as 
much as half of their export revenues on imported fossil fuels.
722
 For the most part, such 
expenditure is necessary to supply energy for efficient business operations, particularly, 
in the tourism industry which has become the economic mainstay for many Caribbean 
countries.
723
 On the other hand, meeting modern energy standards through oil import has 
diverted much financial resources away from progress on health, education and other 
                                                        
718 See, Donald Hertzmark, OECS Energy Issues and Options (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2006) 
at 4 ¶ 10. 
719 Note however that the same is not true of at least one island in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Trinidad and Tobago has been blessed with abundant sources of oil and gas, which have earmarked it as a 
major fossil fuel suppler in the region. In recent years, there have been negotiations to establish a political 
and economic union between the OECS and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The establishment of a 
common regime for the procurement of fossil fuels for energy production and transportation was a key 
aspect of the proposed OECS economic union which Trinidad had agreed to join by 2011. See, OECS, 
Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States: Draft of the New Treaty, at 49 ¶ 28.2(a), online: 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States <http://www.oecs.org>. However, the new administration in 
Trinidad and Tobago of 24 May 2010 has decided not to go ahead with the proposed union. See, VonDez 
Phipps, ―OECS union to be formed with or without TT‖ Saint Kitts-Nevis Online News Paper (28 June, 
2010), online: Saint-Kitts Nevis Online Newspaper <http://www.sknvibes.com>.  
720 Angelika Wasielke, Energy-policy Framework Conditions for Electricity Markets and Renewable 
Energies: 23 Country Analyses (Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für, 2007) at 2, [Wasielke, 
―Energy-policy Framework‖]. 
721 See, Williams, ―A Strategic Regional Approach‖, supra note 31.  
722 See, Wasielke, ―Energy-policy Framework‖, supra note 722 at 2. The same is true for most small island 
developing states: oil imports consume the largest percentage of their gross national income and foreign 
exchange earnings. See, Frank C. Shaw, ―Renewable Energy Essential for the Well-Being of Small Island 
Developing States, Commission on Sustainable Development Told‖  (2009) 7 Industry Journal 30 at 30 
[Shaw, ―Renewable Energy‖].   
723
 See, Glenn J. Berger & J. Alexander Cooke, ―Procuring Cost-Effective and Climate-Friendly Electrical 
Generation in the Caribbean: A Primer‖ (2009) 7 Industry Journal 14 at 14, [Berger et al., ―Climate-




 An added burden of import dependence is the risk of supply 
disruptions and the inability to escape volatile fossil fuel prices
725
. In 2008 Caribbean 
economies suffered several burdensome oil shocks as a direct consequence of their high 
dependence on oil imports. Economists in the region now argue that these economies 
―…will not be able to survive many more oil shocks similar to that experienced in 
2008.‖
726
 Additionally, for quite some time governments in the region have been raising 
concern over the negative environmental impact of current power generation practices.
727
 
Whether taken individually or collectively, these concerns have led to an increasing 
recognition that what the countries in the OECS need desperately is a lowered reliance on 
imported fossil fuels through the development of indigenous sources of energy.
728
 As 
noted in Chapter 3, this need to develop indigenous sources of energy accords with 
current government policy around the world.
729
 As such, countries around the world are 
in the ongoing process of developing their renewable and non-renewable sources of 
energy. However, for many Caribbean countries, particularly those in the OECS, 
                                                        
724 In this regard, some OECS countries view energy independence as an important stepping stone for 
progress towards national development. See, Dr. Vaughn Lewis, ―VINLEC‘s perspective on Sustainable 
Energy Opportunities in SVG‖ (slideshow presented to Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 
2009) online: CREF <http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>.  Specifically, it has been recognized that 
high energy prices stifle economic growth in the Caribbean region, especially in light of the trade policies 
where the region needs to maintain competitiveness in the production of goods and services. In this regard, 
renewable energy is viewed as a long-term solution. See, Maxine Nestor, ―Energy Policy in the Caribbean‖ 
(2009) 1 CARICOM Energy 4 at 4 [Nestor, ―Energy Policy in the Caribbean‖]. 
725 ―During the past couple of years, Caribbean utilities have witnessed unprecedented volatility in 
commodity prices: The price for a barrel of crude oil soared over US$140 on June 16, 2008, plummeted 
soon after, and now is becoming more dear again, closing at approximately US$70 on June 15, 2009.‖ See, 
Berger et al., ―Climate-Friendly Electrical Generation‖, supra note 725 at 14. It has been estimated that 
each US$10 increase in crude oil prices, could negatively impact Caribbean economies by about 2%. See, 
Istaván Ponsot, ―The Necessity of Cheaper and Safer Energy in the Caribbean‖ (2008) 5 Industry Journal 
45 [Ponsot, ―Cheaper and Safer Energy in the Caribbean‖] . 
726 See, Nestor, ―Energy Policy in the Caribbean‖, supra note 726 at 4 
727 Gerner, ―Towards a Regional Caribbean Energy Market‖, supra note 33. 
728 Reducing the dependence on fossil fuels will have a direct effect on the balance of payments deficit in a 
country. It will also reduce the vulnerability of the energy system in light of the international geopolitical 
climate. See, David Ince, ―The Use Regulation in Promoting the Development of Renewable Energy 
Technologies in the Caribbean‖ (2006) Industry Journal 13 at 14 [Ince, ―The Use of Regulation‖]. 
729 Above at 51. 
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renewable energy is the only indigenous supply option. Potentially, the region can make 
use of wind power, solar energy, hydropower, biomass, and geothermal renewable energy 
technologies.
730
 These supply options have been identified as realistic economic 
alternatives to fossil fuels in the region.
731
 At present, the region has utilized wind power, 
hydropower, geothermal and solar energy technologies.
732
 To date, of the nine Member 
States of the OECS only two Member States, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, have fed renewable energy into their electricity grid supply.
733
 A 1999 study, 
Renewable Energy in the Caribbean; Where we are; Where we should be, found that the 
current amounts of electricity generated from these renewable sources are nowhere near 
the region‘s potential.
734
 The fact that only two Member States have been able to feed 
renewable energy into their grid system supports the proposition that the 1999 finding is 
still a defining characteristic of the region‘s energy profile today. 
 Recently, governments, policy-makers, utilities, renewable energy developers and 
other stakeholders in the region have directed much of their attention towards the 
possibility of tapping into the Caribbean‘s ocean energy (wave, tidal, ocean thermal) 
potential.
735
 Discussions have also raised the possibility of harnessing the renewable 
energy potential of the offshore trade winds in the region.
736
 Where onshore wind is 
concerned, the Caribbean energy sector has long recognized the potential of their trade 
winds to offer competitive and reliable electricity in amounts significant enough to supply 
                                                        
730 Scheutzlich, ―Existing and Future Opportunities‖ supra note 25.  
731 Ray Robinson, ―Building A Sustainable Future: The Emera Experience‖ (slide show presented to the 
Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum, 15 October 2009) at 6, online: CREF 
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>. 
732 Scheutzlich, ―Existing and Future Opportunities‖ supra note 25. 
733 See generally, Caribbean Information Platform on Renewable Energy, online: <http://cipore.org>.  
734
 Caribbean Council for Science and Technology, ―Renewable Energy In the Caribbean‖, supra note 26. 
735 Murphy, ―Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖, supra note 28. 
736 Ibid. 
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the needs of electrical utilities.
737
 Like many other countries around the world, onshore 
wind development in the region faces significant challenges: accessibility, connectivity, 
land availability, environmental effects, etc.
738
 It is no surprise therefore, that offshore 
wind has made its way on energy agendas in the region as it has in other jurisdictions. 
Other drivers for the integration of offshore energy into the Caribbean/OECS energy mix 
include: energy security, greenhouse gas emission reductions, job creation opportunities, 
and opportunities for saving foreign exchange.
739
 Apart from the potential benefits to be 
derived from the utilization of wave, tidal, ocean thermal energy conversion and offshore 
wind energy, the use of these technologies have great potential to impact current ocean 
use and management practices.
740
 Currently, the focus on renewable energy sources in the 
region has been on overcoming financing and other capacity challenges. However, if the 
objective of ―…moving the ocean energy industry forward in the Caribbean‖
741
 is to be 
met, then in addition to recognizing ocean energy as a viable renewable energy resource 
and targeting funding support, industry developers and policy-makers argue that there 
needs to be a ―review of pertinent policy and regulatory framework from an ocean energy 
perspective.‖
742
 The remainder of Chapter 6 is dedicated to the latter cause. 
6.3  Energy Strategy in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
 
 Chapter 2 of any Caribbean energy story must outline the pertinent policies and 
strategies for energy management and development in the region. At present, most 
                                                        
737 See, Ponsot, ―Cheaper and Safer Energy in the Caribbean‖¸ supra note 72. See also, Henk Hutting, ―The 
Challenge of Converting the Caribbean‘s Significant Wind potential into a Cost-effective and Reliable 
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741 Murphy, ―Caribbean‘s Ocean Energy Potential‖, supra note 28. 
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Caribbean countries do not have an established national energy policy, long-term energy 
strategy or energy action plan.
743
 Many authors relate the occurrence of this trend to the 
practice of privatizing State-owned electrical utilities prevalent in most Caribbean 
countries.
744
 Typically, privatization practices were ―…motivated by budgetary pressures, 
the desire to attract private capital for expansion, and the need to improve operational 
efficiency.‖
745
 Privatization meant that the responsibility for energy forecasting and 
policy shifted from the authority of the State to privately-owned utilities.
746
 Beyond any 
doubt, policy-makers have noted that energy strategies, policies, legislation and 
regulation are critical tools through which governments are able to deliver alternative 
energy resources.
747
 Without these, the accepted need to diversify energy sources will 
continue to assume the status of a gentleman‘s agreement.
748
  
 Noteworthy, the absence of energy strategies and policies on the national and 
regional levels has spawned identifiable characteristics, which further define the energy 
context in the OECS. So for instance, the lack of energy policies and strategies directly 
hampers private sector participation, which is a heralded and necessary framework 
condition for renewable energy investment and development.
749
 This dynamic has created 
energy governance arrangements in the OECS with ill-defined rules on Independent 
Power Producers and ill-defined rules on support measures of government.
750
 
                                                        
743 See, Detlef Loy, ―Energy Policy and Planning Approaches Throughout the Region‖ (slide show 
presented to the Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum 15 October 2009) online: CREF 
<http://www.caribbeanenergyforum.com>. 
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Consequently, therefore, with the exception of one OECS Member State, Dominica, there 
is a universal monopoly for electrical utilities in OECS countries.
751
 Furthermore, the 
lack of regional energy policies and strategies prevents the development of arrangements 
that seek to export surplus renewable energy within and outside the OECS region.
752
 The 
ramifications are significant. The absence of interconnections among islands and thus 
regional power markets, fail to improve the economics for renewable energy 
development and investment in an already small market.
753
 In sum, these instruments, 
especially policies, must be implemented at the national and regional levels as they 
―…set the framework and establish realistic targets for increased exploitation and 
utilization of alternative energy sources.‖
754




  Governments need to: 
 Formulate and Implement sustainable energy policies and action 
plans 
 Regain control over the energy sector 
 Reform and liberalize the energy sector  
 
 The dynamics outlined above are generally true for OECS countries. To remedy 
the policy deficit, World Bank specialists have urged OECS countries to pursue the 
establishment of a regional energy institution, the Eastern Caribbean Energy Planning 
and Regulation Authority.
756
 In the interim, however, some OECS Member States have 
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 Scheutzlich, ―Existing and Future Opportunities‖, supra note 25.  
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begun to formulate national energy policies. Presently, these policies are at various stages 
of drafting and completion.
757
 
 In sum, the growing consensus in the region has long been that ―…significant 
policy and institutional changes are necessary if we are to derive the benefits of clean 




6.4  Legal Requirements in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
 
 Chapter 3 of this study outlined some of the concerns that encourage shifts 
towards renewable energy generation practices. Chief among those concerns was the 
issue of climate change. It was also noted that the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol were formulated to promote and effect urgent 
and massive reductions in carbon dioxide emissions to achieve climate stability. In this 
regard, specified parties (Annex I) to these treaties were legally bound to mitigate climate 
change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Unlike the United 
Kingdom and other Annex I Parties, Member States of the OECS are not bound to effect 
emission reductions under the international climate change regime.  It is therefore 
unsurprising that a perusal of the law books of Member States of the OECS would show 
that there is no legislation in force, or in draft, akin to the United Kingdom‘s Climate 
Change Act 2008.
759
 That Act sets long-term, legally binding targets for the reduction of 
                                                        
757 See generally, Caribbean Information Platform on Renewable Energy, online: <http://cipore.org>. 
758 See, Clarence Pilgrim, ―Renewable Energy, CARICOM, and Fossil Fuels Part (2)‖ Caribbean Net News 
(23 August 2005), online: Caribbean Net News 
<http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2005/08/23/energy.shtml>. 
759 Climate Change Act, supra note 333. 
 186 
greenhouse gas emissions and by so doing, provides incentive through sanctions for 
utilities to explore and exploit renewable energy.   
 Unlike Annex I State Parties of the climate change regime, the members of the 
OECS produce extremely low levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
760
 In context, this 
means that these states will suffer disproportionately from the damaging impacts of 
climate change.
761
 As noted above, their geophysical sensitivities also make them most 
susceptible to climate change. It is against this backdrop that some writers have suggested 
that Caribbean States establish a regional emission reduction target.
762
 To date, however, 
there are no established targets or attempts to establish the same.  
6.5  Adopting Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Approach to 
 Regulating Offshore Wind to the Development an Effective 
 Governance Arrangement for Renewable Ocean Resources in the 
 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
 
 Taken by itself, there can be no question that the concept of marine renewables is 
a sustainable initiative.
763
 However, the question whether it is able to maintain this cloak 
of sustainability in practice arises for consideration. The answer to the question depends 
on the manner in which it is allowed to enter the marine environment. Chapter 5 reviewed 
the UK governance arrangements that have been employed to regulate offshore wind 
development. Through the application of the three-dimensional Howlett et al. analytical 
framework, and the application of Gibson et al.‘s criteria for measuring sustainability, 
                                                        
760 See, Dr. Graham Sem, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Small Island Developing 
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conclusions were made as to the effectiveness of each governance arrangement 
employed. Specifically, the exercise identified what modes of governance were ill suited 
for the purposes of regulating offshore wind and what combinations of governance 
arrangements proved effective, i.e., what combinations of governance arrangements made 
positive contributions towards sustainable development. Ultimately, Chapter 5 concluded 
that in light of the Gibson et al. criteria, the current regime under the UK Planning Act 
2008 and the MCCA holds the greatest potential for making positive contributions 
towards the sustainable development of the offshore wind industry. In other words, 
Chapter 5 concluded that the Round 3 model of governance arrangement was effective 
because it held the greatest potential for ranking high on the Gibson et al. criteria for 
sustainability. 
 In seeking to propose an effective governance arrangement for the regulation of 
renewable ocean resources in the OECS, the new governance framework is a good device 
for challenging policy-makers to think about what governance arrangement might 
possibly work in the OECS and what governance arrangements might not work. By 
challenging policy-makers to think about the local circumstances, it provides a rational 
basis for transposing lessons learnt in other regimes. This is important, as one of the most 
common pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal 
solutions in one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the socio-
cultural, political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. In 
other words, are the political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS 
sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons from the UK offshore wind governance 
arrangements?  
 188 
 One way to begin answering this question is to look at the current governance 
arrangement for regulating renewable ocean resources in the OECS region and make a 
determination as to whether it bears similarities with the UK case study. However, as 
noted at the outset of this study, there is no governance arrangement in place for the 
regulation of these resources in the OECS. Additionally, there are no draft proposals, bills 
or policies that seek to regulate the same. This is unsurprising because thus far, there have 
been no projects in any of the OECS territories that seek to harness the power of 
renewable ocean resources. As noted earlier, harnessing the power of renewable ocean 
resources is a recent policy objective for the region.
764
 Alternatively, however, policy-
makers can justify transposition in the absence of issue-specific governance 
arrangements, from practices in related areas. Prima facie, it would appear from an 
examination of other governance practices that the political, institutional and regulatory 
contexts in the region are akin to the Round 1 and 2 experiences in the United Kingdom. 
Prima facie, therefore, this makes a strong case for justifying the transposition of 
governance lessons from the UK to the OECS region. Additionally, the similarity in 
governance arrangements is unsurprising as many of the OECS member states were once 
colonized by Britain, and have therefore, adopted many of their governance practices.
765
  
 By way of example, Chapter 5 demonstrated that during the Round 1 and Round 2 
consents processes, the Government held the legal power to make decisions on consent 
applications. The decisions made favoured the development of the offshore wind industry 
over the maintenance of other natural capital for instance, because of the perceived 
benefit of offshore wind power and strong industry pressure for development. In the 
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 Above at 181 – 182. 
765 See generally, Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems, 2d ed.  
(London: Routledge-Cavendish Publishing, 2008). 
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OECS region the likelihood of such a situation recurring is great. The manner in which 
other projects in the region are being approved evidences the truth of this assertion. The 
following sections seek to highlight, by way of example, some existing marine projects in 
the region. Specifically, the section will make a detailed reference to the governance 
arrangements used to regulate the development of a dolphinarium industry in the Island 
of Anguilla, an Associate Member State of the OECS. 
 
6.5.1 Case Study: The Governance Arrangements used to Regulate the 
Development of a Dolphinarium Industry in Anguilla 
 
 In 2001, the Government of Anguilla (GOA) gave developers permission to 
construct a dolphinarium at Meads Bay located in the west of the island. Primarily, the 
developers and the GOA intended that the facility ―…provide high quality, educational, 
entertaining interactive experiences to its guests.‖
766
 Moreover, the dolphinarium was 
also meant to serve as a ―…substantial contributor to the tourist-based Anguilla 
economy.‖
767
 In 2002, the Government of Anguilla published the Anguilla Visitor 
Expenditure Survey
768
 which covered the period 24
th
 February to 9
th
 March. The survey 
sought to profile visitors to the country by referencing the purposes of their visit. The 
survey found that 6.3% of day visitors answering the survey indicated that Dolphin 
Fantaseas was the main purpose of their visit.
769
 The survey also profiled visitors based 
on the activities they engaged in while on the island. The results were that 12% of stay-
                                                        
766 See, Applied Technology and Management, Draft Environmental Impact Assessment: Construction of 
Dolphin Facility, Sandy Point Anguilla (2007) at 3-5 ¶ 3.2.1, online: The Anguilla Weather Site 
<http://www.anguilla-weather.com/Dolphin%20Discovery%20EIS.pdf>. 
767 Ibid. at 2-9 ¶ 2.4.3.  
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 Government of Anguilla, Anguilla Visitor Expenditure Survey February 2002 (Anguilla: Statistics 
Department, Ministry of Finance, July 2002), online: Government of Anguilla <http://www.gov.ai>.  
769 Ibid. at 5 ¶ 1.1. 
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over visitors engaged in activities offered by Dolphin Fantaseas.
770
 The property on 
which the facility was built was later sold to a hotelier. As the maintenance of the facility 
depreciated, the water in the dolphinarium became polluted causing concern to spread 
throughout the island and internationally about the unhealthy conditions that the dolphins 
were now being subjected to. Initially, the decision was made to relocate the dolphins to 
Road Bay, Sandy Ground, an area which houses the main industrial port on the island. 
However, after much protest from the residents of the community, construction at Road 
Bay halted. The residents were mainly concerned about the environmental impact of the 
development on the Road Bay beach, which is a popular tourist attraction. The residents 
were also concerned about the impact of the heavy-duty marine traffic from the nearby 
shipping port on the health of the dolphins. In fact, after demanding to see the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project, the residents discovered that the 
Government neglected to carry out one. This caused further alarm that eventually forced 
the Government to cease work. There is some speculation as to the chain of events that 
‗forced‘ the government to allow construction in the ocean without having first carried 
out an EIA. Catherine Orchard, a resident of the Sandy Ground Community wrote a letter 
to the editor of The Anguillian
771
 in which she detailed the strong opposition to the 
project in her community. She also stated that the Government failed to consult any of the 
residents of Sandy Ground or the Department of Fisheries or the Anguilla National Trust, 
even though the Government maintains that it had consulted with the latter 
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Furthermore, Mr. Proctor [the Director of Physical Planning] said that an 
environmental study would have taken time and that his department had to 
consider the Dolphin‘s timetable, they were under pressure to move from 
the present location. There is only one interpretation possible here: the 
needs and timetables of a foreign owned corporation are more important 
than the Anguillian.  
 
 The facts as presented by Catherine Orchard after doing her own investigations 
into the matter are nothing short of deplorable. In addition to failing to comply with EIA 
regulations, the letter also references the fact that the Government of Anguilla gave the 
developers permission to construct on the seabed without the requisite licences and 
permits. Given the foregoing and the pending calamity, the Government decided to 
relocate the dolphins to Sandy Point, Blowing Point where a new dolphinarium would be 
constructed, but this time in the open sea.
774
 It meant that Dolphin Discovery, the new 
developers, had to seek permission to carry out works on the seabed at Blowing Point for 
the new dolphinarium.  
 As is the case with Round 1 and Round 2 offshore wind developments, the 
developers had to obtain a range of consents and licences from different governmental 
departments to carry out works on the seabed and related onshore works. The specifics of 
the development and its location brought it within the ambit of the Beach Control Act,
775
 
the Beach Protection Act,
776
 the Ports, Harbours and Piers Act,
777
 the Building Act
778
 and 
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774 At the previous location in Meads Bay, the dolphins were accommodated in a concrete pool constructed 
on the sea rocks. The pool held approximately1.5 million gallons of sea water that was changed daily by 
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the Land Development Control Act
779
. Again, this is representative of the fragmented 
approach to the regulation of the marine environment common to the Round 1 and Round 
2 offshore wind regimes in the UK. On 12 June 2007, the developers applied for 
permission to construct a dolphin pier in the water at Sandy Point, Blowing Point, in 
respect of a parcel of land forming part of the property of the Crown. Pursuant to the 
Land Development (Control) Act, the Land Development Control Committee gave 
planning approval on 12 December 2007. The Anguilla Building Board also gave 
approval for the construction of a building to be located in the area pursuant to the 
Building Act. In addition to these approvals, the developers also needed a licence to 
permit any use of the foreshore and the floor of the sea under section 3 of the Beach 
Control Act. As well, developers needed to obtain written permission from the relevant 
Minister for the construction of any pier on any part of the foreshore pursuant to section 
36 of the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. However, construction of a pier and 
dolphinarium was commissioned within the waters without the necessary licences and 
permits under the Beach Control Act and the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. Additionally, 
while the project received planning approval, it commenced work without the requisite 
tenancy rights in violation of the Registered Lands Act.
780
 The events caused nine 
applicants to make a claim for judicial review of the various decisions of the 
governmental bodies or persons giving rise to the construction of the pier and/or 
dolphinarium. Even in the face of clear uncontroverted evidence that construction was 
underway at the site location without the required licences and permits, Counsel for the 
Government of Anguilla argued that there was no basis for the applicants to make a claim 
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 The High Court disregarded Counsel‘s argument and ordered 
interim relief as follows:
782
 
(1) That all construction of all piers or structures or any encroachment on 
the foreshore or floor of the sea in whatever manner at the Sandy Point 
Beach or in the waters forming the Port at Blowing Point by any persons 
whether by themselves, their servants or agents, in violation of the 
requisite licensing provisions of the Beach Control Act and the Ports, 
Harbours and Piers Act cease forthwith until further order. 
(2) The Respondent shall perform all acts and do all things as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of this order. 
(3) It is further ordered and directed that this order be served upon Dolphin 
Fantaseas Anguilla, being a person appearing to the Court to be directly 
affected by the making of this order. 
 
 Noteworthy, the work continued for three days after the grant of the Order. Work 
eventually ceased when a Senior Crown Counsel of the Attorney General‘s Chambers 
visited the site and verbally ordered that the works come to a complete stop.
783
 This act 
alone gave an inescapable opportunity for political comment and criticism in respect of 
‗the power of the Attorney-General‘s Chambers‘:
784
 
The way I heard it said, the A-G's Chambers have power. When the Queen 
says, "Stop", you can ignore her. When the Governor says it, you can 
pretend you did not hear. When the Court says it, you can keep right on 
going. But, when the A-G's Chambers say it, you better comply. Or else!  
 
 Further, it is noteworthy that during the judicial review proceedings, the Attorney 
General referred the Court to the affidavit of Vincent Proctor, the Director of Physical 
Planning wherein ―…Mr. Proctor allude[d] to information passed on to him by the 
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Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands to the effect that "the Ministry of Lands gave the 
Developer permission to commence building the pier" and that "the licence to use the 
beach is a new concept, the details of which is still being developed."
785
 This is 
significant because it demonstrates the manner in which the Government of Anguilla 
approached the regulation of a new marine industry. Arguably, it is worse than the UK 
experience. Instead of adapting existing legislation to suit the development, the 
Government decided not to follow its own procedures and laws for permitting activity on 
the foreshore and the floor of the seabed. In making the Order, Justice Janice George-
Creque noted that despite the breaches of the laws of the land, ―…no steps [were] taken 
to bring such activities which are being carried out in plain sight to halt.‖
786
 She then 
noted that ―…such a derelection or abdication of responsibility [cannot] be permitted to 
the detriment of public interests.‖
787
 Furthermore, in making the Order Justice George-
Creque posed a very interesting question that is particularly relevant for the present 
purpose of ascertaining the character of marine governance arrangements in the OECS: 
How could such activities which attract criminal sanctions, in the absence 
of the requisite licences and permissions, simply be allowed to occur and 
proceed unabated without the necessary intervention by the relevant 
servants or agents of the Crown? 
 
 The simple answer is that the Government of Anguilla treated the construction of 
the dolphinarium differently because of the perceived benefit to be had. As noted in 
Chapter 5, this was one of the reasons the UK Government made poor decisions 
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respecting Round 1 and Round 2 deployments.
788
 To add insult to injury, in proceedings 
to discharge the Order, the Government argued that…
789
   
…maintaining the Order causes prejudice and that the balance of 
convenience lies with the Attorney General representing the Government 
of Anguilla and Dolphin Discovery in the non-continuation of the Order 
and says that the Dolphinarium project is substantially completed and thus 
would cause no additional hardship to the Property Owners. 
In addition: 
Reliance [was] further placed on the losses which Dolphin Discovery may 
suffer from the loss of visits of cruise ship guests to the Dolphinarium as 
well as loss of income and employment opportunities to other ancillary 
service providers who are Anguillians, of the Dolphin Discovery business 
which it is said results in a loss of revenue to the Government of Anguilla.   
Counsel also urges that I take judicial notice of the general slow down in 
the world economy and that of Anguilla.  On this basis, counsel argues 
that the Order is currently having an oppressive effect on the people and 
government of Anguilla and should be discharged on this basis.   
 
 Unsurprisingly, nowhere in the proceedings did the Government attempt to advance 
an argument to the effect that there had been no negative environmental impact. 
Nonetheless, Justice George-Creque concluded that the line of argument advanced by the 
Government did not ―…afford a proper basis for the discharge of the Order granted.‖
790
 
The example of the dolphinarium and the line of argument advanced by the Government, 
demonstrate how governments sometimes favour business efficacy and the interests of 
industry developers over the protection of public interest and the letter of the law.  
 It is necessary to single out for mention the Government‘s argument ―…that the 
Order is currently having an oppressive effect on the people and [G]overnment of 
Anguilla and should be discharged on this basis.‖ It is interesting that the Government 
could confidently advance and seek to rely on this argument when the general population 
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blatantly opposed the relocation and in some instances, the dolphinarium itself. 
According to Anguillian blogger, Don Mitchell CBE QC, ―[t]he Anguilla Hotel and 
Tourism Association is in the process of conducting a poll among its members. 
Preliminary results indicate that upwards of 90% are opposed to it, on the ground that 
none of Anguilla‘s tourists and few Anguillian residents visit it.‖
791
 What is more, since 
the Anguilla Revolution in 1967, three dolphins became the National Emblem on the 
revolutionary flag, representing the tenets of Friendship, Wisdom and Strength. As 
Anguilla is now a British Overseas Territory, the dolphins form the crest on its British 
Flag. Therefore, there is a general feeling among Anguillians that to degrade a symbol of 
national pride by proceeding with the construction of the dolphinarium is a mistake that 
should not be repeated. In the letter to the editor of The Anguillian, Cathrine Orchard 
began by asking one fundamental question that embodies the heartfelt sentiments of the 




 In the end, the Government argued that since the making of the Order, the issued 
the requisite licences and permissions to the developers and as such, there had been a 
material change in factual circumstances that warranted a discharge of the Order.
793
 
However, the licences as issued in August 2008 were made to commence retroactively in 
an effort to legalize the previous construction built in violation of the Laws of Anguilla. 
Given the foregoing, it is interesting to note that the later issuance of the licences were so 
effected for the sole purpose of ‗correcting the illegality‘ and not for the purpose of 
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permitting the development under the terms, conditions and processes of the Beach 
Control Act and the Ports, Habours and Piers Act. It is to be remembered that the 
legislation intended to protect the foreshore and the floor of the seabed by regulating the 
activities that may be carried out there. This observation aside, the Court relied on the 
well-settled principle of law established in the case of Sovfracht v. Van Udens 
Scheepvaart
794
 to hold that the developers had not actually obtained the requisite licences, 
as licences could not operate retrospectively.
795
 In closing, Justice George-Creque noted: 
―[t]his is a sad state of affairs and highlights the pitfalls when activities are undertaken 
without due regard for the regime of laws governing such activity.
796
 
 While there is no marine renewable governance arrangement regarding renewable 
marine resources in the OECS, the above case study of the dolphinarium in Anguilla 
demonstrates that the political, institutional and regulatory governance arrangements for 
new marine developments are akin to the Round 1 and Round 2 governance arrangements 
in the UK.  
6.5.2 New Governance Assessment of the Dolphinarium Governance 
Arrangement 
 
 The dolphinarium case study in the previous section outlined the range of possible 
consents and licences required for development in the marine environment. The 
following sub-sections apply the three-dimensional analytical framework of Michael 
Howlett et al. to the OECS decision-making process for marine works in the context of 
the dolphinarium. To recap, the first dimension created by the Howlett et al. is the 
political dimension. In this mode of governance, the authors were mainly concerned with 
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one question: ―whether political power – that is, the ability to make legitimate, 
authoritative decisions allocating societal resources – favours state or non-state actors.‖
797
 
It can be argued on end about what it means for political power to be vested in the state 
and what it means for that power to be vested in society-driven actors.
798
 For instance, 
earlier, in Chapter 2, it was noted that ―many people have been disappointed with the 
ability of government to tackle social problems.‖
799
 Because of this, New Governance 
scholars argue that the social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules 
and solutions to social problems.
800
 These are issues that the framework forces one to 
consider after having identified whether the political power in the regime favours state or 
non-state actors.  
 The other two dimensions recognize that there is more to a governance 
arrangement than political power. The second dimension for instance, is symbolic of the 
fact that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework for the exercise of power.‖
801
 In this dimension, 
Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution and composition of institutional 
structures, i.e., are the institutions formally or informally constituted? Are the institutions 
composed of state or non-state actors? Essentially, in their view, these characteristics 
determine ―…the abilities of various state and non-state actors to prevail in policy 
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disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities for the choice of the policy instruments 
used to implement the mode of governance.‖
802
  
 The third dimension focuses attention on the nature of the legal instruments used 
in the governance arrangement under study. The authors were concerned about whether 
the legal regime is characterized by traditional top-down hierarchical government control 
through laws and regulations or market-oriented regulation which are generally flexible 
and voluntary.  
 Overall, in each of the dimensions, the focus is on locating the governance 
arrangement, (is it State (hierarchical)? or Non-State (plurilateral)?), of each mode of 
governance (political, institutional, regulatory). Howlett et al. describe the key to using 
the framework in the following terms: ―…movement along the horizontal ‗hierarchical‘ 
to ‗plurilateral‘ axis is seen as being associated with changes along three distinct but 
overlapping vertical dimensions: namely institutional structures, political practices and 
regulatory techniques… .”
803
 In other words, in moving across the horizontal axis, the 
fundamental question is whether there is one actor or many actors in each mode of 
governance, and who those actors are. 
6.5.2.1 The Political Dimension 
 
 The range of consents and licences required for the dolphinarium demonstrate the 
involvement of several actors in the decision-making process for development on the 
foreshore and the floor of the sea. These actors play various roles and perform various 
responsibilities and, thus, can be grouped by their affiliate state or non-state orientations.  
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 On the state side, the central bodies involved in the development and regulation of 
the marine territory are: the relevant ministers under the Beach Control Act, the Beach 
Protection Act and the Ports, Harbours and Piers Act; the Building Board (Building Act); 
the Land Development Control Committee (Land Development Control Act); and the 
Department of Lands and Surveys (Crown Lands Act).   
 Although it may not be expressly reflected by the consents process, many non-
state actors also hold an interest in the development and regulation of marine 
environment. The main non-state actors include the public, industry developers, 
environmental pressure groups, and fishers. The consensus is that many state and non-
state actors hold an interest in marine development and regulation. The question remains, 
which among these State and Non-State actors is actually charged with power to 
determine whether a particular marine project will be given approval for development. 
 A quick review of the dolphinarium case study would confirm that power to 
produce legally binding outcomes on consents applications is concentrated in the hands 
of State actors. However, while power to make decisions is legally vested in the State, 
legitimate questions can be raised as to whether non-state actors influence the exercise of 
state power over consents applications. This question turns on two variables. The first 
variable concerns the identity of the non-state actor in question. This is of particular 
importance because it characterizes the interest of the Non-State actor in the regime, and 
hints to its preference of outcome on consents applications. The second variable speaks to 
whether the non-state actor has the capacity to influence state power in the direction of 
their preferred outcome. 
 201 
 As noted above, there is no doubt that the public has had an indisputably 
dominant and influential role in the decision-making process for marine work. The active 
involvement/protest of the residents of Sandy Ground prevented the initial relocation of 
the dolphinarium in their community. The residents were concerned about the 
environmental impact of the development and about the impact of the heavy-duty marine 
traffic from the nearby shipping port on the health of the dolphins. After demanding to 
see the EIA for the project, the residents discovered that the Government neglected to 
carry out one. This caused further alarm that spread throughout the island. Eventually, the 
alarm forced the Government to cease works. Like the case of many other OECS 
territories, Anguilla is a tourism-based economy. This dependence has birthed a people 
very protective of their tourism product: sun, sand and sea. Their large numbers and 
interests in the marine environment gave them sufficient capacity to influence State 
action in the development of the dolphinarium. Therefore, although there were no 
formally instituted NIMBY organizations, the public outcry became a significant barrier 
to the marine development of the dolphinarium in Road Bay, Sandy Ground. 
 However, the second relocation to Sandy Point, Blowing Point seemed to have 
been immune to public opposition. In contrast to the Road Bay, Sandy Ground area, the 
Sandy Point, Blowing Point area is a much smaller with fewer residents. This perhaps, 
explains why public opposition was not on the same scale as it had been on in the Road 
Bay, Sandy Ground community. Nonetheless, the unscrupulous manner in which the 
Government of Anguilla consented to the construction of the pier and/or dolphinarium in 
Sandy Point, Blowing Point, caused nine residents in the area to apply for judicial review. 
Note that at the time when proceedings for judicial review began, construction had 
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already commenced on the foreshore and the floor of the sea at the Sandy Point location 
without all the necessary permits. Though, the applicants were successful at obtaining an 
injunction, they were only able to affect the decision-making process after construction 
had begun. To date, there has been no attempt to assess the environmental impact of the 
works carried out up until the grant of the injunction. All the same, the point remains that 
the public has some capacity to affect the decision-making process.   
 It seems however, that though public opposition is strong, its capacity to influence 
the decision-making process is weakened by the interests of the state and industry in the 
development of the marine industry. Evidence of this strong influence over the decision-
making process was hinted to earlier in the preceding section. The preceding section 
noted that in proceedings to discharge the Order, the Government of Anguilla argued 
that…
804
   
…maintaining the Order causes prejudice and that the balance of 
convenience lies with the Attorney General representing the Government 
of Anguilla and Dolphin Discovery in the non-continuation of the Order 
[my emphasis] and says that the Dolphinarium project is substantially 
completed and thus would cause no additional hardship to the Property 
Owners. 
In addition: 
Reliance [was] further placed on the losses which Dolphin Discovery may 
suffer from the loss of visits of cruise ship guests to the Dolphinarium [my 
emphasis] as well as loss of income and employment opportunities to 
other ancillary service providers who are Anguillians, of the Dolphin 
Discovery business which it is said results in a loss of revenue to the 
Government of Anguilla.   Counsel also urges that I take judicial notice of 
the general slow down in the world economy and that of Anguilla.  On this 
basis, counsel argues that the Order is currently having an oppressive 
effect on the people and [G]overnment of Anguilla and should be 
discharged on this basis.   
 
 As noted earlier, nowhere in the proceedings did the Government attempt to 
advance an argument to the effect that there has been no negative environmental 
                                                        




 Nonetheless, Justice George-Creque concluded that the line of argument 
advanced by the Government did not ―…afford a proper basis for the discharge of the 
Order granted.‖
806
 The example of the dolphinarium and the line of argument advanced 
by the Government of Anguilla, demonstrate how governments favour business efficacy 
and the interests of industry developers over the protection of public interest, the 
environment and the clear letter of the law. This clear abdication of public responsibility 
caused much unrest amongst Anguillians. In relation to these events, an anonymous 
blogger posed the following questions:
807
  
Why is it that the Gov't appears to place more interest in the ambitions and 
aspirations of these foreign businesses or businessmen [than] concern for the 
welfare of its own people? Money is not an end unto itself and should be 
treated as a means to facilitate continued economic growth. In this respect, we 
need to carefully consider the various programs and projects that are sent our 
way. […] Who is profiting from these unilateral decisions? Is this another 
corruption scheme where the GOA is again being used as pawns in a crooked 
business venture to the detriment of Anguilla and its people? 
 
 In essence, the blogger has answered the very questions he/she posed. Therefore, 
there is no need to satisfy the same. Noteworthy, several bloggers have also voiced 
similar concerns under the same blog.
808
 Clearly then, there is at least some portion of the 
population who hold the belief that political power to allocate resources has continuously 
been exercised inappropriately by the Government.  
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 The Ashton Marina Project in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is another 
example that gives some context to the picture of the OECS political governance 
arrangement painted by the dolphinarium case study. The Ashton Lagoon is located on 
the south coast of Union Island, a small island in the Grenadines. It supports a range of 
important habitat types, which include mangroves, coral reefs, mudflats, seagrass beds 
and salt ponds.
809
 These habitats supported several commercially important fish and 
vertebrae and a variety of important flora and fauna including several rare or endangered 
species.
810
 Together, the lagoon and the nearby Frigate Island provided habitat for 
wintering and migrating populations of seabirds, waterbirds, shorebirds and landbirds.
811
 
On 5 January 1987, the Ashton Lagoon was designated a Conservation Area under 
schedule 11, regulation 20 of the Fisheries Act
812
 in recognition of its rich biodiversity 
and ecological importance. Despite the protected status of the area, the government of 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines permitted the construction of a massive marina, hotel 
and golf course project. Specifically, the project proposed to build a 300-boat marina in 
the midst of the lagoon, a large condominium to be built on top of the outer reefs, and a 
50 acre golf course to be laid over the mangrove.
813
 As well, to complete this new 
tourism development, a causeway was to be constructed connecting Union Island to 
Frigate Island. As one might image the specifics of the project proposal required 
extensive land reclamation.  
                                                        
809 Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies (CERMES), Restoration and Sustainable 
Use of Aston Lagoon: Phase II, at 3, online: CERMES < 
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 Prior to construction, it was recommended that an EIA of the area be carried 
out.
814
 Although the Government‘s EIA gave extensive detail of the permanent and 
irreversible damage to the Ashton Lagoon Conservation Area, the Government of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines nevertheless gave consent for works to commence.
815
 In fact, 
the decision to permit development was made even though ―…the developers presented 
no environmental impact assessment in support of [the] project… .‖
816
 In the context of 
this subsection, political power to permit development of the Ashton Lagoon area is 
legally vested in the State. Like the dolphinarium case study in Anguilla, the Ashton 
Marina Project was also permitted in the face of strong local opposition, especially from 
fishers, who felt that the project ―...would cause irreparable environmental and social 
harm to their community.
817
 The inescapable description of the political reality of the 
Ashton Marina Project is that the consents process was dominated by the interests of the 
developers and the potential economic benefit to the Government. Specifically, the 
Government gave the developers permission to begin construction in an area of 
ecological importance, against the will of the people, and regrettably, against the better 
advice of their own EIA. In actuality, soon after construction began, the developer 
declared bankruptcy and disappeared thereafter leaving behind a severely damaged 
lagoon. And possibly, as a lesson to the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
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the developers also disappeared leaving the Government to service a massive loan which 
the developers tricked the Government into guaranteeing financially. In relation to the 
dolphinarium and noted above, an anonymous blogger asked: ―…is this another 
corruption scheme where the GOA is again being used as pawns in a crooked business 
venture to the detriment of its people?‖ Perhaps therefore, the Ashton Marina fiasco was 
an illustration of governments ‗being used as pawns in a crooked business venture to the 
detriment of the people.‘
818
 All that aside, today the Ashton Lagoon Conservation Area is 
the subject of many restoration efforts. 
 It is clear from the above assessment that many stakeholders hold an interest in 
the development of marine areas in the OECS region. It is also clear, that amongst those 
stakeholders power to produce legally binding outcomes on consent applications is 
concentrated in the hands of the State. Therefore, in the context of the Howlett 
framework, it would appear that the political dimension in OECS countries is 
characterized by traditional hierarchical governance. However, in practice, this State-
directed governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted 
Non-State actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the Howlett 
framework, this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the political 
dimension, ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. This 
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6.5.2.2 The Institutional Dimension 
 
 The founding concept under this dimension is that ―[i]nstitutions set the framework 
for the exercise of power.‖
819
 Here, Howlett et al. were concerned with the constitution 
and composition of institutional structures used to exercise power. Institutions may be 
formally or informally constituted and composed of state actors, non-state actors or both. 
Essentially, in their view, these characteristics determine ―…the abilities of various state 
and non-state actors to prevail in policy disputes and decisions, as well as the possibilities 
for the choice of the policy instruments used to implement the mode of governance.‖
820
 
Based on the assessment of the political dimension in the previous subsection, the prima 
facie assumption can be made that the institutional arrangements that had the capacity to 
make legally binding decisions and influence the outcome of applications for marine 
development are typically characterized by formal establishment.  
 As it relates to State actors, their power to produce binding decisions on consents 
applications was exercised through several governmental bodies or persons. In relation to 
the dolphinarium, the governmental bodies and persons included: the relevant ministers 
under the Beach Control Act, the Beach Protection Act and the Ports, Harbours and 
Piers Act; the Building Board (Building Act); the Land Development Control Committee 
(Land Development Control Act); and the Department of Lands and Surveys (Crown 
Lands Act). These governmental bodies and persons determine whether a particular 
dolphinarium project will be given consent for development. By extension, these 
governmental bodies and persons would also preside on consent applications for other 
marine works. Another characteristic of these governmental departments is that they were 
                                                        
819 Howlett et al. ―Government to Governance‖ supra note 44 at 2.2. 
820 Ibid. at 385 – 386. 
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all established by acts of parliament. Therefore, the common trait among state actors is 
that their power is exercised through governmental departments that are formally 
established by acts of parliament, and are therefore empowered to produce legally 
binding outcomes on consents applications.  
 As noted in the assessment of the political dimension above, there is a wide range 
of stakeholders that hold an interest in the development of the marine area other than the 
state. In fact, diversity in institutional arrangements is borne out in how these non-state 
actors are organized.  
 Most obvious industry developers, like Dolphin Fantaseas, are typically formally 
established institutions (corporate bodies). The company is a subsidiary of a larger 
company which operates dolphinariums in other countries in the Caribbean and the rest of 
the world. This formal establishment backed by financial capital and industry experience 
has given Dolphin Fantaseas significant capacity as an institution to influence the 
decision-making process.  
 By definition, the public is not, per se, formally instituted. Unlike the case in the 
UK, there are no NIMBY organizations in the OECS region. However, as noted in the 
political assessment above, the public has the potential to play an influential role in the 
decision-making process for marine development through public protest and judicial 
review. All the same, as was demonstrated by the Ashton Marina Project, the potential of 
public protest is sometimes unable to match the strong influence of industry developers 
and political priority. This becomes even more apparent on a simple review of the 
influence of the public as statutory consultee during the EIA process for the marina. As 
noted, there was strong public opposition to the Ashton Marina Project that was reflected 
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in the government‘s EIA of the proposal. Nevertheless, the perceived benefit to be had 
and the strong industry influence, trumped those concerns. In Anguilla, the initial 
relocation of the dolphinarium to Road Bay, Sandy Ground was ‗approved‘ and was 
allowed to begin construction without the commissioning of an EIA, which by law would 
have required public consultation. Therefore, had it not been for the environmental 
consciousness of the people of Sandy Ground, the public as a ‗statutory consultee‘ would 
have never had an impact on that project. Even worse, as noted above, many criticized 
the EIA process for the second dolphinarium relocation on the ground that it failed to 
adequately involve the public. In sum, even if the public is given some semblance of 
formal establishment as ‗statutory consultees,‘ it seems as though the EIA practice has 
been to turn blind eyes to public concerns in furtherance of the benefit to be had from the 
industry. Related to this point, in the Notice of Application
821
 for judicial review, the 
applicants noted what they believed a flagrant irregularity in the EIA process. They note 
that the EIA ―… was not compiled by a disinterested source. The EIA was compiled by 
Applied Technology & Management, Inc. They are, it would seem, a reputable company, 





 This section reviewed and characterized governmental institutional structures, 
non-governmental environmental agencies, the public and industry institutional structures 
in the context of the dolphinarium and Ashton Lagoon case studies. The conclusion that 
can be drawn from this assessment is that formal establishment characterized the 
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 Paul Webster et. al. v. Attorney General of Anguilla Claim No. AXA HCV 2008/0015 (Notice of 
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822 Ibid at 11 ¶ 36(a). 
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institutional arrangements that had the capacity to influence the outcome of consent 
applications for development in the marine area. The governmental bodies and the 
industry developers were all formally established, and therefore, best placed to influence 
consents decisions. Most notably however, on the institutional dimension, the 
government retained an important structural advantage in the consents process largely 
due to its ownership of the sea bed and formal legislative control over activities in the 
marine area. In practice, this structural advantage and legislative control tends to 
overpower much of the capacity the general public and fishermen have as ‗statutory 
consultees‘. Taken by themselves, fishers in the region are much like those in the UK: 
some belong to a national fisheries organization, but the majority of them are simply lone 
fishers. In this regard, the institutional arrangements retain some plurilateral features. 
However, the Government was able to dominate the consents process by moving upwards 
along the vertical axis of the Howlett et al. institutional dimension away from informality 
towards more formal structures. Additionally, there has been very little movement along 
the horizontal axis of the institutional dimension. In sum, the institutional dimension is 
mainly representative of hierarchical governance. This governance arrangement is 
consistent with that of the UK round 1 and 2 offshore wind experience. 
 
6.5.2.3 The Regulatory Dimension 
 
 Power to make decisions on consents applications is legally concentrated in the 
hands of the state and exercised through formally established institutions. This dynamic 
has influenced the creation of a marine development consents regime that respects 
traditional top-down hierarchical government control through laws and regulations. First, 
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as is most obvious, the regulation of the dolphinarium was effected through existing 
regimes that respected top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations. This 
fact remains despite the decision taken by the Government of Anguilla not to follow its 
own procedures and laws for permitting activity on the foreshore and the floor of the 
seabed. As noted by the Minister of Lands, ―…the licence to use the beach [for the 
construction of a dolphinarium] is a new concept, the details of which is still being 
developed."
823
 In relation to the Ashton Marina Project, the Government of Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines also used existing laws and regulations to permit the development. 
Moreover, for quite some time, Dominica has been using existing laws and regulations to 
permit hydropower development. Even today, hydropower is still comes under the 
purview of the Electricity Supply Act.
824
  There has been no attempt to pass specific 
legislation for the regulation of hydropower renewables. Essentially, therefore, the nature 
of the regulatory regime is consistent with the notion of hard law – the upper end of the 
vertical axis on the regulatory dimension. To recap, Howlett et al. describe the notion of 
hard law as ―… synonymous with a state-centric, command and control mode of 
regulation that imposes generally applicable obligations, articulated with a relatively high 
degree of precision, that are directly enforceable through the courts.‖
825
 Noteworthy, the 
respective EIAs by design and purpose were intended to incorporate some measure of 
non-state actor participation in the consent process for offshore works. However, as has 
been seen in the case of the dolphinarium, the Government neglected to carry out an EIA 
for the Sandy Ground relocation. Further, in the preparation of the EIA for the second 
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 Electricity Supply Act, Laws of the Commonwealth of Dominica, Act 10 of 2006, online: Government of 
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825 Howlett et al., supra note 44 at 386. 
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relocation at Blowing Point, many allege that the EIA failed to consult with stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, the GOA accepted the EIA. In essence, governments do not always follow 
its own procedure and rules pertaining to development in the marine area. Further, the 
Ashton Lagoon illustrated that governments may at whim decide to ignore the EIAs 
altogether even when completed for the specific purpose of aiding the decision-making 
process. In sum, the hard law governance arrangement constrained the ability of non-state 
actors to alter the policy-making process and the eventual binding outcome. As a result, 
the regime is representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis of Howlette 
et al.‘s regulatory dimension.  
 
6.5.3 Discussion of Findings and Adoption of Governance Lessons from the UK 
 
 In seeking to propose an effective governance arrangement for the regulation of 
renewable ocean resources in the OECS, the new governance framework is a good device 
for challenging policy-makers to think about what governance arrangement might 
possibly work in the OECS and what governance arrangements might not work. By 
challenging policy-makers to think about the local circumstances, it provides a rational 
basis for transposing lessons learnt in other regimes. This is important, as one of the most 
common pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal 
solutions in one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the socio-
cultural, political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. In 
other words, are the political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS 
sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons from the UK offshore wind governance 
arrangements?  
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 As noted at the outset of section 6.5 above, one way to begin answering this 
question is to look at the current governance arrangement for regulating renewable ocean 
resources in the OECS region and make a determination as to whether it bears similarities 
with the UK case study. However, it has already been noted that there is no governance 
arrangement in place for the regulation of these resources in the OECS. This is 
unsurprising because thus far, there have been no projects in any of the OECS territories 
that seek to harness the power of renewable ocean resources. As noted earlier, harnessing 
the power of renewable ocean resources is a recent policy objective for the region.
826
 
Alternatively, however, policy-makers can justify transposition in the absence of issue-
specific governance arrangements, from practices in related areas. The previous 
subsections primarily outlined the governance arrangement used to develop the 
dolphinarium industry in Anguilla. The new governance assessment also drew principles 
from the political context of the Ashton Marina Project in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. In addition, the assessment also referenced the regulation of hydropower in 
Dominica in support of a description of the OECS regulatory dimension. In essence, the 
findings of the new governance assessment demonstrate that the political, institutional 
and regulatory contexts in the OECS are akin to the Round 1 and 2 experiences in the 
UK. 
 Firstly, it was found that the political dimension in OECS countries is 
characterized by traditional hierarchical governance. Further, it was also found that, in 
practice, this State-directed governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by 
formally instituted non-state actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the 
Howlett framework, this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the 
                                                        
826 Above at 181 – 182. 
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political dimension, ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement.
827
 
A review of Chapter 5 would confirm that the OECS political arrangement is consistent 
with the Round 1 and 2 political arrangements. Secondly, as with Round 1 and 2 of the 
British consents process, the institutions that have the capacity to exert influence over the 
consent process in the OECS are formally established. Finally, consistent with Round 1 
and 2 of the UK consents process, the nature of the regulatory dimension is also 
representative of hard law approaches to governance. In other words, the OECS 
regulatory regime is also representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis 
of Howlett et al.‘s regulatory dimension. Taken together, the similarities in each mode of 
governance provide a rational basis for transposing legal approaches and solutions in the 
UK to the development of a governance regime for regulating renewable ocean resources 
in the OECS. 
 As noted earlier in this Chapter, in 2009 OECS countries directed energy 
discussions towards the possibility of tapping into their ocean energy potential. Added to 
this focus, the region has had the principle of sustainable development as their defining 
developmental objective for quite some time. Clearly then, if sustainable development is 
the defining objective for all OECS Member States, the political, institutional and 
regulatory efforts to tap into the offshore energy potential cannot begin as it has in the 
UK. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the British experience is that the Round 1 and 2 
political, institutional and regulatory efforts to regulate offshore wind produced 
unsustainable outcomes. It follows then, that because the governance arrangements in the 
OECS and the UK are similar, if the same arrangement is used for regulating renewable 
ocean resources in the OECS, there is a high probability that the regime would not make 
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positive contributions towards sustainability. In other words, the OECS Member States 
would need to adopt a different governance approach to Round 1 and 2, if the intention is 
to develop renewable ocean resources in furtherance of the principle of sustainable 
development. The issue that must now be dealt with is whether the British Round 3 
regime as is, is wholly appropriate for the OECS or whether the Round 3 regime would 
require some modification, if it is to fare well as an effective governance arrangement in 
the OECS.  
 It would be helpful to recount the transitions in the governance arrangements from 
Round 1 to Round 3 as they properly explain why the Round 3 regime would be most 
appropriate for contributing towards sustainable development. Among other things, the 
transitions from Round 1 to Round 3 demonstrate one fundamental point, i.e., 
hierarchical governance of offshore renewable resources does not seem to work. The 
dolphinarium case study demonstrates the unsatisfactory effects of hierarchical 
arrangements. As with Round 1 and 2, where political power is concentrated in the hands 
of the state, the reality has been that industry developers are easily positioned to influence 
the exercise of that power to the detriment of the environment and the people who rely 
upon it. Chapter 2 made mention of the argument by New Governance scholars that the 
social trait of non-state actors would influence more effective rules, approaches and 
solutions to the allocation of societal resources. One inescapable interpretation is that 
hierarchical control means that those normally affected by government decisions seldom 
have the capacity or opportunity to exert some influence over the decision-making 
process. In other words, in the context of Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for 
sustainability, hierarchical arrangements tend to restrict progress on the principle of 
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socio-ecological civility and democratic governance. Taking all of the foregoing into 
consideration, hierarchical control represented development for the people and not 
development by the people - a restriction that New Governance scholars would also 
frown upon. Herein lies the main problem with the Round 1 and 2 governance 
arrangements and by extension the current framework in the OECS.  
 However, the transition between the Round 2 and 3 regimes demonstrates a 
conceptual shift away from governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of 
hierarchical control. This concept is a favourable approach that policy-makers should 
adopt in the development of a governance regime for regulating offshore renewable 
resources in the OECS region. In considering whether the Round 3 regime would require 
some modification for use in the OECS, it is helpful to set out a brief description of the 
changes in the modes of governance that forced a shift away from the tradition of 
hierarchical governance. However, firstly it is to be recalled that unlike the Round 2 
transition, the Round 3 model of governance was established through the creation of 
specific legislation. At present, the Planning Act 2008 and the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 represent the new legal frameworks within which decisions will be 
made. Therefore, as it pertains to the regulatory dimension, the tradition of top-down 
hierarchical control through laws and regulations continued. What was changed however, 
was the fragmented approach to marine management. For instance, the MCAA sought to 
modernize, integrate and simplify the consent process by consolidating into a single 
licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational factors. 
This licence is to be granted by an independent organization, the Marine Management 
Organization (MMO), created for this purpose. The Act also transfers several functions 
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relating to marine management (sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable energy, 
etc.) to the MMO. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the Round 3 
model of governance under the MCCA regulates all renewable energy activity in the 
marine environment and not just offshore wind. Therefore, there is a wider governance 
lessons that policy-makers in the OECS may adopt given that the regime transcends all 
forms of offshore renewables. In essence, the transfer of these functions (sea fisheries, 
nature conservation, renewable energy, etc.) drew together into a single licensing 
decision consideration of the interests of other users of the sea. The governance lesson 
learnt is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations is not 
a faulting initiative in and of itself so long as such control through laws and regulations 
adopts an integrated approach to marine management. This governance lesson draws 
inspiration from the fact that conceptually, sustainability is a challenge to business as 
usual practices and therefore, the use of existing regimes would be ill suited for making 
positive contributions towards sustainable development in the OECS.  
 In relation to the political dimension, the problem in the Round 1 and Round 2 
UK regime is that power was concentrated in the hands of the State, which was under 
industry influence. To alleviate this problem, the British government through the 
Planning Act and the MCAA, removed from the State the legal power to make decisions 
on consents applications, and vested it in central corporate bodies that were created to be 
independent of the government. Conceptually, the purposeful vesting of power in 
independent establishments serves to insulate the new decision-makers from the pressures 
of industry, thereby, weakening industry‘s influence over the process. Given the results, 
for an effective governance arrangement in the OECS, it would be prudent to mimic the 
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Round 3 arrangement by placing power to make legally binding decisions in a body 
corporate independent of the Government.   
 It is true and undisputed that the newly created corporate bodies are, by the clear 
provisions of the Acts, independent of the Crown.
828
 It is important to note however, that 
a proper consideration of the realities of the Round 3 regime in practice may blur the 
strict conclusion that the newly established corporate bodies are actually independent of 
the government of the day. By way of example, Chapter 5 noted that the cozy relations 
between the MMO and the Secretary of State do not make the MMO as independent as 
the analysis concludes. By sections 14 and 15 of schedule 1 of the MCAA, the Chief 
Executive of the MMO is appointed by the Secretary of State, so too is the Scientific 
Adviser. Additionally, the membership of the MMO are to be not fewer than 5, nor more 
than 8 other persons who are to be appointed by the Secretary of State
829
 and serve a term 
not more than 5 years
830
. Though the MMO is to be funded by the Government, it is 
authorized by section 33 to borrow money from the Secretary of State or from private 
sources as it may require for meeting its obligations and carrying out its functions. While 
the MMO has the option of borrowing from private sources it may only do so if the 
Secretary of State consents. In practice, these realities have the potential to reflect 
government commitment to promote wind energy development in the consents process. 
Obviously, therefore, where the political dimension is concerned the Round 3 model is 
not foolproof. Given the control of the government over the MMO, there is built into the 
Round 3 model some room to continue business as usual political practices. In other 
words, the process of assessment of eligibility of projects may likely continue to 
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experience a balance of influence that may still favour those with the stronger leverage. 
Again, it is to be recalled at this time, that each government, through the Marine Policy 
Statements under the MCAA, prioritizes its goals for sustainable development; a concept 
that is economic-development oriented as it is environmental and resources protection 
and conservation-minded. Possibly then, the OECS would need a different approach 
which through learning from the British must avoid the potential pitfall to better ensure 
that some semblance of sustainability would be accomplished in the development of 
offshore renewable resources. On the other hand, it is submitted here that the structure of 
the MCAA, which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine area under the 
MMO gives the organization tremendous power. Ironically, the MMO is also authorized 
to enter into agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to have them 
carry out its mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine Plan. For 
the OECS region, this power carries both a financial and technical benefit. For instance, 
the MMO may conclude agreements with relevant bodies that have been exercising 
existing power concerning the various sectors brought under the Act, to authorize them to 
do so under its delegation. Delegation therefore has the benefit of drawing on the 
knowledge capital of these departments that have a long history in relation to the 
management of their respective sectors. A conclusion inclusive of practical realities 
would state that though the political arrangement under the MCAA is not foolproof, as a 
compromise the MMO‘s power is very huge but also potentially unwieldy. 
 Apart from shifting the governance arrangement from development for the people 
to development by the people, what makes the Round 3 model effective, and thus more 




 As with the dolphinarium case study, under the Round 1 and 2 British 
regimes, the institutions that had the capacity to influence the consent process were 
formally established. Those formally established institutions were mostly industry 
professionals. The creation of onerous and structured consultation duties under the 
legislations seek to diversify the institutions that have the capacity to influence outcomes, 
by empowering a range of non-state actors to have some leverage under the exercise of its 
institutional jurisdiction. Further, in relation to the fact that there is still some room in the 
UK model to continue business as usual political practices, the onerous and structured 
consultation duties empower non-state actors to act as a potential check and balance on 
the exercise of power by the MMO. In sum, the adoption of lessons from the Round 3 
governance arrangement in the OECS would ensure that marine renewables in the region 
are regulated in a manner that makes positive contributions towards sustainability. In 
sum, the major recommended changes would be the vesting of political power in an 
independent body corporate and the adoption of integrated regulatory instruments backed 
by structured consultation duties. 
 Lastly, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) experience in Round 2 
was a lesson in everything not to do when carrying out SEAs and by extension EIAs. 
Generally, the SEA was considered to be a rushed and cosmetic exercise. The British 
Government completed the entire SEA process in the space of five short months.  Having 
rushed the SEA process in the interests of industry developers and business efficacy, the 
British government alienated many stakeholders and the public by failing to give an early 
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and effective opportunity within appropriate time frames for stakeholders and the public 
to express their opinion. This is an unwelcome state of affairs as one of the fundamental 
purposes of the SEA was to empower actors other than the State. By their very nature, 
many non-state actors have limited capacity to understand and respond to issues raised 
during consultation on matters of this nature requiring some functional understanding of 
what is at stake. As such, the allotted minimum of four weeks for consultation did little to 
empower them. Instead, it further weakened their influence over the consents process. 
Moreover, the rush to complete the SEA also had the undesirable result of producing an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that failed to consider a number of core issues 
including the cumulative impacts. The SEA experience also demonstrates the danger in 
concentrating power to make legally binding decisions on consent applications in the 
hands of the State. Under the Round 2 regime, the SEA process was rushed to advance 
State goals and targets, but more so, to provide an environment of business efficacy for 
developers. Therefore, the exercise of power by the State in relation to the manner in 
which the SEA was conducted came under the influence of industry developers. The EIA 
experience regarding the dolphinarium in Anguilla deserves brief mention. In the first 
relocation process, the EIA process was circumvented to meet the developer‘s deadlines 
to evacuate the facility at Barnes Bay. Simply put, the lesson from the UK SEA 
experience is that environmental impact studies should be commissioned on terms, 
conditions and processes that conform to some international standard rather than the 




6.6  Conclusion 
 
 This Chapter briefly outlined the energy context in the OECS region by touching 
upon the regions‘ supply and consumption context, strategy and legal requirements. The 
defining characteristic of the energy supply and consumption context in the OECS is that  
the region has a high-dependence on imported fossil fuels. This dependence is directly 
linked to the lack of oil, natural gas, and coal resources in the region. The grim 
consequences of this chronic dependence on imported energy in the OECS countries, is 
reflected in the fact that some countries have had to spend as much as half of their export 
revenues on imported fuels. Further, the added burden of import dependence in the region 
is the risk to energy security. Compounding the energy supply and demand context in the 
region is the threat of climate change aided to some extent by the combustion of these 
imported fossil fuels. These energy challenges have led to an increasing recognition that 
what the countries in the OECS need desperately is a lowered reliance on imported fossil 
fuels through the development of clean and renewable sources of indigenous energy. In 
furtherance of this mandate, attention has been directed to the possibility of tapping into 
the energy potential of offshore renewable resources in the region. However, standing in 
the way of the development of renewables is the absence of national and regional energy 
policies as well as the absence of firm regulatory regimes.  
 The body of the Chapter sought to develop a rational basis for appling lessons 
learnt in Chapter 5 towards the creation of an effective governance arrangement in the 
OECS for marine renewables. To do this, a new governance assessment was carried out 
for the OECS region drawing mainly on a dolphinarium case study from Anguilla. In 
describing the governance arrangement in the OECS, the new governance assessment 
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also drew principles from the political context of the Ashton Marina Project in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. In addition, the assessment also referenced the regulation of 
hydropower in Dominica in support of a description of the OECS regulatory dimension. 
In essence, the findings of the new governance assessment demonstrated that the 
political, institutional and regulatory contexts in the OECS are akin to the Round 1 and 2 
experiences in the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the lessons learnt from the British 
offshore wind experiences in Chapter 5 were used to guide recommendations for the 
creation of an effective governance arrangement for offshore renewable resources in the 
OECS. Specifically, the Chapter grappled with the issue of whether the British Round 3 
regime as is, is wholly appropriate for the OECS or whether the Round 3 regime would 
require some modification, if it is to fare well as an effective governance arrangement in 
the OECS. The conclusion was that the Round 3 regime is an effective governance 
arrangement for making positive contributions towards sustainable development and 
should serve as a model for the OECS region. Firstly, the Round 3 arrangement sought to 
cure the main problem with the Round 1 and 2 regimes, that is, it reversed the trend of 
hierarchical control by shifting political power to independent corporate bodies (MMO 
and IPC). As with the Round 1 and 2 regimes, the OECS governance assessment 
demonstrated how governments favour business efficacy and the interests of industry 
developers over the protection of public interests, the environment and the clear letter of 
the law. However, the entire tradition of hierarchical control was not displaced. In fact, 
under the Round 3 model, the regulatory and institutional dimensions retained their 
hierarchical control. On the regulatory dimension, the major governance lesson for the 
OECS region is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and 
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regulations is not a faulting initiative so long as such control through laws and regulations 
adopts an integrated approach to marine management. In other words, the passing of 
integrated legislation for the marine environment under the Round 3 model, avoided the 
peril of unsustainable development associated with piecemeal approaches to regulating 
the marine environment. Further, on the institutional dimension, the governance lesson 
for the OECS region is that although desirable, the character of the institutions do not 
necessarily need changing, so long as the regime introduces structured duties to consult. 
In the main, these duties to consult are necessary to balance the influence of formally 
established non-state actors (industry) in the regime against informally established non-




















7.1 Thesis Overview, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 Our oceans cover over 70% of the Earth‘s surface. From the beginning of time, 
the utilization of this huge body of water and the diverse marine resources that it supports 
has made life on earth possible for mankind. Early uses of the ocean were generally 
confined to subsistence fishing and trade and navigation. Today, the oceans are pressured 
to provide a variety of services for the advancement of individual livelihoods and world 
economies. These services include food and recreational opportunities; the development 
of coastal and marine tourism economies; the facilitation of navigation, shipping and 
commerce activities; access to immense sources of usable energy (such as oil and gas) 
and other non-living resources (minerals). The sea also serves as a depository for the 
waste products generated through our contemporary global socio-economic activities. 
Above all, the oceans provide the invaluable service of regulating our climate and 
weather. The variety of services offered underscores the importance of the seas to 
mankind. If the expectation is that present and future generations will continue to benefit 
from our dynamic oceans and seas, then the maintenance of safe, healthy and productive 
seas and the attainment of principled ocean governance are of even greater importance.  
 The seemingly endless uses and services of the oceans have spawned a modern 
culture of exploration and exploitation. This pervasive culture is aided and abetted by 
advances in technology, excessive consumption patterns, and the increasing demands of 
growing coastal populations and economies. Coastal overdevelopment and excessive 
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marine exploitation pressures have empowered anthropogenic influences that 
fundamentally change the natural order of coastal and marine ecosystems. The 
cumulative pressures of over-fishing, pollution, climate change and other 
environmentally harmful activities are bearing down on the marine environment. Simply 
put, the health of our seas is at risk. So too is its capacity to provide the services that 
contribute to human well-being, economic security and sustainable development for 
present and future generations. If left unchecked, the severity of these risks will be 
amplified as our technologies advance and as human needs, values and expectations of 
the oceans continue to change and increase.  
 Over the past few years, there has been significant progress to develop 
commercial scale operations of ocean energy. Today, the ocean is on the threshold of 
providing a reliable base-load source of renewable energy on a commercial scale.
832
 It is 
safe to say that renewable energy is now part of that long list of services we expect from 
the oceans and seas. Typically, when new values, expectations and services, such as the 
generation of renewable energy, are demanded from the oceans and seas, there is a clear 
mandate to guide their deployment, and in particular, to develop new regulatory regimes 
where they do not exist, and revise existing arrangements where they exist.
833
 The key 
however, is to pursue these mandates in a manner that ―…suitably deal[s] with the 
environmental impacts of ocean energy projects.‖
834
  
 The recent discussions at the 2009 Caribbean Renewable Energy Forum indicate 
that in the very near future, the possibility of tapping into the energy potential of 
renewable marine resources will be pushed to primacy on the energy agenda‘s of OECS 
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 Leary, ―Renewable Energy from the Ocean and Tides‖, supra note 35 at 417. 
833 Ibid. at 424 - 425. 
834 Ibid. 
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Member States. The region lacks laws and policies for regulating the development and 
use of these resources. Therefore, it has been the purpose of this thesis to propose a 
governance arrangement that meets the priority of sustainable development for the 
regulation of offshore renewable resources in the OECS region. To do this, the study has 
sought to draw lessons from the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction Freedom-Kai Phillips 
describes as ―…clearly ahead of most in terms of legislation pertaining to renewable 
energy broadly and ocean-based renewables particularly.‖
835
  
 In seeking to extrapolate governance lessons from the UK‘s offshore wind 
governance regimes, Chapter 2 developed a two-tiered analytical framework to assist in a 
review and assessment of the effectiveness of the UK case study. The first tier of the 
analytical framework is the New Governance Approach as articulated by Michael 
Howlett, Jeremy Rayner & Chris Tollefson. The concept of this approach is particularly 
useful for policy makers and regulators. For one, the approach is not about adopting or 
advocating a certain course of action, procedure or method to solving public problems.  
Rather, it is a way of taking stock of political practices, institutional structures and 
regulatory instruments and deciding where amongst these dimensions the power to make 
decisions respecting societal resources is concentrated. In other words, the first tier of the 
analytical framework is that it provides a means by which regulators may understand, 
analyze, and thereafter, critique a particular governance arrangement. This is a useful first 
step when trying to create new governance regimes or revise those already in existence, 
as it opens the door to understanding the political, institutional and regulatory nature of 
the governance arrangement under study. The only probable drawback to Michael 
Howlett et al.‘s framework is that it stops at an evaluation of the decision-making process 
                                                        
835 See, Phillips, ―Ocean Renewable Energy‖, supra note 36. 
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that leads to decisions and substantive outcomes. The framework fails to indicate what a 
substantively good outcome would be. For any policy-maker or regulator, this would 
necessarily be their focus.  
 The second tier of the analytical framework was, therefore, created to pick up the 
slack of the first tier. In essence, the second tier is a substantive standard against which 
the effectiveness of offshore renewable energy regimes can be measured. As Chapter 2 
notes, many standards are available to measure the effectiveness of offshore renewable 
energy regimes. Because these regimes impact ocean use and management, suitable 
criteria for effectiveness can be located in principles that advocate certain standards for 
stewardship of the oceans and seas. Chapter 2 noted that statements of principles for 
ocean governance can be found in a variety of sources: directives and protocols on good 
governance, international agreements, declarations and codes of conduct. Some of these 
principles include sustainable development, integration, precaution, the ecosystem 
approach and community-based management. Any of these principles may serve as 
legitimate criteria for measuring the effectiveness of substantive outcomes of offshore 
renewable energy regulation. Ultimately, the core requirements for progress towards 
sustainable development developed by Gibson et al., was chosen as the second tier of the 
analytical framework.   
 Chapter 5 presented the case study of the development of the offshore wind 
regulatory regime in the United Kingdom. To date, there have been three identifiable 
regulatory attempts to establish the manner in which offshore wind technologies would 
be allowed to enter the UK marine environment. Each regulatory approach coincided 
with the UK government‘s decision to deploy a new round of wind projects, that is, a 
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different consents process was used to approve Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3 projects 
respectively. In chronological order, Chapter 5 outlines the consents approaches used to 
approve project applications under each round of development. Each consent process was 
then considered in light of Howlett et al.‘s three-dimensional new governance framework. 
Thereafter, Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for progress towards sustainability were 
used to measure the effectiveness of the substantive outcomes of each consent process. 
Finally, on an evaluation of all three regulatory regimes, Chapter 5 concluded that in light 
of the Gibson et al. criteria, the current regime under the Planning Act 2008 and the 
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 holds the greatest potential to make positive 
contributions to the sustainable development of the offshore wind industry. In other 
words, Chapter 5 concluded that the Round 3 model of governance arrangement was the 
most effective regime because it holds the greatest potential to rank high on the Gibson et 
al.‘s criteria for sustainability. 
 Chapter 6 sought to apply the governance lessons from the study of all three 
offshore regulatory regimes in the UK to the development of an effective governance 
arrangement for renewable marine resources in the OECS. One of the most common 
pitfalls of comparative research is the fruitless exercise of comparing legal solutions in 
one jurisdiction to legal problems of another jurisdiction where the socio-cultural, 
political and economic contexts of those jurisdictions differ dramatically. Therefore, 
much of Chapter 6 was dedicated to demonstrating that the political, institutional and 
regulatory contexts in the OECS are sufficiently similar to justify transposing lessons 
from the UK. As there is no marine renewable energy governance arrangement regarding 
renewable marine energy resources in the OECS, a new governance assessment of the 
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dolphinarium industry in Anguilla was used to demonstrate that the political, institutional 
and regulatory governance arrangements for new marine developments are akin to the 
Round 1 and Round 2 governance arrangements in the UK.  
 Briefly, the results of the new governance assessment of the dolphinarium 
industry are as follows. First, the political dimension in OECS countries is characterized 
by traditional hierarchical governance. However, in practice, this state-directed 
governance arrangement is vulnerable to pressures exerted by formally instituted non-
state actors (industry developers). Therefore, in the context of the Howlett framework, 
this dynamic has created movement along the horizontal axis of the political dimension, 
ultimately creating a de facto plurilateral governance arrangement. A review of Chapter 5 
would confirm that the OECS political arrangement is consistent with the Round 1 and 2 
political arrangements. Second, as with Round 1 and 2 of the British consents processes, 
the institutions that could exert influence over the consent process in the OECS, are 
formally established. Finally, consistent with Round 1 and 2 of the British consents 
process, the nature of the regulatory dimension is also representative of hard law 
approaches to governance. In other words, the OECS regulatory regime is also 
representative of hierarchical governance on the horizontal axis of Howlett et al.‘s 
regulatory dimension. Taken together, the similarities in each mode of governance 
provide a rational basis for transposing legal approaches and solutions in the UK to the 
development of a governance regime for regulating renewable ocean resources in the 
OECS. 
 The OECS region has had the principle of sustainable development as its defining 
developmental objective for quite some time. Chapter 6 reasoned, that if sustainable 
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development is the defining objective for all OECS Member States, the political, 
institutional and regulatory efforts to tap into the offshore energy potential cannot begin 
as it did in the UK. Chapter 5 demonstrates the British experience, to the effect that the 
Round 1 and 2 political, institutional and regulatory efforts to regulate offshore wind 
produced unsustainable outcomes. It follows then, that because the governance 
arrangements in the OECS and the UK are similar, if the same arrangement is used for 
regulating renewable ocean resources in the OECS, there is a high probability that the 
regime would not make positive contributions towards sustainability. In other words, the 
OECS Member States must adopt a different governance approach to Round 1 and 2, if 
the intention is to develop renewable ocean resources in a manner that furthers 
sustainable development. In this regard, the major recommendation was that policy 
makers and regulators in the OECS must adopt lessons from the British Round 3 regime 
and process.  
 To recap, among other things, the transitions from Round 1 to Round 3 
demonstrate the fundamental point that hierarchical governance of offshore renewable 
resources does not seem to work. Similarly, the dolphinarium case study demonstrated 
the unsatisfactory effects of hierarchical arrangements in the OECS region. As with 
Round 1 and 2, where political power is concentrated in the hands of the state, the reality 
has been that industry developers are easily positioned to influence the exercise of that 
power to the detriment of the environment and the people who rely upon it. Chapter 2 
mentioned the argument by New Governance scholars that the social trait of non-state 
actors would influence more effective rules, approaches and solutions to the allocation of 
societal resources. One inescapable interpretation is that hierarchical control means that 
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those normally affected by government decisions seldom have the capacity or opportunity 
to exert the requisite influence over the decision-making process. Therefore, in line with 
Gibson et al.‘s core requirements for sustainability, hierarchical arrangements tend to 
restrict progress on the principle of socio-ecological civility and democratic governance. 
Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, hierarchical control represented 
development for the people and not development by the people - a restriction that New 
Governance scholars would also frown upon. Herein lies the main problem with the 
Round 1 and 2 governance arrangements and by extension the current framework in the 
OECS. Therefore, the first governance lesson suggested for regulators and policy makers 
in the OECS is that hierarchical governance of offshore renewable resources must be 
eschewed.   
 However, the transition between the Round 2 and 3 regimes demonstrates a 
conceptual shift away from governance arrangements that conform to the tradition of 
hierarchical control. This concept is a favourable approach that policy-makers should 
adopt in the development of a governance regime for regulating offshore renewable 
resources in the OECS region. First, unlike the Round 2 transition, the Round 3 model of 
governance was established through the creation of specific legislation. At present, the 
Planning Act 2008 and MCAA represent the new legal frameworks within which 
decisions will be made. Therefore, as it pertains to the regulatory dimension, the tradition 
of top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations continued. What changed 
however, was the fragmented approach to marine management. For instance, the MCAA 
sought to modernize, integrate and simplify the consent process by consolidating into a 
single licensing decision consideration of environmental, human health and navigational 
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factors. This licence is to be granted by an independent organization, the MMO, created 
for this purpose. The Act also transfers several functions relating to marine management 
(sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable energy, etc.) to the MMO. It should, 
however, be emphasized that the Round 3 model of governance under the MCCA 
regulates all renewable energy activity in the marine environment and not just offshore 
wind. Therefore, there are wider governance lessons that policy-makers in the OECS may 
adopt given that the regime transcends all forms of offshore renewable resources. In 
essence, the transfer of these functions (sea fisheries, nature conservation, renewable 
energy, etc.) drew together into a single licensing decision consideration of the interests 
of other users of the sea. The second governance lesson recommended for the OECS 
region is that traditional top-down hierarchical control through laws and regulations is not 
a faulting initiative in and of itself so long as it adopts an integrated approach to marine 
management. This governance lesson draws from the fact that conceptually, sustainability 
is a challenge to ‗business as usual‘ practices and therefore, the use of existing regimes 
would be ill suited for making positive contributions towards sustainable development in 
the OECS.  
 In relation to the political dimension, the problem in the Round 1 and Round 2 
British regime is that power was concentrated in the hands of the State, which was under 
industry influence. To alleviate this problem, the British government through the 
Planning Act and the MCAA, removed from the State the legal power to make decisions 
on consents applications, and vested it in central corporate bodies that were created to be 
independent of the government. Conceptually, the purposeful vesting of power in 
independent establishments serves to insulate the new decision-makers from the pressures 
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of industry. This weakens industry‘s influence over the process. Thus, for an effective 
governance arrangement in the OECS, the third governance lesson is that it would be 
prudent to mimic the Round 3 arrangement by placing power to make legally binding 
decisions in a body corporate independent of the Government. Note however, that a 
proper consideration of the realities of this arrangement may indicate that the corporate 
bodies are not as independent as the analysis concludes, and so, there is still some room 
to continue business as usual practices. On the other hand, it is submitted here that the 
structure of the MCAA, which centralizes, essentially, the overall use of the marine area 
under the MMO gives the organization tremendous power. The MMO may enter into 
agreement with other agencies, including private agencies, to have them carry out its 
mandates as set out in the Marine Policy Statements and Marine Plan. For the OECS 
region, this power carries both a financial and technical benefit. For instance, the MMO 
may to conclude agreements with relevant bodies that have been exercising existing 
power concerning the various sectors brought under the Act, to authorize them to do so 
under its delegation. Delegation therefore has the benefit of drawing on the knowledge 
capital of these departments that have a long history in relation to the management of 
their respective sectors. A conclusion that accounts for the practical realities in issue 
would state that though the political arrangement under the MCAA is not foolproof, as a 
compromise, the MMO‘s power is very huge but also potentially unwieldy. 
 Apart from shifting the governance arrangement from development for the people 
to development by the people, what makes the Round 3 model effective, and thus more 
attractive for the OECS region, is the introduction of duties to consult under the 
legislations. As with the dolphinarium case study, under the Round 1 and 2 British 
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regimes, the institutions that had the capacity to influence the consent process were 
formally established and, mostly, they are industry professional institutions. The intent 
behind creating onerous and structured consultation duties under the legislations is to 
diversify the institutions that have the capacity to influence outcomes by empowering a 
range of non-state actors to have some leverage under the exercise of institutional 
jurisdiction. Further, in relation to the fact that there is still some room in the UK model 
to continue ‗business as usual‘ political practices, the consultation duties empower non-
state actors to act as a potential check and balance on the exercise of power by the MMO. 
The adoption of lessons from the Round 3 governance arrangement in the OECS would 
ensure that marine renewable resources in the region are regulated in a manner that 
makes positive contributions towards sustainability. In sum, for an effective governance 
arrangement in this sector in the OECS, regulators should vest political power in an 
independent body corporate and adopt integrated regulatory instruments that prescribe 
structured consultation duties. 
 Additionally, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) experience in 
Round 2 was a lesson in everything not to do when carrying out SEAs and, by extension, 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). Generally, the SEA conducted was considered 
to be a rushed and cosmetic exercise. The British Government completed the entire 
process in a space of five short months, and this, in the interests of industry developers 
and business efficacy. This alienated many stakeholders and the public who were denied 
an early and effective opportunity within appropriate time frames to express their 
opinions. The process thus failed to fulfill one of its fundamental purposes, which was to 
empower actors other than the State. By their very nature, many non-state actors have 
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limited capacity to understand and respond to issues on matters of this nature raised 
during consultation, that require some functional understanding of what is at stake. The 
allotted minimum of four weeks for consultation did little to empower them. Instead, it 
further weakened their influence over the consents process. The rushed SEA process also 
had the undesirable result of producing an incomprehensive Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) that failed to consider a number of core issues including cumulative 
impacts. The SEA experience also demonstrates the danger in concentrating power to 
make legally binding decisions on consent applications in the hands of the State. Under 
the Round 2 regime, the process advanced State goals and targets, and provided an 
environment of business efficacy for the industry developers that strongly influenced its 
course. By way of a brief cross-reference to the EIA experience regarding the 
dolphinarium in Anguilla, it must be noted that in the first relocation process, that process 
was also circumvented to meet the developer‘s deadlines to evacuate the facility at 
Barnes Bay. So, the lesson from the UK SEA experience is that environmental impact 
studies should be commissioned on terms, conditions and processes that conform to some 
international standard rather than the demands of the relevant and interested industry.  
 
7.2 General Conclusions on Conditions for Effective Ocean Governance 
 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to propose a governance framework for the 
regulation of renewable marine resources in the OECS. Beyond this, it has a wider 
purpose to look at general conditions or effective ocean governance via the context of 
renewable energy development. In this regard, what this thesis demonstrates is that strict 
hierarchical governance of the marine environment is not a desirable condition for 
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effective ocean governance. This point accords with the modern concept of ‗ocean 
governance‘ outlined in Chapter 2 of the study. Chapter 2 noted that academics proffer 
the view that ‗ocean governance‘ goes beyond traditional command and control 
approaches to regulating and influencing human behaviour in relation to the ocean. The 
other dimension or characteristic of the concept advanced by Rothwell & VanderZwaag 
embrace a more interactive decision making process which not only incorporates 
―…government agencies and departments but a broader range of participants including 
the private sector, scientists, community groups, non-governmental organizations, 
academics, First Nations and others.‖
836
  
 It is well accepted that ‗ocean governance‘ is primarily concerned with the 
management of stakeholder activities in coastal and marine areas.
837
 However, the 
concept of ‗ocean governance‘ necessarily goes beyond the ambit of simply mitigating 
conflict of use inevitabilities in the marine environment. In fact, the justification for the 
management of stakeholder activities in ocean spaces is mainly two-fold: to maximize the 
benefits that may be derived from the resource and non-resource use of the ocean, while 
ensuring the ocean‘s long-term viability by conserving and protecting ocean habitat and 
marine life. To balance these objectives, the evolving trend in ocean governance favours 
interactive decision making over traditional regulation. A core condition of effective 
ocean governance therefore, is a strong presence of human perceptions on the value of 
ocean uses. In sum, through the study of marine renewable resources development, this 
thesis generally demonstrates that strict hierarchical governance of the marine 
environment is not a desirable condition for effective ocean governance. 
                                                        
836 VanderZwaag, ―Towards Principled Ocean Governance‖, supra note 72. 
837 Sutherland, ―Issues in Governance of Marine Spaces,‖ supra note 67 at 7. 
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 This thesis has proposed that the OECS region adopt governance lessons from the 
UK Round 3 Model of governance. In this regard, it is necessary to note that this model 
of governance might need modification or improvement as experience grows and as 
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